Wednesday, June 29, 2011
CPSIA - Do Accidents Happen?
Once upon a time acts of fate were no one’s fault and we each bore the risk individually. Today, things seem different – when bad things happen, the search begins for someone to blame. The media and politicians feed this trend in hysterical tones (they profit by doing so). Individual responsibility is passé. In the case of children’s products today, blame is often laid at the feet of the product or its manufacturer by the CPSC. In some cases, the fault is clear (the hazard is “substantial”); in other cases, it’s not nearly as clear. In this article, I am only interested in those more ambiguous cases where there is an element of fate or other factors outside the control of the manufacturer. Should we be satisfied with how the CPSC draws the line?
CPSC as Allocator
The CPSC’s assignment of responsibility for injuries (in the form of recalls) is an inherently “legal” process. Our laws allocate risk and responsibility in society in the form of rights. About 75 years ago, legal theorists developed a field of inquiry known as “law and economics” which held that legal systems incorporate economic principles which ensure efficient allocation of resources and promote economic activity. “Rights” are essentially factors of production in economic terms. Ronald Coase of the University of Chicago Law School won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991 for his seminal work on law and economics over the preceding 50+ years. Notably, Obama regulations “czar” Cass Sunstein is an ex-University of Chicago Law School law professor, as is President Obama himself. Sunstein is closely associated with the study of law and economics.
The issues confronting the CPSC over injuries to children are not emotional in nature at all. They are actually purely economic issues because the CPSC is a market regulator. It is an objective fact that injuries to children or other consumers are a cost we bear in exchange for the benefits of economic activity (availability of innovative manufactured products, the provision of jobs, etc.). Naturally, as a community we want to bear as few such costs as is efficient, again to promote growth, hence a societal interest in reducing injuries. The interest in reducing injuries is economic, however; we are not indifferent to cost and judge them in light of corresponding benefits. For instance, this explains why you do not wear a crash helmet on the way to work despite your awareness that fatal auto accidents happen every day. The costs outweigh the benefits.
As a regulator, the agency brokers costs among a large group of parties. Consumer costs related to injury (including emotional loss and lost income, among other things) are weighed against manufacturer and market costs (recall costs, damage to brands, decreased growth, lost jobs, etc.). Whether the CPSC does the math properly or not, their decisions allocate resources by directing that one party incur costs to protect other parties from incurring costs. These decisions are purely economic even if stated in emotional terms. It is therefore clear that CPSC regulators have the capacity to promote economic growth or stifle it.
Is the Goal “No Injuries” Ever?
The CPSC has a legal responsibility to differentiate between a product hazard that causes accidents and accidents caused by the hand of fate. Congress limited the authority of the agency to regulate only those product hazards deemed “substantial” (a term of art under the CPSA and FHSA). As stated here many times previously, I believe the CPSC under current leadership regularly exceeds its legislative authority in this regard. The CPSC acts as though its role is to move society toward a Utopian ideal in which children are never injured or die prematurely. While I certainly don’t endorse injuries to children, the Utopian ideal of injury-free childhoods is illusory. In fact, an injury-free childhood could only be achieved at a very high cost. If the CPSC attaches an almost infinite value to preventing injuries, their allocation decisions will always constitute a transfer (a tax) and cause economic inefficiency (depress economic activity).
This over-appraisal of the cost and consequence of childhood injury is illustrated by recent remarks of Chairman Inez Tenenbaum about a recall of one million pool drain covers. Ms. Tenenbaum appears to justify the recall on the possibility of injury despite media reports confirming that no deaths had occurred since 2009:
"I want to make it clear that this recall announcement does not mean that one million drain covers will need to be replaced or repaired. The recalled covers were marked with the wrong flow rating . . . . Now for those public pools and spas that need their covers replaced or fixed, I have an obligation to advise that those facilities be closed at this time. They should reopen as soon as the work is completed that addresses the recall and brings the facility into compliance with the law. I know this is a very difficult message for many communities to hear so close to Memorial Day weekend, but we cannot risk a child becoming entrapped in a recalled drain cover." [Emphasis added]
This unstated policy attaching infinite value to childhood injury is much more than a strict liability standard because the CPSC only acts after an assessment of fault (rather than simply assigning responsibility). Isn’t the agency saying that the actions or inactions of manufacturers cause accidents?
Recent Recalls Allocate Uncontrollable Costs to Manufacturers
Consider some recent recalls for perspective:
a. Big Lots recalls bunk beds recalled after a three-year-old child died when caught under a futon.
b. Maclaren recalls one million strollers sold over 11 years because of more than a dozen fingertip amputations caused by a hinge.
c. Mattel recalls more than 7,000,000 children’s trikes sold over 14 years because of genital injuries to ten young girls jumping on the trike.
While it may be hard to look past these sometimes grisly childhood injuries, each of these cases calls into question whether the injuries were really the fault of the manufacturer. It’s not worth defending the product designs – let’s concede that in retrospect the products could have been better designed. Parental supervision appears to be an issue in each case. Manufacturers are typically unwilling to resist CPSC recalls by blaming consumers for injuries incurred using its products. That route is very risky and may in fact be more costly than going along with the CPSC’s dictates. As a result, the record in these cases is usually very one-sided – the CPSC has the first and last word on the subject, often on TV. Why would anyone stand up for these companies in public? There’s no incentive to do so; after all, the costs are paid by only one party, and that party isn’t talking.
There is a fundamental error in routinely blaming manufacturers for accidents or fate. It is widely accepted that laws operate efficiently when they allocate responsibility for risk to the party in the best position to address the risk. Manufacturers can efficiently bear many such costs – but not all. For instance, product safety is best assigned to manufacturers rather than consumers. This is fairly obvious – manufacturers know their own products better than consumers do and are best able to take steps to keep products safe at the lowest possible cost (most efficient). This is the reason why the common law tort system assigns product liability costs to manufacturers.
So who is in the best position to control costs associated with accidents or fate? Risks associated with acts of fate are difficult to control. In fact, many foreseeable risks leading to childhood injuries are completely outside the control of manufacturers:
1. Fate
2. Failures of adult supervision
3. Product abuse or misuse
4. Mental deficiencies or mental illness (e.g., pica)
5. Risks well-known to the user (e.g., knives are sharp).
I would advance that good adult supervision is the lowest cost way to prevent accidents with children’s products. There are significant limitations to what a manufacturer can achieve on behalf of consumers who don’t adequately supervise their children. Of course, drawing the line is a big issue here. But can’t an argument be made that adult supervision of the toddlers using the Mattel trike could have prevented foreseeable injuries from jumping on the trike? That a parent must carefully supervise the location of a child’s hands before closing a stroller? This is a simple point – manufacturers cannot control these factors from their offices or warehouses. The cost for a manufacturer to do so would be excessive.
Some people might argue that assigning blame for matters of fate to manufacturers of consumer products is a neat way to efficiently spread cost among the community. Why not make the manufacturer pay the uncontrollable cost of fate relating to their products, and let them pass the costs along to consumers in the form of higher prices? Manufacturers can be converted into involuntary insurers by public policy, risk intermediaries for events of misfortune. The appeal is irresistible; after all, it doesn’t cost tax dollars to pay for these losses if we force responsibility on manufacturers. Of course, if you are a careful consumer, you might resent paying more to subsidize free-riding consumers who don't take appropriate precautions. But money aside, doesn’t it reflect a hardening of our society if if we ignore heart tugs when kids are injured? Is this heartless . . . or sensible? Is the CPSC doing the American public a favor by increasingly pushing responsibility for uncontrollable risks to manufacturers?
The Important Role of Economic Efficiency in Laws Governing Children’s Products
I believe bad things do sometimes happen to good people. What is the economic effect of assigning these costs to manufacturers by default? Unfortunately, this invariable result is not economically efficient and will have the effect of a tax on the children’s market. In other words, the economic incentive to participate in markets will shrivel as manufacturer returns on investment decline because of legal risks (costs) they cannot control. This is basic stuff, folks – the reduced economic incentive causes market participants to withdraw, just as high taxes cause people to stop taking risks (trading).
Ronald Coase addressed this subject in two articles that led to his Nobel Prize. In a 1937 paper on the nature of the firm, Coase articulated what became known as the Coase Theorem which holds that if trade in an externality is possible (in this case, childhood injuries) and there are no transaction costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. Translated into English and applied to the facts here, Coase theorized that it would not matter which party was responsible to pay the costs of an injury (victim or tortfeasor) if there was no cost to bargaining between the parties. This of course is not the case in the real world. Coase returned to the subject in a 1960 article entitled “The Problem of Social Cost” and explored the role of regulations in achieving economic efficiency when economic activity creates social costs. This eminently readable article is a foundation stone of modern legal theory.
Considering the social costs of human activity (such as pollution or injuries from the use of children’s products), Coase concluded that efficient allocation of resources would be achieved regardless of allocation of rights relating to social costs (responsibility to pay those costs) provided that trading can be conducted without transaction costs. In other words, in an efficient market, economic factors (resources) will always be put to their highest and best use through allocation of resources and bargaining. Through bargaining in an efficient market, the party with the most productive use of economic factors will ultimately possess the resources, thus ensuring compensation for social costs regardless of who has been assigned legal rights.
Coase cites numerous examples (including torts) in making this point. Coase notes the symmetry of these disputes in his analysis. When cattle overrun crops causing economic losses, there would be no damage without the cattle, and likewise no damage without the crops! Causation is not black-and-white to an economist interested in efficient outcomes. As he notes, a smoothly operating pricing system ensures that “the fall in the value of production due to the harmful effects would be a cost for both parties.”
Nevertheless, Coase recognized that there ARE transaction costs in the real world (e.g., legal expenses, bargaining holdouts, etc.). These costs of altering and recombining rights allocated by the legal system can interfere with the ability to bargain and thus prevent the efficient allocation of resources in the market. He argued therefore that regulations are justified to the extent they allocate rights to the most efficient risk-bearer. Regulations can supersede market transactions by imposing the most efficient outcome. This is presumably the underpinning of President Obama’s call for more federal regulation. According to him, this will be good for us. Coase might demur, noting that it all depends on the facts as we shall see below.
Coase was realistic in his assessment of the inherent dangers of regulation: “But the governmental machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible administration subject to political pressures and operating without any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the efficiency with which the economic system operates. Furthermore, such general regulations which must apply to a wide variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate. . . . It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages that come from government regulation.” Coase’s solution: perform a cost-benefit analysis to make sure that regulations increase economic output (the all-in costs must be less than the all-in benefits when reduced to dollars).
We encounter situations regularly in which the party causing a legal nuisance does not bear the consequential costs. For instance, a home remodeler does not have to pay compensation to neighbors for noise and debris that may adversely affect them. He may feel a social obligation to give them freshly-baked cookies but is under no legal obligation to do so. This is one of many legalized nuisances. Why is this the legal rule? The allocation of rights takes into account that as a society, we want to encourage investment and capital improvements. The small cost of dealing with these inconveniences is considered a cost we all should bear in exchange for the benefits received from the economic activity. This rule does not apply to exceptional cases of nuisance where the costs outweigh the benefits. Not every instance of damage is remediable under our legal system for good reason.
Coase cites a fascinating real world example of this rule carried to a surprising extreme: under traditional English law, railroads are protected from liability for fires caused by sparks from their engines. Coase devotes considerable ink to prove that this legal rule creates an efficient allocation of resources (a positive effect for society) notwithstanding that there are “winners” and “losers”. This result would be very difficult to achieve through bargaining. Clearly a railroad would have a very difficult time working out a deal with every landowner along its lines as a precondition to laying down track.
Importantly, Coase points out that the opposite rule (where the railroad must pay for the fires its engines cause) does much more than just transfer liability. It also shifts incentives to everyone’s detriment. A farmer along the track now can gamble with the railroad’s money – he can get a market price from market buyers if he can harvest his crops or from the railroad if there is a fire. The farmer’s return is thus guaranteed, the incentive to take care is removed, and he will be rewarded for planting crops likely to be burned. This alternative rule’s transfer of costs to the railroad will simultaneously reduce the potential reward for constructing tracks and likely result in fewer train lines, reducing the broadly-distributed economic benefits that come with the expansion of the rail system. In other words, shifting liability in this case makes everyone along the train line poorer.
Coase notes that “nuisances” are not always against our interest: “[Pigou] is wrong when he describes these actions as ‘anti-social’. They may or may not be. It is necessary to weigh the harm against the good that will result. NOTHING COULD BE MORE ‘ANTI-SOCIAL’ THAN TO OPPOSE ANY ACTION WHICH CAUSES ANY HARM TO ANYONE.” [Emphasis added] CPSC, are you listening?
Placing the cost for nuisances on the producers’ shoulders may be well-intentioned but it is not necessarily the right result because it does not provide any incentive to consumers to take steps to prevent injury. “A tax system which was confined to a tax on the producer for damage caused would tend to lead to unduly high costs being incurred for the prevention of damage.” The CPSC’s tendency to blame products via recalls and bans is the equivalent of a tax in this case. The “unduly high costs” leads to a reduction or suspension of economic activity. We can observe this in the children’s market over the past three years – the agency and Congress have both received considerable testimony on this topic (and seemingly ignored it). Coase won the Nobel Prize for pointing out that regulators often neglect to look at the full economic picture and thus fail to achieve optimal social results.
It goes without saying that the regulators may nevertheless achieve optimal newspaper headlines.
Conclusion
Why is it inefficient to invariably push costs to manufacturers for injuries associated with children’s products? As Prof. Coase notes, in a raucous marketplace, transaction costs can distort the allocation of resources. In this case, the prospect of liability and uncontrollable losses are a high transaction cost that affects the efficient allocation of resources by trade. Coase posits that a cost-benefit analysis must be performed to make sure that efficiency is achieved. The rule for such analyses is quite clear – the all-in cost of the regulation must be less than the all-in economic benefits achieved.
The best way to understand the formula in this case is to look at all marginal children’s recalls as a class. Let’s agree that there actually are some “substantial” product hazards out there and exclude them from our analysis. [Manufacturers are in the best position to evaluate and prevent "substantial" hazards on behalf of consumers.] We must also assess all the money spent as a result of CPSC action as a group. It does not matter who spends the money – we want to tote up all the costs and lay them off against all the benefits. The benefits are easy to calculate – there is an economic value to a life and also to injuries. This type of analysis is not only common, it is a requirement of federal law (as a result of Coase’s work outlined above). The government has tables of these values. Likewise, the costs are pretty easy to tote up: out of pocket costs for the recall, replacement of inventory, damage to reputation and brand, legal and regulatory costs, lost jobs, reduced investment, etc.
In the case of accidents or other uncontrollable factors leading to injury, the CPSC’s calculus is defective. It is quite telling that the regulators are not interested in my point that no victims have been identified. Lead-in-substrate victims – NONE. Phthalates victims – NONE. The ledger on the benefits side is undocumented, vague and untested, but the regulators' indifference suggests that they place an almost infinite value on injury or even the possibility of injury. On the cost side, the regulator also seems to largely ignore the impact on markets. As noted by Coase, the regulators are not subject to competitive pressures so they can easily overlook these costs. The math does not add up, and as a result, their decisions inevitably will choke the market. The CPSC acts as though not subject to the laws of economics.
The legislative fix for this misguided regulatory effort is clear – mandate economic analyses as a justification for any CPSC regulation. It is also necessary to restore (actually, to mandate the use of) risk assessment by the CPSC. Risk is all about cost allocation and cost management. By removing the ability to assess risk, Congress essentially removed the wiring necessary for the CPSC to make an intelligent assessment of the economics of their decisions. While the CPSIA was clearly written and passed into law in anger, enough time has passed to expect cooler heads to prevail. Congress, it’s time to act!
Tuesday, March 22, 2011
CPSIA - In My Fantasies, the CPSC is Just Like Homeland Security
"[Docket No. DHS–2011–0015]
Reducing Regulatory Burden; Retrospective Review Under Executive
Order 13563
AGENCY: Office of the General Counsel, DHS.
ACTION: Notice and request for comments.
SUMMARY: Pursuant to Executive Order 13563, ‘‘Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,’’ issued by the President on January 18, 2011, the Department of Homeland Security (Department or DHS) must develop a preliminary plan to facilitate the review of existing DHS significant regulations through the use of retrospective analyses. The preliminary plan will include criteria for identifying existing DHS significant rules that might be modified, streamlined, expanded, or repealed, so as to make DHS’s regulatory program more effective or less burdensome in achieving its regulatory objectives. The Department is soliciting views from the public on how best to develop its preliminary plan. The Department is also seeking views from the public on specific existing significant DHS rules that the Department should consider as candidates for modification, streamlining, expansion, or repeal. These efforts will help DHS ensure that its regulations contain necessary, properly tailored, and up-to-date requirements that effectively achieve regulatory objectives without imposing unwarranted costs." [Emphasis added]
Imagine that, an agency that wants to streamline and to avoid imposing unwarranted costs!
Of course, Homeland Security is not facing anything as dreaded as LEAD - have I mentioned that there is NO safe level of lead? - and can probably cut a few corners without any untoward effects. Homeland Security doesn't seem too busy, just checking a few boarding passes, looking serious and so on. I guess when you have an unimportant, almost trivial responsibility in the government, you can afford to review your rules for fat, waste and stupidity. But when CHILDREN'S SAFETY is concerned, and bicycle licking is possibly at stake, well then, you can't take ANY chances.
Damn the cost, man, we have to be SAFE!!!
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
CPSIA - Do We Need More Government? [No!]
Hey, have any of you noticed that since I began a daily reminder of our abandonment by this Democrat-led government (reminders began on August 22nd when 738 days had passed without help), no Democrat has done a single thing to help us? Have you also noticed that as they weren't rising up to help us, the Dems were actually engaged in making things WORSE? Definition of Children's Products, the so-called "15 Month Rule", making carpets subject to testing, further implementation of a database certain to make our business environment FAR more hostile.
Do we need a lot more of this?
Mr. Obama says we do: "The basic idea is that if we put our blind faith in the market and we let corporations do whatever they want and we leave everybody else to fend for themselves, then America somehow automatically is going to grow and prosper." The implication is clear - more government is the solution, we can't trust markets. Corporations need overseers, heavy regulation.
This quote is from a remarkable WSJ article that appeared last week by Daniel Henninger entitled "Capitalism Saved the Miners". Beleaguered victims of the awful CPSIA should read this article. Let me sum it up with his concluding remarks:
"The U.S. has a government led by a mindset obsessed with 250K-a-year 'millionaires' and given to mocking 'our blind faith in the market.' In a fast-moving world filled with nations intent on catching up with or passing us, this policy path is a waste of time. The miners' rescue is a thrilling moment for Chile, an imprimatur on its rising status. But I'm thinking of that 74-person outfit in Berlin, Pa., whose high-tech drill bit opened the earth to free them. You know there are tens of thousands of stories like this in the U.S., as big as Google and small as Center Rock. I'm glad one of them helped save the Chileans. What's needed now is a new American economic model that lets our innovators rescue the rest of us." [Emphasis added]
I don't know about you, but I think we operated our company very well before Mother Government invited herself into our affairs. We knew the difference between right and wrong, and were pretty good at allocating our capital to its highest and best use. Now we must play "Mother May I" with the self-appointed experts who arrived to protect against "dangers" they can't accurately describe or measure. The vacuuming up of our money, our resources, our mind share, our energy, destroys our ability and will to compete.
Fine, ignore the reality. Wait for the bodies. Assert your superiority and your authority. But the facts are the facts. The case against the CPSIA is crystal clear and the only ones who don't "get it" are the Democrats. After two years of banging my head against the wall, I can only conclude that they don't WANT to get it.
It's no mystery - I know why the Dems refuse to listen. They are rather transparent about it. When I spoke to Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL9) at a candidate forum eight days ago, I asked her why she called me a "cynical special interest" to the WSJ. She asked me who I was, and then told me she didn't know me. That fact didn't stop her from trashing me, a private citizen, to a nationally-prominent newspaper. Pointing the finger at me serves her interest in getting reelected - she's saving the populace . . . again. Who is in a position to argue with her? When I protested that our products had been safe for 26 years, she replied that she "didn't understand what the problem is" and turned to a voter standing nearby to assert that she just wants to protect children against lead. The higher moral ground . . . for people who don't know what they're talking about. Unfortunately, scare tactics sell very well.
I believe the Mob also sells protection. Do you want to buy some protection from them?
The Chilean miners were saved by companies that invested their money to make the world a better place incentivized by the opportunity to make a profit. Our industry, the one that serves children as our reason-to-be, is being depleted by a heavy tax - the intrusion of a heavy-handed government that treats us as "guilty-until-proven-innocent". The government REFUSES to listen to us.
Those of you with children will pay the consequences.
Thank you, Mother Government. The market saved the miners, but you will happliy kill us.
Vote on November 2nd for a fresh start.
Sunday, October 10, 2010
CPSIA - What Are We Trying Achieve?
Sean Oberle published a lengthy contemplation of the issue raised in my last post on the relationship between compliance and safety as objectives for regulators and for industry. Mr. Oberle's essay speaks for itself, so I will not attempt to summarize it. He concludes with the following message: "Therein lies the frustrating and frightening aspect of product safety. Those of you tasked with ensuring product safety – industry rep, consumerist, and regulator alike – are trying to quantify ambiguity amid a chaos of demands … all of them in flux … I don't envy you."
Sean, boy are you right!
I think it's worth discussing a few issues on compliance versus safety since Mr. Oberle devoted so much ink (or electrons) to the topic.
1. The law defines what the CPSC can and cannot do. It's a shame no one told them . . . .
First and foremost, the CPSC exists because of the CPSA and its activities are governed by the CPSA. Recall authority is governed by Section 15 which limits the agency's recall authority to "substantial product hazards", namely a product that ". . . creates a substantial risk of injury to the public". [Section 12 gives the agency additional powers to seek a court order for "imminent hazards".] In other words, the CPSC does not have the legislative authority to tilt at windmills - it cannot demand recalls for anything unless it presents a "substantial risk of injury to the public".
Consider recalling 12 million glasses that the CPSC acknowledges in writing are SAFE. Substantial risk of injury?
Consider recalling more than seven million trikes sold over 14 years that caused six children to cut themselves. Children who were under three years of age and should have been under the care of attentive adults. Substantial risk of injury?
Consider recalling more than 400,000 Sarge cars because the little yellow dot on the wheel hubcap violated the lead-in-paint ban, and those dots were produced from two cans of paint. Substantial risk of injury?
One must distinguish between legerdemain and reality, between policy and what the law intended. It is a little focused-upon responsibility of the agency to exercise this judgment. Is it even possible for everything that happens to be a "substantial" risk? We know of cases where a single broken toy without an injury provoked an official investigation at the agency. Fair? Is this an activity that the CPSA authorizes? It is . . . if you are running the agency and you say it is. Arguably, the recall of the 480,000 Mattel Wheelies on September 30 was just such a case. Consumers apparently reported two broken cars with wheels that fell off, and no injuries were reported or implied. Substantial risk of injury? I question that.
2. The notion that we need all this supervision flies in the face of injury statistics. But it sure makes the CPSC look irreplaceable, doesn't it?
I have already published and discussed ad nauseum the historical injury statistics from lead based on CPSC recall notices - ONE DEATH and THREE UNVERIFIED INJURIES over 11 years (1999-2010). If we were facing such a dire public health crisis, why weren't kids dropping like flies from lead poisoning over such a long time period of "lax regulation"? If the harm was so widespread and so devastating, why aren't any of these actual victims known? Names, addresses, photos, case histories?
A friend replied to me recently reasoning that there is no safe level of lead. Okay, I concede that lead can be dangerous but it is absolutely true that lead in present throughout our environment and in the air, food and water that we consume every minute of every day. So since we take in lead from several sources all the time, we know we are building up lead and this leads to several questions. If lead is so harmful at all levels, why aren't we ALL showing the effect of our cumulative build-up of lead? How can you demonstrate that children's products contribute meaningfully to the asserted "problem"? How can you prove that "fixing" children's products will meaningfully change lead blood levels? And if you could prove those things (which cannot be done), how can you measure the return on investment of our multi-billion dollar annual investment? Remember, we can only spend those dollars one time - so is flushing them down the toilet on test reports REALLY our best use of scarce and irreplaceable dollars? How would you measure that?
But the more that the CPSC enforces the law against "bad" corporations, the more they scam the public into thinking they needed the help all along. They talk about recall statistics but never put them in the context of injury statistics. The proponents never compare lead injury statistics to other injury statistics like swimming pools.
[Is a child injured by lead "worse" that a child killed in a pool? It better be - because we are spending billions to prophylactically eliminate the possibility of purported lead injuries while leaving swimming pools open to continue a continuing skein of killings of more than one child each day. That's okay according to our Democrat-run Congress. Tell that to the family of drowning victim - they can take comfort in knowing that their child didn't have lead poisoning thanks to the relentless and remorseless enforcement of the CPSIA . . . .]
So as the regulators abuse and confuse the definition of hazard, they create an atmosphere of dependence. Oh thank you Mother Government for saving me! What would I do without you?!
3. Mr. Oberle reminds us that "Lack of incidents may not mean a product is safe." And just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they AREN'T out to get you.
Mr. Oberle does not take an offensive stance on this topic, btw. He is right, you can sometimes catch something dangerous before it creates harm. Presumably a quicker recognition of the hazard in Magnetix might have prevented injuries. Responsible companies need to always keep a lookout for insights that reveal latent hazards.
On the other hand, injury statistics are a useful tool. If, as is the case for lead, the assertion is that the hazard is widespread and present over a lengthy period of time, injury statistics become QUITE relevant. So, if lead was such a terrible problem in children's products (putting lead-in-paint aside, long ago banned), injury statistics over many years would reveal a latent problem. Think of the breadth of the definition of "Children's Products" and think of the years of recall data available for study. We are looking at TRILLIONS of interactions with children every year in the United States alone. Where are all the lead victims? We cannot say that we don't know the scale of this problem. We have apparently been running an "experiment" on the U.S. public for decades in the period the zealots label as "lax regulations" or "lax enforcement". If lead-in-substrate were so dangerous, wouldn't you expect to see SOME evidence of it?
If we must imagine the scale of the danger, can we spend imaginary dollars to deal with it?
4. The compliance hawks want to frame this as a financial question - how much is your safety worth? I think that's the wrong question - I think the question is "how long do you want to have a job?"
I have already reported that our compliance group is currently up to six people from a historical one or two, and of course, our products are no safer today than in the past. They were always safe and still are, but it costs us a lot more to operate. That's not good for you or for me.
So how do we pay for all this new bureaucracy? We have not raised prices, that's impossible these days. We are lucky to have customers and cannot spit in their faces with a price increase. Think of your business - it won't fly.
We also need to hit profitability targets because we need to remain financable. We do not get money from "money fairies" - we have to deal with a bank, just like you. Our bank prefers to see that we make money. I know that doesn't seem very civic-minded but I can't fault them for their POV. In any event, I think it's elementary that a business needs to make a profit to have the model sustain itself. Therefore, we cannot commit ourselves to ever-eroding profitability. When our costs rise, we cut elsewhere . . . just like you do.
Needless to say, we have skinnied up a lot since 2007. We have a much-reduced headcount and operate far more efficiently. This is how everyone behaved during the financial crisis and the jobs have not returned, in part because the economy remains sluggish. With our rising overhead relating to pointless regulations, what can we do? We must recover the money from activities that are focused on raising revenues. In effect, we are discontinuing activities that create growth to fund activities that are pure costs.
What's the math behind this? Consider how we recover a dollar of bureaucratic cost from productive activities. If you are already operating efficiently and cannot wring out big productivity gains (as may be the case post-financial crisis cost reductions), then how do you pay for an additional dollar of overhead cost? When you eliminate a "productive" dollar of cost to pay for an unproductive dollar of cost (e.g., you trade a dollar of marketing promotion for a dollar of test costs), it's not an even trade. No, because your dollar of productive cost creates gross margin whereas your overhead produces no profit whatsoever. Your productive dollar of cost produces gross profit which defrays your operating costs and produces marginal net profit on top of that. Wiping out the dollar of productive cost also wipes out the contribution to operating costs, so effectively, only the associated marginal net profit can defray the unproductive cost. Since profit percentages are generally low for most of us, the ratio of productive cost dollars needed to be sacrificed to cover unproductive costs is probably on the order of 2:1 or 3:1. Hire another QC person and fire the equivalent of two people elsewhere. In our case, we do it by attrition. We just shrink away.
As if this weren't bad enough, it's also a recipe for disaster or business death in a worst case. The continued erosion of productive spending to finance unproductive spending has a dramatic impact on growth. Revenue flattens out or stays in a downward trend. It's no surprise - you are starving your company of investment dollars as you spend at constant levels. You have simply shifted your spending from productive uses favoring growth to unproductive uses that will not create growth. Presumably, those of you with children have discussed the merits of eating fruits and vegetables versus eating potato chips. It's no different for a business and how it consumes dollars. We will never grow up to be big and strong if Mother Government restricts our financial diet this way.
Sean's right. I don't envy you . . . or me. This makes me very pessimistic about the future.
I hope you are mad as hell and won't take it anymore. In 23 days, you will get to vote. DO IT!
Monday, May 10, 2010
CPSIA - Numbers Don't Lie (Update No. 1)
a. Did anyone have this data previously? I think the answer is NO. I have heard from inside the CPSC that this kind of data analysis is not being done. The data is nowhere to be found, except here. Recent testimony by consumer advocates and Congressional zealots is strangely bereft of details, just long on invective. Don't we deserve better?
The hysteria over lead-in-paint recalls, combined with other recalls that were unrelated created such a lynch mob atmosphere in Congress that the only data that registered was data that supported the mob's POV. The actual data is therefore something of a surprise.
Let's look at the four reported lead injuries for a moment. The one death from lead, the famous incident in Minnesota where Jarnell Brown swallowed a lead charm off a Reebok bracelet, is well-known.
Injury no. 1: L.M. Becker recall (vending machine jewelry, Sept. 10, 2003): "The firm received one report of a child who swallowed the necklace's pendant, which reportedly resulted in high blood lead levels."
Injury no. 2: Four company recall (vending machine jewelry, July 8, 2004): "CPSC has received one report of lead poisoning when a child swallowed a piece of toy jewelry containing lead that was previously recalled. No reports of injury or illness have been received for the recalled products announced today." THIS REFERS TO THE L.M. BECKER "INJURY" ABOVE.
Injury no. 3: Munrie Furniture, Inc. (cribs and matching furniture, December 23, 2008): "Munrie has received one report of a child ingesting the paint. The child was diagnosed with lead poisoning."
Injury no. 4: Allreds Design (bracelets and clips, February 17, 2010): "Allreds Design received one report of a 10-month-old child who was treated by a physician for elevated lead levels."
Do these three injuries (one injury is double-counted) have anything in common? I assert that causation is not proven in these cases. Yes, lead poisoning is alleged, however there is no evidence that the cause has been determined definitively. READ what the CPSC said - the connection to the defective children's product is loose or even conjectural ("reportedly resulted in high blood lead levels"). Remember car seats that gave kids lead poisoning? Toxic car seats were a hoax. The injury data is flimsy at best. And this is all the evidence there is of injury from lead in children's products in the last 11 years of recalls.
The Democrats and consumer groups would rather eat broken glass that admit that the lead poisoning scare is a hoax. They want to run our businesses - so there's no conceding that all this economic damage cannot be traced to anything other than ONE TRAGIC ACCIDENT IN AN ELEVEN YEAR PERIOD. Uno, that's it, in our country of 300 million where thousands of kids die every year for various reasons.
Well, at least we know our companies will die in a valiant cause, to reduce the ten-year death rate from lead in children's products from one to zero . . . .
b. Was the CPSC really broken? This is Mr. Waxman's assertion, as expressed in his opening remarks at the April 29 hearing. So it must be true, right?
I hope to provide more data on this topic soon. In the meantime, I will simply pass along the comments of a friend who is in the CPSC community, namely that Congress underfunded the CPSC for 20 years, leading to severely constrained budgets and hiring. Consider these quotes from a 2007 Businessweek article about the CPSC:
"Yet while the CPSC has never been more vital, through much of its 33-year history the agency has been chronically understaffed and underfunded. Overseeing 400 recalls a year, most at companies' requests, the CPSC's compliance team has less time to initiate its own investigations, which tend to reveal the most serious risks. . . . Growing workload and shrinking resources have left many disheartened. From a peak of nearly 1,000 in 1980, CPSC's head count has fallen to 400. . . . What can be done to help the agency? In a word, money. It's been 17 years since Congress thoroughly reviewed the CPSC's resources and needs, says Nord."
So, let's see, Congress has been tightfisted with budgets for this little agency for many years, starving it of needed resources and headcount, effectively shrinking it over a 17-year period to a withered state, and then after an outbreak of large-scale toy recalls (by and large injury-free), Congress blames the agency for inattention to its mission and severely rewrites the law to punish the marketplace and the agency itself.
After all, why blame the entity responsible for the problem in the first place, Congress? Much easier to blame the agency!
c. Wow, those were a LOT of recalls? Is that the tip of the iceberg? As far as I can tell, the answer is that most of the iceberg is a mirage. Experienced CPSC hands note that the recall notices are prepared by the press office at the CPSC and are meant to attract attention and headlines. Big numbers, if defensible, are best suited to demonstrate that the cop is on the beat. A few tricks of the trade is to add in as many sources of "recalled" items as possible. I believe that as many as 60% (that's no typo) of all recalled units NEVER WERE SOLD. I would simply observe that if they were never sold, they never had the potential to cause injury.
Second, the population of recalled items is always inflated out of an abundance of caution whenever there is ANY doubt as to the identity of dangerous products. In other words, if a company sold one bad lot but also sold nine good lots, all indistinguishable, the recall would be announced for all ten lots, even though there is NO dispute that nine of the lots are absolutely fine.
Without this insight, recall statistics might be alarming, at least in a sense. Actually, the recalls are something of a mirage, an illusion of legions of bad products that really don't exist or were never sold. How can we verify this? Among other things, injury statistics back up this assertion. If we had 300 million units of dangerous products in circulation, the injury statistics of 2381 injuries in 11 years seems pretty low to me. Assuming an average time in the marketplace of three years per recalled item, this implies an annual injury rate of 0.026% (from all causes, not simply lead). If the products are in the market for only one year on average, the annual injury rate is still only 0.077%. In other words, in a worst case scenario, you can safely use RECALLED children's products 99.92% of the time. And you would presumably be even safer with NON-RECALLED products.
Oooo, scary.
Think of it this way: There are about 3 billion toys sold in the U.S. annually, according to Alan Hassenfeld, former CEO of Hasbro. Over 11 years, that 33 billion toys. [Considering that "Children's Products" includes far more than just toys, the pool of 11 years of sales is probably north of 500 billion units.] Were you to assume that all 899 recalls in my data were toys, the pool of 308 million units recalled would represent 0.93% of all toys sold in that period. So, if 0.93% is safe 99.92% of the time, and the rest presumably safe at a higher rate (let's say 99.999%), then the blended safety of all toys is 99.99%. The result is probably higher than that.
Numbers, numbers, do they matter?
We are spending not less than $5.6 billion per annum to "fix" this 99.99%+ safe problem. In an effort to create a much "safer" environment for kids, the helpful folks at the CPSC have produced literally thousands of pages of documents, rules and instructions to govern our businesses down to the tiniest detail. Unfortunately . . . the assertion that anyone will be safer CANNOT be proven as a matter of mathematics.
A neurotic bill administered by people who no longer can assess what is and is not safe is a danger to our society. The data proves it. Who should be held accountable? Congress? The Dems? Inez Tenenbaum? Some or all of the above.
Monday, April 12, 2010
CPSIA - Broken Record . . . Does Anyone Care Anymore?
The back-up in work at the CPSC is part of the untold story of the CPSIA. Certainly the zealots do not want to expose the damage done by their favorite law to this proud agency. The fantasy goes like this: if the CPSC isn't acting, there isn't anything to act on. Ergo if recalls go down, we must be safer - because the all-knowing CPSC is everywhere, instantly processing data, and recalling everything that is "bad". If you believe that fairy tale, I have a bridge to sell you, or perhaps some lovely swamp land. This fantasy was on display in the recent hearing on the public database in which absurd promises were made about timely agency review of database postings. The agency's inability to keep up with the data flow, probably from day one, will turn the database into a national commercial slander bulletin board. Among other things, this is because there aren't and will never be enough hands on deck to manage the work flow with good quality control and concern for truth.
Some recent evidence of misallocated resources was provided by the General Accounting Office in their April 2010 report to Congressional Committees entitled "ALL-TERRAIN VEHICLES: How They Are Used, Crashes, and Sales of Adult-Sized Vehicles for Children’s Use". Remember, it is almost inevitable that misallocated safety resources will lead to disaster, just as driving while taking your eyes off the road invites tragedy. Tragedy . . . you heard it here first.
The GAO report notes:
"[ATV industry] officials said they are taking actions to prevent the sale of adult-sized ATVs for use by children and Commission staff said they have taken steps to ensure compliance . . . . Since 1998, Commission staff have conducted undercover inspections of ATV dealers, by posing as buyers, to check compliance with the age recommendations. Nevertheless, compliance rates of the ATV dealers that Commission staff checked decreased from 85 percent in 1999 to 63 percent in 2007 . . . . A Commission compliance official said no undercover inspections of dealers had been conducted since early 2008 because Commission staff were focused on preparing to implement the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act, but that inspections will be resumed in the future. . . .
Because Commission staff had not conducted any undercover inspections of dealers since 2008 and because the number of new entrants in the marketplace that had not been checked (as of February 2010, 37 companies had ATV action plans authorizing them to sell ATVs in the United States, compared with 8 companies in 2008), we conducted undercover operations of selected dealers to check whether dealers were willing to sell adult-sized ATVs for use by children under the age of 16. . . . The dealers who were willing to sell adult-sized ATVs for use by children included retailers that sold ATVs made by the traditional manufacturers and new market entrants as well as those that sold a single brand and a variety of brands. In some cases, sales staff subtly and in other cases blatantly admitted that they should not be selling adult-sized ATVs for use by a 13-year-old, but would do so anyway. In addition, one dealer we visited was selling ATVs manufactured by a company without an ATV action plan." [Emphasis added]
I quote from this report not to indict ATV'rs. Some bad apples will be in every barrel, so almost any market sweep will turn up something. In this case, however, the GAO confirms that the CPSC has been in a two year nap induced by the CPSIA. And the nap isn't over, either.
This problem explains why, in a recent conversation, a CPSC staffer referred to the agency as the Children's Product Safety Commission (that's not its name!). Something has been diverted or polluted in its mission by the CPSIA.
I feel we are sliding down this slippery slope to the doom of the critical market for children's products. After two years of whining, I must sound like a broken record. That said, the CPSIA implementing rules aren't survivable and with full implementation now just months away, there's almost no time left to do anything about it. I have not yet explained in this space the so-called 15 Month Rule to be discussed this week in Thursday morning's Commission meeting. When the time comes, you will get a strong sense of what a railroad job this entire process has been. The priority has been irretrievably shifted to paper pushing. The strictures imposed by the testing zealots will snuff out many businesses - or send us all underground.
Consumers will suffer and so will your business. We will see more collapses and will see markets go under-served. You were warned.
Thursday, April 8, 2010
CPSIA - The Long-g-g-g-g Wait is Over!
And if you're one of those people who stays up late at night, fretting over how to find a testing company properly qualified to test your clacker balls, you can rest easy now - this godsend of a standard addresses that exact dilemma! Third party assessment of clacker balls has been identified by Congress as ESSENTIAL to restore America's confidence in the clacker ball industry. Clacker ball safety - that's change you can believe in!
These steps are long overdue, particularly in light of panic over imported clacker balls which may be prone to off-tempo clacking.
Of course, not every lab is qualified to test your clacker balls. A Third Party Clacker Ball Conformity Assessment Body (we call them "test labs", but you should probably call them TPCBCAB's) needs to be accredited in the Clacker Sciences before any General Conformity Certificate would be acceptable. As if this weren't obvious . . . . For high-volume clacker ball manufacturers, the CPSC has thoughtfully provided special rules for money-saving Firewalled Clacker Ball Conformity Assessment Bodies (FCBCABs, not to be confused with a TPCBCABs). So you have options!
Fortunately, the CPSC saw the crisis in clacker ball safety coming and POURED money from its annual $118 million budget into its clacker ball department, hiring squads of Ph.D.'s skilled in clackerology - just file a Section 15 report and see how quickly they clack your balls like never before! And to protect our borders, the CPSC beefed up its atrophied team of Field Clacker Ball Inspectors (FCBIs). To combat clacking marauders, the CPSC staged FCBIs at each domestic port, alert and poised to protect America against contraband balls.
Does anyone think it's ironic that there are no clacker ball recalls listed on the CPSC website? Okay, the agency has only been protecting us since 1972 - that's only 38 years - but still, no clacker ball recalls? Clearly the absence of recalls proves the need for more vigilant clacker ball testing is URGENT. The public's relief at a re-energized CPSC, ready to oversee our every clack, is palpable. No longer a toothless tiger, this CPSC has become a snarling, clacking . . . something.
So, worry not America, your clacker balls will be safe again for many hours of happy clacking!
Just don't forget - when you play with your balls, always ask for lead-free. You CAN'T be too safe . . . .
Wednesday, January 6, 2010
CPSIA - Transparency, Tenenbaum/Adler-style!
It is ironic that the Democrats would choose to spurn the Government in the Sunshine Act ("Sunshine Act") so brazenly. The decision to leave Northup's item off the upcoming meeting agenda is not technically a violation of the Sunshine Act, but then again it is certainly NOT on the list of exceptions to the public meeting rule (5 U.S.C. 552(b)(c)). In my humble opinion, it is a clear violation of the spirit of the Sunshine Act and can hardly be characterized as "transparent" government. As Ms. Northup noted, the sponsors of the Sunshine Act would be appalled. So why did the Dems do it?
Before I recap and analyze of this incredible event, I would like to quote Inez Tenenbaum on the importance of "transparency" (emphasis added):
- CPSC Press Release (July 9, 2009): "Ms. Tenenbaum identified three major areas of focus for her common sense approach to serving as Chairman. 'First, I want CPSC to be more accessible and transparent to parents and consumers. By creating an electronic database of product incident reports that consumers can search and by collaborating with state and local agencies and consumer groups, we can give the public confidence that CPSC is working openly and in their best interest,' she stated."
- APEC Conference Keynote Address (August 1, 2009): "My regulatory philosophy embraces open dialogue, information sharing with all stakeholders, and a commitment to finding mutual interests. . . . Enforcement is actually one of my three top priorities as Chairman, along with government transparency and consumer education and advocacy."
- Statement Before the Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection (September 10, 2009): "In my first two months leading the CPSC, I have focused on three key goals: transparency and openness to those we serve . . . ."
- Keynote Address, 3rd CPSC-AQSIQ Safety Summit (October 21, 2009): "I embrace open government, information sharing with all stakeholders, and a commitment to finding mutual interests."
One must wonder who spoke to whom to get this flip flop accomplished. Assuming Ms. Tenenbaum meant what she said publicly about the need for "transparency", someone must have really put a wet blanket on the idea of publicly discussing this subject. I wonder who might have strong views on the wisdom of an unstaged, open discussion of these issues . . . .
Consider Ms. Northup's argument: This is one of the most critical issues to come before the Commission. The CPSIA has been controversial and difficult to work with two years now. The Appropriations Committee has asked us to give recommendations on how to change to the law. [See this link, pp. 33-34 for the actual instructions.] There is no disagreement that blood lead levels need to be a top priority in children's safety but none of the CDC, NIH or EPA point to children's products as a serious lead threat. The Sunshine Act prevents the Commissioners from meeting other than one-on-one without calling a public meeting, which means we can never sit down together to discuss these issues. The issues are too important to relegate to a game of "telephone". A hearing is the only way for the five of us to discuss this issue at one time.
Tenenbaum's response was telling: The Staff has been working night and day on this and everyone has had a chance to put in their comments. Each Commissioner has had some drafting responsibility. Each Commissioner has the right to submit their own statement to Congress and likewise to request to testify to present their own personal views. Given our ability to have "extensive discussions" one-on-one, this debate is best held in private. We should NOT have a public hearing on this subject.
Okay, are you persuaded? This is coming from Ms. Transparency, to judge from her many uses of that old chestnut in various speeches and testimony.
Nancy Nord made the point that the reason to have a Commission is to meet publicly and have discussions openly and transparently. Apparently this didn't persuade the Dems. Bob Adler amplified the "argument" against trusting the American public to listen in to the debate: After conceding that he would sound like the "Prince of Darkness", he stated that an open Commission hearing should involve give-and-take but a hearing on this topic would not involve deliberation but instead speeches telling him why he's wrong and the others are right. He said he was very comfortable with the current process because he knows everyone's views quite well and besides, so does the public via blogs, tweets, statements and so on. The minority Commissioners are not being "squelched". He said that a public meeting removes the ability to think out loud. "As soon as you say it [in a public meeting], it's all over the blogosphere." [Thanks for the plug, Bob.]
So what does this MEAN? A few thoughts:
- The Dems don't want to allow an unruly public debate of the issues - why? There are several possible reasons - (a) they have been told a public debate is "not a good idea" by Congressional Dems who have consistently refused to hold public hearings, (b) they have been told that many/most changes are "non-starters" by Guess Who so don't even think about suggesting them, or (c) they don't want to defend their views publicly because . . . there is no way to put a good face on their views.
- The Dems were outfoxed today. By putting up the request to discuss this subject publicly, the Republicans forced their fellow Democratic Commissions to stand up publicly - before you, the general public - and try to defend "smoke filled room" politics. Now that's "Change We Can Believe In!" In other words, they were caught between a rock and a hard place - their Congressional handlers said "no way" and to get this result, they had to publicly wave their arms and try to convince us that secrecy is somehow openness. The Dems can NEVER again say they are all about transparency. If they do, they will expose themselves as being all about . . . something else.
- The "commitment" of the Commission to find middle ground and vote more cohesively as a group, which they achieved after considerable effort on the recent Stay decision (lead testing and certification), is apparently paper-thin. Ms. Tenenbaum obviously knew of Ms. Northup's motion ahead of the meeting today (she had her response drafted in advance). [Did anyone else catch the chill in the air during the meeting?] So, if they all knew this was coming, where was that commitment to work together? To consider everyone's views? Forget it. It's also hardly an advertisement for the ability of the Chairman to steer this group.
- The illusion that this government cares about the mess it made or is making any reasonable effort to fix it has been blown up. The game is fixed and has been fixed from the get-go. You need only read the Appropriations conferee report (link above). The Democrats control both Houses of Congress - so this statement was written by Democrats: "The CPSIA was signed into law on August 14,2008 and is considered to be the most significant piece of consumer protection legislation enacted since the CPSC was established in the early 1970s. The legislation received nearly unanimous bipartisan support in Congress. Congress passed this legislation in the wake of a massive number of consumer product recalls in 2007 and 2008--more than 20 million-many of which involved toys manufactured in China. The conferees strongly support this legislation but are aware of concerns surrounding implementation of certain aspects of the law." Of course, I have already documented that 43 Senators and 96 Members of the House have either sponsored or voted for CPSIA amendment legislation. It's a complete mischaracterization of the current reality - but when read by Ms. Tenenbaum into the record during the meeting today, it almost sounded true . . . .
This process is some sort of Kabuki Theater for your amusement. Having fun yet?
Today's decision is par for the course in a twisted, bass-ackwards debate over safety characterized by ideologues out to steal our legal system, bureaucrats devastating markets that they simply do not understand, regulators witnessing the destruction of their agency to serve a small number of Congressional "masters" with a broad, world-changing agenda. To propel it along, the Dems now propose to shield their work under the cloak of darkness. Does it really matter? Well, Bob Adler already knows what everyone thinks and doesn't care to be told he is wrong (and others are right). So I guess it really doesn't matter. His mind is made up, Waxman's mind is made up - and no one cares what you think.
So, when you have to let a few more people go to cover ridiculous testing costs or to pay your lawyer extortionate fees to keep you on the straight and narrow, or when you cut your product line or drop some customers to find profit elsewhere, just remember: the Democrats on the Commission thought it would be best to have the debate on the CPSIA one-on-one in private, rather than let you understand their views or participate in an open hearing.
Just remember that . . . on November 2, 2010.
Tuesday, December 8, 2009
CPSIA - Educational Company Woes under the CPSIA
"The resources that we have to invest to comply with CPSIA are truly wasted. The human cost is incredible, never mind the waste of physical and cash resources. I anticipate that CPSIA will generate four to eight hours a year of work for every product that we sell - we will be measuring it in man-years. Existing regulations prior to CPSIA were adequate, and like many regulatory requirements, only needed adequate funding to be completely effective. The timing could not have been worse for our industry."
. . . .
"As mentioned before, CPSIA has had a significant impact on our business. Every second is spent addressing our customers' concerns, working with our suppliers to meet requirements. I personally have spent at least about 30 percent of my time this year (on CPSIA) in one form or another. As president of the company, I should be investing my energy (on other things)."
Mike, I feel your pain!
Sunday, November 29, 2009
CPSIA - Reaction to my Testing Guidance Comments
In my blogpost, I noted that children's products with paint require independent testing while painted non-children's products used in the home and around children only require a GCC, no testing. That makes NO sense to me, as explained in my blogpost.
I received a series of emails from a regular reader of this space, someone with a great deal of expertise in the CPSC and its practices. Let's just say, this person knows quite a bit more than me. Here's what my reader said in reply to this essay:
"I think the implication that children's products needed some special class of testing by someone other than the manufacturer was highly questionable to begin with. (Put another way, why should we distrust children's product manufacturers? Or in the alternative, is the risk from such products really so much higher that special safeguards were necessary? In truth, most of the serious injuries and deaths that led to recalls were because of defects and not because of non-compliance with rules that you could test for.)
. . . .
Unfortunately, there seems to be a national trend--including other agencies and state and local governments--of legislating requirements based on junk science disseminated by interest groups. This leads not only to incredible costs, or loss of product for consumers, but diverts the attention and resources of the agencies from their core mission of reducing deaths, injury, and illness. That is the ultimate irony here: that in promoting safety some of these presumably well intentioned people are in fact likely decreasing the public safety."
Score one for people that actually know what they're talking about! Couldn't say it better myself (although I have been trying for about a year).
Tuesday, September 22, 2009
CPSIA - How Much Should We Pay to Prevent "Cheating"?
So the question is: if people might pull the "switcheroo" or otherwise commit intentional fraud, wouldn't the right solution be to make everyone test under much more controlled and regulated circumstances? This might make things much harder for cheaters. Isn't that good?
My response is NO. First of all, I hope it is no surprise to you or anyone that some people cheat. I believe this was discussed in the Bible and frequently thereafter. This MIGHT be the reason we have a criminal code and JAILS. Some people are also incompetent. They don't cheat, they just fail repeatedly but goodnaturedly. The rest of us work hard and get our jobs done. As for me, although some people might cheat, I do NOT. If all the honest people must pay a high certain price in order to squeeze out the bad guys, we will all be crushed. This is akin to being treated like a murderer - just because there have been murders in your town. The CPSIA punishes the many for the sins of the few.
The dispiriting idea underlying the lunkheaded Section 102(d)(2)(B) is that no one can be trusted, and that unless the government gets involved in regulating the minutia of safety testing, we cannot be sure that everything will be okay. [Did you ever think about why the CPSC must now accredit testing labs? We never needed it before - what precipitated the change? I am not aware of a single recall that was blamed on an incompetent or fraudulent lab. This is all the more troubling when you consider how much money has been wasted on this pointless and growing devotion of CPSC resources.]
The economics of over-regulation are poor. Investment incentive is crushed by excessive regulatory costs as a profit motivation is rendered moot. In this case, we are CERTAIN to bear excessive costs for needless and pointless testing, all because a panicked Congress' felt an urgent need to "do something" about recalls. What costs will be eliminated as a result? If our company has to pay 2-5% of our revenue for compliance with this new law (my estimate), can we save that much or more in avoided costs? Not based on our 25-year track record (recalled 130 pieces out of a billion in 25 years, or 0.000013% per annum). We now must trade an annual cost increase of 2-5% for an annual savings of 0.000013%. What about the costs to society? Well, in our case, all 130 pieces were recovered and there were no known injuries. Cost to society: zero. This is not so crazy, as less than 0.01% of all children's products are ever recalled. Consider the famous lead-in-paint recalls of 2007-8: 125 recalls, no deaths and only one claimed injury (from a crib).
So, who will pay for this folly?
You.
Some myths need to be dispelled:
a. America pays the costs of the CPSIA. This is simple economics. The law of land regulates us a community. We pay for all recalls and we incur the costs of all injuries. Although costs may be shifted (reallocated) among us by law (some winners, some losers), ideal laws lower our net societal costs by incentivizing the most efficient allocation of resources. Thus, a law might assign one party to bear a responsibility because they can manage it at the lowest overall cost, thus avoiding significant and greater costs by a less efficient party. Common examples of this are torts (the law places strict burden for product liability on manufacturers) and railroad crossings (railroads must pay for safety of the crossings). Manufacturers and railroads are in the best position to protect against safety dangers, as opposed to consumers acting individually. If manufacturers and railroads weren't allocated this responsibility, consumers would bear too much cost (inefficiently) in the form of injuries or losses. This is nothing more than a law-and-economics explanation of how legal systems work. See "The Problem of Social Cost" by Ronald Coase (Coase received the Nobel Prize for this theory). In the bargaining world hypothesized by Mr. Coase, costs would be borne by the party best able to bear them efficienlty, which might be manufacturers . . . or might be consumers.
[It also is clear that no matter what happens to the CPSIA (be still, my heart!), manufacturers will still have a strong incentive (by law) to make their products as safe as possible. Tort law provides this economic incentive quite well.]
b. NOT all recalled items are "deadly". Some recalls have the potential to kill, but most do not. Of the simple "risk of injury" recalls, many are technical violations (immaterial threats of injury), theoretical risks, or worst of all, self-imposed (sometimes companies insist on recalls over the objection of the CPSC). It is plainly WRONG to contend that recalled items are "deadly" (Ahem, Ms. Tenenbaum).
c. We cannot simply "raise" our prices to cover the new costs. Products have a strong "perceived value" which cannot be overcome with marketing. Some items are quite price sensitive. How much would you pay for your Starbucks latte? If the price went over $5, would you change coffee shops? $6? $8? No one is indifferent to price. How much would you pay for napkins at McDonalds, given that you probably think you are entitled to free napkins? Most people would cut their napkin use by 90%+ if the cost was as little as 1 cent each. This reasoning applies to ALL products and ALL services, no exceptions (even medical care). In the case of toys, many toys are commodities and have essentially a known "market value". If you price them too high, you will lose business. "Perceived value" is set or heavily influenced by the mass market, precisely the part of the children's market most able to absorb new CPSIA costs. Those of us in the specialty markets are toast as a consequence.
d. The right way to measure recall effectiveness is in their economics. As noted above, we Americans will bear the net cost of this law. Is it worth it? We know that some items subject to recall present "unacceptable" risks of injury and others do not. It has always been the common sense practice of the CPSC (until recently) to exercise judgment when imposing a recall. They used to recognize that recalls come at a cost.
There are many factors to assess in determining that a recall is merited. Having never been a CPSC manager or a legislator (heaven forbid!), please take my amateur's list of factors with a grain of salt: (i) nature and severity of the risk of injury, (ii) number of units in circulation, (iii) age of the child subject to the risk, (iv) public policy [Is there a reason to justify strict liability? This would presumably be infrequent.] and (v) durability and value of the recalled item. Common sense dictates that you must weigh the benefits of a recall against the economic damage wrought by the recall. Since we finance both sides of the ledger, we Americans have an incentive to behave rationally and take the lowest cost route. [The Coase Theorem again.]
If you think about the case where one "dangerous" children's product (say, a pair of shoes) is in circulation somewhere in the United States, it probably wouldn't be worth the significant expense of recovering that special pair of shoes unless we knew that one or more lives were DEFINITELY at risk, a very high cost. [Exploding shoes, perhaps.] Thus, if some situations present low grade risk of injury and a high expense for a recall, it may sense to NOT expend the money on a recall, but perhaps to engage in other activities to keep costs down (like education or a "running" change in product design). Let's also not forget that manufacturers that go through a CPSC process incur meaningful "transaction" costs even if there is NO recall (i.e., legal expenses, possible inventory loss, embarrassment, etc.). Thus, even without penalties, there is an incentive to do better next time - a recall is not needed to get most companies to straighten up.
Given my estimate that we will expend 2-5% of revenues to comply with this awful law, could the economics ever justify that expense to save "injuries"? You already know that we incur an anticipated annual expense for recalls of 0.000013% of revenue, all to avoid a 25-year injury rate of zero. This annual "CPSIA tax" of 2-5% is entirely "inefficient" in a Coase sense, as the imposition (and allocation) of costs is irrational. This completely explains why the law is misconceived. Since the CPSC is not allowed to exercise judgment under the CPSIA, and since economics are not allowed to be considered either, it is by definition an irrational and shamefully inefficient law. Mr. Coase would be outraged.
I happen to be outraged, too. Cheaters frustrate me but that's no justification for treating everyone like they are cheaters. It's time to rewrite the law to permit the cheaters to be treated like cheaters, and leave the rest of us ALONE.
Thursday, September 17, 2009
CPSIA - What on EARTH is She Talking About?
a. "On a broader level, I commend companies already following the drawstring voluntary standard. However, I am deeply concerned by the industry's need to increase its efforts to educate its member companies about the problem with drawstrings on children's upper outwear, as well as the Agency's need to increase its efforts to publicize the hazards of these circumstances. Industry and the Agency must make a more aggressive effort, together, to get this warning information out to manufacturers, especially smaller ones who may be less likely to be aware of the seriousness of this problem. In addition, efforts need to be increased to have parents be better informed and be more vigilant in making sure their young children do not wear clothing with drawstrings in their upperwear."
Huh? A need for EDUCATION OF MANUFACTURERS, ESPECIALLY SMALL ONES? What?! The CPSC and industry working COOPERATIVELY to REACH OUT to both makers AND TO PARENTS? Heresy! Besides, doesn't Commissioner Nord know that all problems are best solved by governments, and that individual responsibility, not to mention the obligation to supervise children, is an outmoded concept? Please!
b. [This quote is even CRAZIER.] "In situations like this, I am sadly reminded how agency and industry efforts and limited resources have had to be focused on issues that do not present real safety concerns, like bike valves, library books and rhinestones, instead of on real dangers like drawstrings on children's apparel. The Agency, the industry, and the public at large need to remain focused on the seriousness of drawstrings in children's outerwear until every avoidable injury is just that - avoided." [Emphasis added.]
I don't get it. What's she talking about? You would think she's never been the Chairman of the CPSC or something. First of all, why does she regret the expenditure of millions of dollars and thousands of man-hours dickering about dangerous items like rhinestones? Kids lick their bike chains and chow down on rhinestones every day, after all - oooh, that's so unsafe! And what's this about "limited resources"? Can't Obama just print up some more dough? It's raining dollars, let's hire lots of investigators . . . . I am also mystified by the notion that it is possible to figure out that some dangers are "real" and some are not. Didn't Congress do all the thinking for us already? Ms. Nord, get with the times!
I certainly hope this kind of thinking doesn't catch on. What would I do for amusement?
Sunday, September 13, 2009
CPSIA - Consider the Source
Master Propagandist Rachel Weintraub has now intoned that we in the business community don't know how to control our businesses or assess safety without her insights and instructions. And how, precisely, did she become such an expert on manufacturing controls? According to her resume that she presented as a speaker at an October, 2008 conference, she has worked at Consumer Federation of America as Senior Counsel and Director of Product Safety since January 2002. Before joining CFA, she worked at USPIRG from September 1999 to December 2001 as a "consumer advocate". Before that, she attended Boston University Law School (Class of 1999) and Binghamton University (Class of 1996). That's the entire resume - NO business experience whatsoever. By all appearances, she has never worked for a business of any kind since she left high school.
I think expressing ignorant opinions is dangerous, Ms. Weintraub. Having never worked at a manufacturer, I believe Master Propagandist Weintraub is not an expert on supply chain management, nor the person I would choose to consult on how to design a quality control system.
She asserts that "You only know if a product is safe if it’s been tested" and snorts at the notion that there is ANY other way to assure quality. I happen to have 19 years experience MAKING toys and educational materials and would like to comment on this contention. First, let me state MY qualifications for your evaluation. I have a B.S.E. in Chemical Engineering and a J.D. as well. [I only admit that I am a lawyer to friends, so consider yourself "inside the circle".] I have worked for a laboratory distributor, a manufacturer of machine tools and a national law firm, aside from my present employer Learning Resources, Inc. I have had responsibility for our company's quality control and legal compliance activities since I joined the firm in 1990 and since our founding in 1984, I estimate that we have sold between 750 million and 1 billion units. We have also tested consistently during that period of time and recalled a grand total of 130 units. All of these defective units were recovered. I know something about the issue Ms. Weintraub addresses.
Let me say as an initial matter that it is necessary to incorporate some testing into any rational quality control process. This is why we have consistently tested our products.
Among the many PROBLEMS with the law that Ms. Weintraub so ardently and manipulatively defends is that the CPSIA will cause us to significantly OVERTEST. Overtesting is not only ineffective but it is also very expensive. At our company, I believe we can maintain our sterling compliance record for about $150,000 per year in testing and inspection costs (absent government meddling). Last year, we spent $250,000 in testing and year-to-date, we have spent $200,000. I expect the costs to rise by year end to as much as $500,000. Next year, if Ms. Weintraub gets to realize her warmest wishes AND if we change NOTHING at our company (unlikely in that event), I think our testing costs will be far in excess of $1 million and may be double or triple that number. In a nutshell, the testing requirements that Ms. "I have never worked at a company" Weintraub fervently believes are necessary will drive our costs up 20 times. That's a . . . problem.
Perhaps in the Never Neverland of consumer groups, there appears to be no recession right now. Perhaps the flow of contributions from trial lawyers makes life full and rich for consumer groups these days, I don't know. However, sadly, out here in Reality World, profits are down. A lot. Raising testing costs well into seven figures, well, that money will have to come from somewhere. With budgets as tight as they are, financing difficult to obtain and orders light, the "where" is hard to identify. Under the circumstances, it may be worth reconsidering the "absurd" notion that safety can only be assured by a plan endorsed by the Master Propagandist.
In our business, we use many techniques to control our quality and our supply chain. We tend to use companies we know well to produce our products. We know the families that own and run them. We have longstanding relationships and have created alignment on manufacturing principles and expectations. They know the rules, so do we. Their character and integrity is part of our criteria for doing business.
We use other techniques when we perceive the need to take extra precautions. Remember, we are all too aware that we sell products for use by children - after all, our mission is to make life better for kids. It is an urban myth that we needed Congress to give us this insight. We overdesign products to withstand abuse. We use random testing and spot inspections. We regularly review products for possible design improvements. We also routinely test our products for compliance with a variety of safety rules, all of which adds to our certainty of safety. It is worth noting that our one recall in 25 years resulted from a retest at the request of an Australian customer against their local rules, which revealed a bad lot. [We subsequently fired this one-product supplier, who came into the company with an acquisition.]
Ms. Weintraub advocates a simple-minded approach to safety - namely, that piles of passing test reports stacked up to the sky will assure safety. I can understand why she might think this, having never worked for an actual company. It sounds good, doesn't it, especially if you don't think about it too much? Personally, I don't think it will work and would not advocate it as our company's primary quality control strategy. The notion that we can rely on pieces of paper for safety assurance will not bear up over time. Have you ever heard the expression that "there are many slips 'twixt cup and lip"? The only technique which I think works is supply chain management. If we allow our laws to place the focus on safety test compliance, rather than safety itself, ultimately a horrific safety issue with a children's product will emerge - backed up with lovely passing test reports. [I have previously speculated that this in fact occurred in some of the large scale recalls of 2007/8.] What then, Master Propagandist?
As I said, the money (and human resources) to support the CPSIA's ridiculous testing scheme has to come from somewhere. It will come at the expense of future product development, current speciality market products and finally, will siphon off management time and attention that might have been applied toward a better safety system. Not good . . . .
If these safety costs are allowed to be implemented in February 2010, many of us won't be around to see what happens, either. You will miss us - and all you will have left are the consumer group propagandists. I hope they are good at designing, manufacturing and financing the specialty market products you need. Let me know how it goes.
Thursday, August 27, 2009
CPSIA - Wanted, a Demonstration of CHARACTER
Because Congressional leaders (Dems) won't talk to us and aren't motivated to do anything to fix the mess they made, much of the angst now focuses on the CPSC. I have said many times that I don't envy their job. The CPSC is paid to enforce this stupid law, and inevitably, enforcing a stupid law . . . well, it doesn't make you look good. Much frustration and anger has been directed at the agency for doing their unpleasant job, a burden replete with inflexible and uneconomic regulatory limitations, unreasonable workloads and unrealistic deadlines. In addition, the agency is acting in a disciplined way, writing rules to implement a stupid law in the stupid way Congress wanted it implemented. Of course the new CPSC rules look stupid - given where they came from. This could be anticipated - as a Federal agency, the CPSC must simply fill in the holes in the law, not re-write it. [There is Supreme Court law on this topic (Wayman v. Southard (1825): "a general provision may be made, and power given to those who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details.").]
If Congress won't act and the CPSC can't help us, either . . . what do we still want under these circumstances?
I have an answer: we want a demonstration of character by the CPSC. I know those are strong words but it's time to stop beating around the bush. Congress is deaf - face it, if Mr. Waxman gave a damn about you and me, he might have found a couple hours to call a hearing in the last year. He has no intention to act, no matter the pain or waste we have proven (as our dear friend in Senator Durbin's office acknowledged last May). That means that unless we want to wait for someone to save us that isn't going to come, we need the CPSC to rise to the occasion. Notwithstanding the legal analysis above (which I happen to believe is correct), we need MORE from the CPSC and its leadership. They know as well as we do how misguided this law is. They know about our pointless losses and the incredible, wrenching disruptions in our businesses. They also know the law is causing MASSIVE misallocation of their limited resources away from real issues of safety and toward nonsense (like the agency's contemptible Resale Roundup program which has a zero percent chance of preventing an injury or saving a life, or the senseless devotion of hundreds or thousands of man-hours and millions of dollars to the prosecution of safety investigations of ballpoint pens, rhinestones and bikes and ATVs for their lead content). They know this law is ruining their agency and the markets they are supposed to patrol.
The agency's inability or unwillingness to find a way to steer this law to sanity is not as compelled as they might want you to believe. To argue such is nothing more than a cop out. Any lawyer worth his salt can read a law to mean anything he wants. In fact, the agency's tilt toward Congress might be remarkably shortsighted. Is it really in anyone's best interest, including the CPSC's, to play footsie with Congress on such a defective law? The outcome seems pre-ordained to me. Of course, the route of least resistance may be to try to convince America that policies like sending inspectors to garage sales are necessary to "keep kids safe" but how long will that illusion last, and when the mania finally passes, who will still respect the CPSC? They are hitching their wagon to legal lunacy that they themselves recognize clearly.
The solution is character. The CPSC can resist. Notably, they have been given permission by 28 Senators to use their "common sense". Perhaps a little more creativity in legislative construction is needed. Perhaps a little more skepticism about the perfection of Congress' legislative process or Congress' knowledge of safety issues is merited. There once was a day when the CPSC's principal concern was doing the "right" thing (as opposed to trying to please Congress), and the mission of safety was their guiding light. Unfortunately, today's mission seems to be maximizing bureaucracy, not safety. Guys, you are letting us down. We have no one left to turn to but you. Trust, faith and hope in the agency has not been entirely destroyed, despite low points like the pen decision, the ATV decision and Commissioner Moore's recommendation to sequester library books. I, for one, want to continue to believe that I can trust the CPSC, as I have for almost 20 years. I will admit my faith is wavering.
CPSC leadership can strike a different chord, can write different rules and can take more personal risk in pressing Congress for a restoration of rationality to our national standards of safety. This is an issue of character - I think it's time for action.
