Wednesday, April 27, 2011
CPSIA - The CPSIA Testing "Dilemma"
That's a really good question.
You may recall reports that FOUR Members of Congress asked consumer advocates for a list of "victims" of lead-in-substrate at the April 7th hearing. No names were offered nor were they promised. This makes perfect sense to the consumer advocates - after all, lead harms "silently" and consequently, it's okay for them to assert that there are victims without being able to prove it. You can call that "Consumer Group Accountability". Nice work if you can get it. So I wonder - if a consumer advocate hears voices in his/her head, do the voices' deranged instructions need to go in the law, too? It seems to me that if a consumer advocate perceives something, we must accept that it's real, no questions asked. I assume the answer is yes these days.
Notwithstanding the "gravity" of Rachel Weintraub's assurances, the assertion of invisible lead victims flies in the face of ordinary experience, not to mention logic. Let's posit that lead harms silently and MOST victims would go undetected. [I am POSITING this, not conceding this. I can't buy the assertion that NO victim would ever be detectible - even the advocates don't take that ridiculous position.] It is indisputable that lead poisoning comes from exposure to lead. You must come in physical contact with it AND it must make its way into your blood stream. The mechanisms for lead entering a child's bloodstream are limited to two - breathe it in or take into your digestive system. Breathing in lead-in-substrate has never been identified as a pathway, so it appears that the only mechanism possible for lead poisoning from lead-in-substrate is ingestion through contact. You have to put it in your mouth.
Notably, kead poisoning is identified by elevated blood lead levels. Hence another factor must be considered - namely the lead mass consumed in relation to the volume of blood circulating in a child. In other words, one must consume XXX milligrams of lead per period to obtain and maintain dangerous blood levels depending on your age (body mass). Clearly exposure is the critical factor here - the more lead you ingest, the higher your blood lead level would be (theoretically). [To read a real scientist's explanation of this mechanism of lead poisoning in children and all the footnotes and asterisks to this simplified description, read Dr. Barbara Beck's testimony from the April 7th House hearing.] Ignoring absorption rates and other provisos from the real world for purposes of this discussion, it all boils down to exposure, right?
Consider that there are 50+ million children in the United States in the regulated age range. [The VAST majority of lead problems occur in children under five.] Those 50+ million children span a wide spectrum of life styles, habits, living quarters, adult supervision and mental health. They have literally TRILLIONS of annual interactions with products regulated by the CPSIA. Based on my experience and observation, I will assert that some of them, a material but small number, interact obsessively with children's products and mouth them inappropriately. These few children are extreme cases. You read about kids like this all the time. They are the kids who munch down 20 high strength magnets just for the heck of it. Those kids would exhibit lead poisoning from lead-in-substrate if it were possible in the real world.
So where are these kids? Can we find any of them? Apparently not. They are not in the medical literature. They are not in the popular media. They and their parents have not appeared as witnesses at CPSC hearings or on the Hill. They are not known to the nutjob consumer advocates. They are not known to the ignorant Democratic staffers who staunchly defend this law. [Even though there are 2.2 billion children in the world, most of whom live in conditions ripe with the possibility of lead-in-substrate poisoning, they are not known anywhere else on Earth either, to my knowledge.] They are not known to ANYONE ANYWHERE.
There's a simple reason for this - they don't exist.
And if there are no known victims and not one extreme example can be found here or anywhere, I have to ask - why does my government insist that we test our products obsessively? To what end?
What permits the federal government to blindly demand this of me? Why isn't the government required to PROVE that there is a REASON that we must burn our money? If this is all "politics", why aren't jobs, market vitality, well-stocked schools and lean government ALSO "political" considerations? Is scamming the public about health risks to kids the only way Dems know how to buy votes?
And one more thing - if all of our products comply with the (ridiculous and unjustified) lead standards but we don't test, should I go to jail? Is this law about safety . . . or about process? Does Washington really think we're all morons?
You can answer that for yourself.
Thursday, May 6, 2010
CPSIA - Numbers Don't Lie
Many people use data relating to lead and childhood injuries that play on basic human emotions. After all, who would want another child to be injured, much less killed? That truism is justification for the CPSIA as "necessity", notwithstanding possible "unintended consequences". Even the mere mention of cost and effectiveness discredits opponents of the law.
A convenient example of this phenomenon is Henry Waxman's opening statement at last week's hearing. He called out three separate incidents of injury to kids: "Just over four years ago, a little boy named Jarnell Brown died of lead poisoning when he swallowed a metal charm that came with a pair of kids’ shoes. A year later, in 2007, two children became comatose and had to be hospitalized because of a children’s toy that turned out to have a toxic drug in it. That same year, millions of cribs were recalled for a simple defect that had caused multiple infant deaths."
These three groupings of injuries are unrelated and derive from radically different hazards. Jarnell Brown swallowed a jewelry charm made of lead. The two kids were affected by AquaDots, an unprecedented, one-of-a-kind chemical toy defect. Crib injuries are obviously of a different nature and involve a separately regulated category of child (infants) subject to unique risks. Despite the wildly disparate data, he concludes: "The bottom line was clear: our system for keeping children safe was broken."
While I think that the Cubs are pretty mediocre and so are the Bulls, I don't think Chicago is broken. This is apples-and-oranges. So goes the CPSIA debate.
Let me be clear, I am not saying Waxman INTENDED to mislead with his remarks - no, in fact this is how most people have treated data in support of the law. Few if anyone uses actual balanced injury or hazard data. Even the fear mongers' standard of "there's no safe level for lead" is almost obviously untrue but it strikes an emotional chord and is, at one level, hard to refute. Clearly, sprinkling lead on your bowl of cereal in the morning isn't recommended. That said, it is equally clear that lead is very infrequently deadly and since we all consume lead daily by breathing, eating and drinking, it must be tolerable (at a minimum) at certain dosage levels. Thus there has to be a "safe" level for lead - or else we'd all be as dumb as a box of rocks. I consider to be a simple observation.
So what's the truth? Data on recalls and the hazards uncovered by the CPSC is frankly hard to come by. I went through the exercise of preparing a 25-month analysis of lead-in-paint back in February 2009 and published my data. The data were great but frankly, I needed more. So I set out to prepare a much broader survey of recall data so we could really talk numbers. I have attached a data analysis of the 899 CPSC recalls of Children's Products between March 5, 1999 and April 15, 2010. This is slightly over 11 years of data and while it is a somewhat arbitrary period, I consider it statistically significant and useful to reason from.
A few caveats: I prepared this data with the assistance of several people and spent quite a bit of time cleaning it up. It is good data, but almost certainly inaccurate in some respect or respects. This is not intentional and I would certainly welcome notice of any errors you may find. The source of the data is posted recall notices on the CPSC website. The categorization of products and hazards might be considered quirky and could be misleading if you do not look at the details. However, overall, this is the best data I know of for an analysis of injuries and deaths from Children's Products.
The rationale behind this analysis is that official CPSC recall data over an 11-year period reflects the policies, judgment and decisions of the agency and is revealing about what the agency thought was and was not important during that period of time.
The spreadsheet has three worksheets. You have complete access to ALL of my data. I have incorporated hyperlinks to EVERY recall in the spreadsheet, so you can dig deeper if you are so inclined. The first sheet, entitled "Total by Category" is sorted by Product Category. The second sheet, entitled "Total by Year" sorts the same data by Recall Date. The final sheet, entitled "Summary by Product" includes FOUR ANALYSES pulled from the first two sheets. There is recall statistical data by (i) product category by hazard, (ii) hazard by product category, (iii) year by hazard, and (iv) hazard by year. Four slices of the data, never before seen.
Some interesting facts:
- Grand Total Recalls: 899
- Grand Total Children's Products Recalled: 3,128
- Grand Total Units Recalled: 308,697,297 (remember, this is over 11 years)
- Grand Total Injuries to Kids from Recalled Products: 2,381
- Grand Total Deaths from Recalled Products: 35
For perspective on these data, please consider CDC data on childhood mortality: the current mortality rate for kids age 1-4 is 4,631 per annum (leading causes of death: unintentional injuries and congenital malformations) and for kids age 5-14 is 6,149 per annum (leading causes of death: unintentional injuries and cancer). I believe unintentional injuries are principally car accidents. Anyhow, this implies an 11-year mortality rate of 118,580. Notably the annual mortality rates exclude kids 0-1. I don't have those numbers and haven't bothered to look for them. You get the picture. The CPSC has accounted for 35 deaths in the same period.
It bears noting that these statistics suggest that our markets are in fact rather safe. Injuries to children and deaths associated with Children's Products, while unacceptably high, are just 0.03% of the overall mortality statistics. We can and should continue to focus on improvements, but we should also have some perspective on our challenge. Polishing the apple is different than crisis management.
To further clarify the injury/death problem from lead, let's look at the breakout of injuries and deaths by hazard. Unlike my February 2009 analysis, this data shows all hazards and all recalls in the 11-year period. Please note that some of these hazards are very closely associated with one or two product categories. Lead is closely associated with jewelry. Lead-in-paint is largely associated with toys but touches almost all product categories. Falling and entrapment is a largely infant category. Strangulation is mainly clothing (certainly of late, with all the drawstring recalls) and infant products. With this data, you can see what comes from where.
Injuries and deaths from Children's Products in this period break down as follows:
- Brake Failure 0, 0
- Burns 74, 0
- Cadmium 0, 0
- Choking 150, 3
- Collision 2, 0
- Falling/entrapment 1803, 17
- Fire hazard 4, 0
- Illness 0, 0
- Impalement 0, 0
- Laceration 284, 0
- Lead 3, 1 [The only death from lead in 11 years is Jarnell Brown, mentioned above.]
- Lead-in-paint 1, 0 [That's right, ONE INJURY in 11 years, no deaths.]
- Magnets 3, 0
- Strangulation 26, 7
- Suffocation 29, 7
- 1999: 0 recalls [partial year]
- 2000: 0 recalls
- 2001: 5 recalls
- 2002: 3 recalls
- 2003: 4 recalls
- 2004: 6 recalls
- 2005: 10 recalls
- 2006: 16 recalls
- 2007: 98 recalls
- 2008: 65 recalls
- 2009: 29 recalls
- 2010: 11 recalls [partial year]
The data is also useful to give perspective on the effectiveness of the CPSIA's application of regulatory and corporate resources to new safety activities. In conjunction with last week's hearing, the HTA filed an economic analysis prepared by an independent safety consultant that projects aggregate annual CPSIA testing costs of $5.6 billion. Personally, I think that number is very low for the all-in economic impact from this law, but for the sake of argument, let's use it as THE number for regulatory compliance. So we are all going to spend $5.6 billion ANNUALLY to comply with this law regulating lead and phthalates. Over an 11-year period, ignoring inflation, our costs will be $61.6 billion. This expenditure is presumably designed to reduce the incidents of lead poisoning and phthalates. We have accounted for four injuries and one death. That's what our $61.6 billion is aimed at.
Consider this: if we really want to keep kids safe, we should be somewhat indifferent to HOW they are injured - we just want to protect them from harm. Thus, a bump on the head, a broken arm and lead poisoning are all the same, equally bad. So what if we spent at the same rate on ALL injuries and death identified in CPSC recalls, at the projected CPSIA spend rate? Our cost would be $61.6 billion / 5 (11-year lead and lead-in-paint injuries and deaths) X 2416 (total injuries and deaths in the same period). Sitting down? The total compliance cost we would bear over 11 years would be $29.8 trillion ($2.7 trillion per year). The current national debt is $12.95 trillion. Please also consider that our annual safety expenditures would exceed the expected receipts of the federal government this year ($2.4 trillion). If the federal government only funded us, the government would still run a $300 billion deficit this year.
Call me a worrywart, but I think that kind of safety spending is a bit over the top.
The debate over safety has dramatic economic implications. Safety is a principal concern of the industries serving children's markets, of course, but if we are crippled economically we won't be around to make safe products. There is a sensible balance that can be achieved. The data suggests that the CPSC actually knows what it's doing (at least it did before it became a political football) and can properly allocate its resources.
If the CPSC were entitled to focus on real safety risks (based on data), not the phobias of politicians and consumer groups, and if they could be convinced to stop trying to run our businesses for us, I think we could reduce and refocus safety spending and become much more effective in improving safety.
Numbers don't lie. It's time to reassess and amend the CPSIA. And if the Dems won't let us do that, it's time to reassess them and Congress as a whole.
Monday, February 2, 2009
CPSIA - Don't Believe the Consumer Groups' Snow Job!
Sent: Monday, February 02, 2009 10:09 AM
To: 'Christian.Fjeld@mail.house.gov'; 'robin.appleberry@mail.house.gov'; andrew_grobmyer@pryor.senate.gov; james_reid@rockefeller.senate.gov
Cc: 'brian.mccullough@mail.house.gov'; 'shannon.weinberg@mail.house.gov'; 'william.carty@mail.house.gov'; 'mjg@brown-gidding.com'; Etienne Veber; 'challengeandfun@gmail.com'; 'kathleen@fashion-incubator.com'; 'Stephen Lamar (slamar@apparelandfootwear.org)'; 'Nancy Nord (nnord@cpsc.gov)'; 'Joe Martyak (jmartyak@cpsc.gov)'; 'Mary Toro (MToro@cpsc.gov)'; 'tmoore@cpsc.gov'; 'Patrick Magnuson (patrick.magnuson@mail.house.gov)'; 'Carter Keithley (ckeithley@toy-tia.org)'; 'Rick Locker (fblocker@LockerLaw.com)'; 'Desmond, Edward'; 'David Callet (calletd@gtlaw.com)'; 'ravitz.georgia@arentfox.com'; 'Pamela Gilbert (pamelag@cuneolaw.com)'; 'Robert Adler'; 'Dan Marshall (dan@peapods.com)'; 'erik.lieberman@mail.house.gov'; 'cfalvey@cpsc.gov'; Judy Bailey (judith.bailey@mail.house.gov); adele@narts.org; kmchugh@astratoy.org; richard.goldberg@mail.house.gov; matthew.abbott@mail.house.gov; 'Brian_hendricks@hutchison.senate.gov'; 'david@commerce.senate.gov'; 'Cathy.hurwit@mail.house.gov'; pweller@cpsc.gov; mgougisha@cpsc.gov; bridget_petruczok@boxer.senate.gov; michael_daum@cantwell.senate.gov; bill_ghent@carper.senate.gov; hap_rigby@demint.senate.gov; frannie_wellings@dorgan.senate.gov; david_quinalty@ensign.senate.gov; james_chang@inouye.senate.gov; jonathan_becker@klobuchar.senate.gov; michelle_schwartz@lautenberg.senate.gov; lee_dunn@mccain.senate.gov; sonya_wendell@mccaskill.senate.gov; matthew_hussey@snowe.senate.gov; brendan_plack@thune.senate.gov; hugh_carroll@wicker.senate.gov; elissa.levin@mail.house.gov; christopher.schepis@mail.house.gov; theresa.lavery@mail.house.gov; greg.louer@mail.house.gov; brian.diffell@mail.house.gov; amy.ingham@mail.house.gov; laura.vaught@mail.house.gov; matt.johnson@mail.house.gov; saul.hernandez@mail.house.gov; aaron.shapiro@mail.house.gov; rick.axthelm@mail.house.gov; steve.plevniak@mail.house.gov; scott.cleveland@mail.house.gov; jonathan.smith@mail.house.gov; pat.cavanagh@mail.house.gov; rachelle.wood@mail.house.gov; michael.gaffin@mail.house.gov; angela.manso@mail.house.gov; dana.lichtenberg@mail.house.gov; derrick.ramos@mail.house.gov; elizabeth.stack@mail.house.gov; lori.pepper@mail.house.gov; josh.connolly@mail.house.gov; david.bahar@mail.house.gov; mark.bayer@mail.house.gov; Neeta.Bidwai@mail.house.gov; kyle.victor@mail.house.gov; chris.debosier@mail.house.gov; morgan.jones@mail.house.gov; matthew.dockham@mail.house.gov; tuley.wright@mail.house.gov; cade.king@mail.house.gov; betsy.christian@mail.house.gov; chris.herndon@mail.house.gov; Mike.Ward@mail.house.gov; laura.abshire@mail.house.gov; randi.meyers@mail.house.gov; Greta.Hanson@mail.house.gov; liz.muro@mail.house.gov; jamie.euken@mail.house.gov; jon.oehmen@mail.house.gov; brad.schweer@mail.house.gov; dana.grayson@mail.house.gov; michael.beckerman@mail.house.gov; valerie.henry@mail.house.gov; Becky.Claster@mail.house.gov; tiffany.guarascio@mail.house.gov; jeff.mortier@mail.house.gov; Christopher_day@billnelson.senate.gov; john_phillips@kerry.senate.gov; Kerrie Campbell (kcampbell@manatt.com)
Subject: RE: CPSIA - Don't Believe the Consumer Groups' Snow Job!
On January 30, several consumer advocate groups supporting the CPSIA issued a press release (“January 30 PR”) to “set the record straight” (see http://www.citizen.org/pressroom/release.cfm?ID=2812). In this letter, the authors make many assertions in their arguments in favor of the bill and against the “misleading statements” appearing in “the media, on blogs and on other Web sites”.
Frankly, it has proven challenging to oppose the CPSIA in part because the law is known to be supported by the various consumer groups issuing the January 30 PR. Who would oppose such meritorious organizations? Every American has benefited in one way or another from the work of these groups over the years. Is it possible that their letter is misleading itself, a last ditch effort to support their law in the midst of sagging support? Let’s examine the facts:
January 30 PR Includes Misleading Statistics. The January 30 PR states: “In 2007, there were 473 recalls of children’s products, including millions of toys that contained dangerous levels of lead paint and other toxins. In 2008, consumers fared even worse with 563 recalls, including nearly 8 million toys.” Is this true? I have summarized the posted recalls from the CPSC website on the attached spreadsheet. I encourage you to open each of its seven pages and check my work (the citations are there). This is what the CPSC says happened:
2007: 212 Recalls, 47,626,080 units of which 10,291,440 were due to
lead-in-paint
2008: 178 Recalls, 18,256,110 units of which 3,971,264 were due to
lead-in-paint
2009: 19 recalls (through Jan. 30), 2,375,100 units of which 23,950
were due to lead-in-paint
Of the 125 recalls due to lead-in-paint since January 1, 2007, 36 were for less than 5,000 units and like many (if not the vast majority), were very likely disclosed voluntarily by the companies themselves. Contrary to the assertions of the authors of the January 30 PR, the trend in recalls is SHARPLY DOWNWARD.
The misleading statistics used in the January 30 PR include crib and bassinet recalls, hoodie recalls, flammable clothing recalls, magnet recalls, and so on. This careless misuse of statistics has the effect of whipping up fear among legislators and the public. Fear is displaced, leading to support for a safety bill that will horribly miss its target. Notably, as I have been saying in my correspondence with you for three months, the vast majority of lead infractions are from LEAD-IN-PAINT AND JEWELRY. The consumer groups don’t mention this, but only ONE lead recall (10,000 pieces) in this period was due to substrate. [The circumstances are not clear.] EVERY OTHER LEAD RECALL RELATED TO L-I-P OR JEWELRY. Notably, none of the L-I-P recalls involved a reported injury. Consider the expense imposed on industry with that statistic in mind.
I suggest one can tentatively conclude the following:
a. The laws preceding the CPSIA were sufficient to control L-I-P and lead in jewelry, as shown by the statistics for recalls in this period. Obviously, the CPSC was hard at work recalling those items without the benefit of the CPSIA. There is nothing in these statistics or other information publicly available to suggest that any lead human health issue exists that the CPSC is not empowered to address using the pre-CPSIA law.
b. It is not reasonable to assert that lead in other forms is dangerous without data. In this very active two-year period, apparently ZERO reports of injury from lead in substrates were reported. [There was one report of injury from L-I-P.] As noted again and again in my letters, the prohibition against “total lead” will not change “safety” but will impoverish the companies attempting to serve the children’s product markets.
c. The current enforcement environment, plus all the negative publicity from recalls, is having the desired effect on recalls. Recalls declined in all columns from 2007 to 2008, and continues to decline in 2009. Please note that there have been successively fewer recalls, fewer units recalled, and fewer repeat offenders. At the pace of 2009 recalls for January, L-I-P recalls are on track for a meager 300,000 units this year, down from 10 million two years ago. All without the benefit of the draconian CPSIA penalties and prohibitions.
The January 30 PR letters goes on to state: “These recalls prove that the law’s implementation cannot come too soon.” It is not possible to make this statement after examination of the data on the CPSC website. Did the authors bother to check their facts?
The January 30 PR Misstates that Exemptions Material-by-Material is Workable. To rationalize the design of the CPSIA, the January 30 PR asserts that the CPSC has the ability to exempt materials provided that “there is no risk of harm to the public health”. Interestingly, the House and Senate leadership behind this bill has a different notion (in their letter dated January 16, Reps. Waxman and Rush and Senators Rockefeller and Pryor state that exemptions are allowed for “certain materials – those that inherently do not contain lead or contain lead at levels that do not or would not exceed the law’s limits”, see
http://energycommerce.house.gov/images/stories/Documents/PDF/Newsroom/nord%20moore%202009%201%2016.pdf). Even if the CPSC could make the judgment under the law as the consumer advocates suggest, the resulting system would be so mind bogglingly complex and incomprehensible that it would be defeated in practice within weeks. Most products have many components by the definition contemplated by the CPSIA. With exceptions for certain materials, a typical testing package will be a fat packet represented to be a complete set of tests on only those component materials still subject to testing – it will be impossible to reconcile the reports to the original item. And this is going to IMPROVE safety in the United States by making testing transparent?
It is not possible to create a workable system out of a hodgepodge of testable and exempt materials in a world of real products. Only a non-businessman could come up with a system like this and think it would work.
The January 30 PR Misleads on Testing. The authors of the January 30 PR state that “testing costs have been exaggerated”. Not unlike their assertions on recall statistics, they do not supply invoices or quotes to show affected American businesses how to solve their testing dilemma. I have submitted actual quotes to you previously (see my letters of November 26 and December 12 at http://www.learningresources.com/text/pdf/no_more_telescopes.pdf). If testing is so cheap, why don’t these consumer groups reveal their excellent sources?
The January 30 PR also misleads in stating that under the CPSIA, “big corporations can’t skimp on safety by manufacturing toys in countries with lower safety standards, such as China.” This is highly misleading for more than one reason. First, U.S. corporations are responsible to obey the laws of the United States when they sell products here. Whether they manufacture here or on the Moon, they are still subject to this country’s laws. Blaming China is rather convenient, but the legally responsible parties are still the importers. U.S. importers have always had an obligation to control their supply chains, so China’s willingness or unwillingness to comply with U.S. laws is moot – we need to patrol our own products. Second, as the above statistics demonstrate, U.S. corporations were never able to skimp on safety, not if they had any concern over breaching our laws. It goes without saying that skimping on safety is not a good way to build a business with consumers, either. The January 30 PR relies on convenient conclusions to make its arguments.
The January 30 PR Misleads on Resale Stores (or Just Doesn’t Get It). In reassuring the resale stores are fine, just fine, under the CPSIA, the authors of the January 30 PR state: “the responsibility and expense of certifying the safety of a product belongs to a manufacturer.” Actually, I believe the law states quite clearly that “no person” may “sell, offer for sale . . . distribute in commerce . . . any consumer product” which violates the new CPSIA standards (15 USC §2068(a)(1)). So while resale stores don’t have to test, they still can’t violate the standards. And how, exactly, is a store supposed to pull that one off? Should anyone be troubled by the “knowingly” standard under 15 USC §2069(d) which makes it impossible to play “don’t ask, don’t tell” without exposing your business to high penalties and potentially exposing yourself to jail time? The authors of the January 30 PR provide a laundry list of items that it thinks stores should particularly watch out for. That’s very helpful; can we use their letter as our defense?
The January 30 PR Blames the CPSC for the Failings of Its Law.The authors of the January 30 PR continue their public bashing of the CPSC, fixating blame on the agency for failing in their impossible task: “We called on the agency several weeks ago to urge them to offer more guidance.” They cite “numerous other problems with the agency’s implementation of the law”. Nowhere do the authors address the fact that the law as explained by the above January 16 letter leaves it NO AUTHORITY to make the changes necessary to fix this law. It is not fixable, and as such, the agency cannot work magic.
There is Something I Agree with in the January 30 PR. The authors state: “The continued circulation of misinformation about the new law helps no one.” ‘Nuf said.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
rwoldenberg@learningresources.com
View CPSC Children's Product Recalls 2007 - 2009 >>>
