Tuesday, June 14, 2011
CPSIA - NSSEA Calls for Letters on ECADA
Now's the time to stand up and be counted!!! There are two forms of letter below (Manufacturer and Dealer/Retailer). Please modify as appropriate.
Letter from Manufacturers:
Dear XXXXXX:
I am writing as a constituent and concerned member of the National School Supply & Equipment Association (NSSEA) to express my support for HR 1939, the Enhancing CPSC Authority and Discretion Act of 2011 (ECADA). We urge you to support this important bill that fixes problems created by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) while maintaining the core provisions of this law that ensures the safety of consumers.
[INSERT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR BUSINESS, INCLUDING NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES]
The safety of our products and the safety of our customers are our top priorities. Unfortunately, we have encountered many problems in trying to comply with the well intentioned but overly burdensome CPSIA. We have been forced to spend thousands of dollars for unnecessary lead and phthalate testing and continue to deal with compliance programs that change multiple times to meet constantly changing rules. ECADA provides common sense reform to sections of CPSIA which have burdened our industry during these challenging economic times. Given your strong record as a friend of small business and manufacturers, I hope that I can count on your support for this bill.
A costly new rule mandating a burdensome, unreasonable testing regime, the lifting of the stay on third party testing for lead substrates, and the retroactive application of a tighter lead standard despite overwhelming evidence showing that this new limit is not technologically feasible are just several challenges that my company will face this year if the reforms in ECADA are not approved by Congress soon. ECADA reduces the most excessive regulatory burdens created by CPSIA while maintaining protection for consumers. The bill enhances the Consumer Production Safety Commission’s (CPSC) ability to investigate complaints and prioritize testing based on cost-benefit analysis, and improves the CPSC’s public database by ensuring more accurate information.
As manufacturers and small business struggle to recover from the worst recession in decades, it is vital that government does not impose costly and unnecessary regulations that have no positive impact and hinder the fragile recovery. I urge you to vote for ECADA to ensure that companies like mine can continue to provide quality products and services that are so important to our children's education.
Sincerely,
XXXXXXXX
Letter from Dealers/Retailers:
Dear XXXXXX:
I am writing as a constituent and concerned member of the National School Supply & Equipment Association (NSSEA) to express my support for HR 1939, the Enhancing CPSC Authority and Discretion Act of 2011 (ECADA). We urge you to support this important bill that fixes problems created by the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) while maintaining the core provisions of this law that ensures the safety of consumers.
[INSERT INFORMATION ABOUT YOUR BUSINESS, INCLUDING NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES]
The safety of our products and the safety of our customers are our top priorities. Unfortunately, we have encountered many problems in trying to comply with the well intentioned but overly burdensome CPSIA. As a distributor, we fear that the range of products offered by our suppliers will continue to narrow due to the costs manufacturers incur for unnecessary lead and phthalate testing. In turn, the needs of American students will be unmet, including those children with disabilities and special learning needs, because fewer specialized products will be available to our customers.
CPSIA has caused considerable confusion in the marketplace due to the constantly changing rules and regulations associated with the law. ECADA reduces the most excessive regulatory burdens created by CPSIA while maintaining protection for consumers. The bill provides common sense reform to sections of CPSIA which have burdened our industry during these challenging economic times. The bill enhances the Consumer Production Safety Commission’s (CPSC) ability to investigate complaints and prioritize testing based on cost-benefit analysis, and improves the CPSC’s public database by ensuring more accurate information.
Given your strong record as a friend of small business and manufacturing, I hope that I can count on your support for this bill. As small business struggles to recover from the worst recession in decades, it is vital that government does not impose costly and unnecessary regulations that have no positive impact and hinder the fragile recovery. I urge you to vote for ECADA to ensure that companies like mine can continue to provide quality products and services that are so important to our children's education.
Sincerely,
XXXXXXXX
Monday, September 27, 2010
CPSIA - My Comment Letter on 100 ppmLead Standard
My comment letter submitted today on the proposed 100 ppm lead standard due to be inflicted on August 14, 2011:
September 27, 2010
Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 502
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0080 Children’s Products Containing Lead; Technological Feasibility of 100 ppm for Lead Content
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on Children’s Products Containing Lead; Technological Feasibility of 100 ppm for Lead Content (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0080) published in the Federal Register on July 27, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).
You have requested feedback and additional information on several topics relating to the prospect of a new lower 100 ppm lead-in-substrate standard. I will attempt to respond to your specific queries at the end of this letter. I find that the questions you have articulated are basically irrelevant to our company’s situation. Your questions seem to presume that the standard will be implemented. If you take the step of implementing the new standard, you will be inflicting needless and extension damage to our company with absolutely no corresponding benefit to consumers or the general public. This is terrible and irresponsible public policy. The new standard is not based on science but rather phobia and fear of the unknown. Our business will suffer for no purpose. The jobs lost will at your hand.
I want to comment on process. The agency appears to be in a race to complete its CPSIA rulemakings before year end, damn the consequences. According to www.regulations.gov, the CPSC received 73 comment letters on the Proposed Interpretative Rule for “Children’s Product” (CPSC-2010-0029 due June 21, 2010). Nevertheless, as has been widely reported, the agency ignored or glossed over the vast majority of those comments (including all of mine) and pronounced the draft rule to be “final” with virtually no changes. This flagrant disregard of public comments turned the CPSC’s rulemaking process into a sham if not an outright breach of law. I believe the agency intends to pass through rulemaking this year to avoid the embarrassment of further extending the CPSIA testing stay due to expire on February 10, 2011. The incentive to give short shrift to our comments grows daily.
I have lost faith in the sincerity of the agency’s interest in public comments after two years of being completely ignored. To judge by the agency’s disregard of my numerous comment letters, I must add little to your deliberations – in which case I do not understand why you ask me to waste hours on letters like this. After all, if you have no interest in my views, why not let me spend my time on other more productive activities? Unfortunately, I have also learned that any silence by stakeholders will be interpreted as “approval” by the powers-that-be. Thus, we are left with no option but to write these letters. With those thoughts in mind, I hereby submit my comments on the 100 ppm lead standard, fully anticipating that I will be ignored yet again.
I am aware that the agency contends that it is “compelled” to implement this new standard without regard to economics. The extremely rigid legislative language governing the implementation of the 100 ppm standard is thus portrayed as insurmountable. Is the agency truly powerless to resist? I might take that position more seriously if the agency was equally committed to following the law in other aspects of its daily affairs. However, the CPSC exhibits no such self-restraint. CPSC recalls initiated in flagrant disregard for the “substantial product hazard” standard in Section 15 of the CPSA demonstrates that the agency can invent legal flexibility wherever it wants. For instance, the CPSC pressed for a recall of McDonald’s Shrek glasses (signifying that the glasses were a “substantial product hazard”) despite this June 4th acknowledgement by the agency’s Director of Public Affairs in a tweet: "Scott_Wolfson: Note to reporters: the recalled McDonald's glasses are not toxic." Safe glasses do not constitute a “substantial product hazard” by any definition – yet the agency proceeded anyhow.
So when does the law actually matter, precisely? If safe drinking glasses may be labeled a “substantial product hazard”, then I guess anything goes. I find it worrisome to be regulated by a federal agency which does not abide by a disciplined interpretation of law but instead caters to prevailing political whims. If the law means nothing, then the agency should not presume to assert its inability to resist this provision. I think that’s just too convenient to be believable.
My comments on the proposed 100 ppm standard are informed by my view that the agency can do as it pleases. I have not restricted myself by the fiction that economics don’t matter.
The problems with the 100 ppm Lead Standard:
a. The new standard will have NO impact on human health. There is simply no evidence of injuries from lead at levels between 100 ppm and 300 ppm in substrate. It is notable that no other federal agency (NIH, CDC, EPA, FDA, etc.) has identified lead-in-substrate as a human health hazard. Without evidence of injuries at these barely measurable lead levels, the new standard cannot be justified economically or otherwise. It is worth noting that if the “cost” of lead-in-substrate levels of 100-300 ppm cannot be measured, the “benefit” of the new standard will be equally elusive. Given the known costs of this initiative, the new standard fails any conceivable cost-benefit analysis.
I published a study of CPSC recall data from 1999-2010 in my blog (www.learningresourcesinc.blogspot.com) in May 2010, revealing that only one death has been documented in association with lead in children’s products in the last 11 years, and only three (unverified) lead injuries in the same period. This is substantially fewer childhood fatalities and serious injuries than swimming pools and spas cause in an average day according to CPSC statistics. Given the trillions of daily interactions between children and Children’s Products in the course of a year, these meager 11-year lead injury totals are the statistical equivalent of no injuries. Thus, it will be impossible to prove statistically that any reduction in injuries flows from the change in standard. Troubling? Fear of lead-in-substrate is nothing more than a Congressionally-endorsed fear of cooties.
b. The new standard will substantially raise our product costs. The new standard means we will need to implement much tighter manufacturing tolerances for materials and for our processes. The many extra man-hours needed to implement and maintain these tighter tolerances will be expensive. It is difficult to estimate the cost, but we project a 10-20% increase in cost for finished goods subject to the new standard. Subcontractors who manufacture our goods will charge us for the risk of waste, plus the additional overhead required by the new standard. That is, they will charge us more if they are still willing to remain a vendor of Children’s Products subject to this standard. We are a small business, so many of our factories may feel our short runs are simply not worth the risk. That’s how I would look at it if I were them. Loss of vendors (manufacturing capacity) is yet another cost we would bear under the new standard.
It is worth noting that based on the results of our last two years of testing (thousands of testing line items), we estimate that less than 2% of our testing line items fall between 100 ppm and 300 ppm in lead as of today. The cost of trolling for those few affected components will be excessive and the waste associated with replacing “defective” materials will be a tax on our entire production and fulfillment processes. Not exactly a stimulus program. . . .
c. Our ability to control lead levels is unknown because test result variances are so wide. We have found that testing multiple samples from the same lot can show variances of up to 67% in lead content. It doesn’t take much variance to produce wild percentage swings at such trace lead levels. As an illustration, I have attached hereto a test report on a SINGLE PIECE OF PLASTIC STRING used to fasten a mesh bag. The string was tested in ten places, resulting in lead levels of 239 -275 ppm. In another case, we found three test results of the same yellow plastic substrate varied from 23 -139 ppm. None of this matters from a safety standpoint but from a regulatory standpoint, it’s a crisis in the making.
These small variances potentially endanger our business. How are we supposed to run our business selling inexpensive children’s products burdened by such an inflexible physical standard? The CPSC needs to recognize that substrates in the real world are not pure, consistent and invariable. The tight tolerances in this new standard will likely have us retesting several items a month at considerable expense and strain. [And G-d knows what standard the CPSC will inflict on us to govern retesting.] Each retest would presumably interfere with our ability to deliver on time and would stress our system and our people. Out-of-pocket costs would be high, perhaps over $100,000 per annum for our product portfolio of 1500 items; labor and other frictional costs would no doubt add to this total substantially.
d. It will be impossible to predict which components will fail. As test results tend to vary significantly for components from the same lot, it is difficult to control or predict problems. We have found violative results for many different materials used in our business – there is no pattern. Defects found in certain components might render the entire finished good worthless, potentially greatly increasing our losses. For example, an inexpensive backpack might be found to have a zipper that violates the new standard upon completion of the production run. This could happen even after extensive pre-manufacturing testing because physical goods tend to vary in composition. Perhaps only a tiny percentage of the zippers violate the new standard by a few ppm, but given the cost to repair and rehab the item and the practical inability to identify violative zippers, the entire lot of backpacks might have to be scrapped. There would be an increased incentive to substitute components across entire product lines, not because of any health or safety concern but simply to avoid regulatory compliance risk. Differences in utility would be a secondary consideration to avoidance of CPSC recalls or scrapping finished goods inventory. This situation would not be stable because consumers would not likely accept lower standards for our products just to mollify the CPSC – other seismic market changes could be anticipated.
e. The legal risks implicit in the new standard are simply intolerable. Let me ask you a question: how would you attempt to manage a major risk to your business caused by less than 2% of your activity? What if you had no idea WHICH 2% it was? What could you do? I think you might reevaluate your business model. Most people don’t roll the dice on their family wealth or their regular income. By imposing a standard for lead-in-substrate that is barely above measurable levels, the agency would be imposing EXACTLY this risk on us.
We believe we would be exposed to a daily risk of assault by consumer groups and other do-gooders bent on our destruction. This combat would be divorced from considerations of safety – it would be all about regulatory compliance. Our business purpose is not to pay fees to CPSC Bar attorneys, write up Section 15 reports or perform recalls. We do not have the profit margins to finance this kind of wasteful activity and do not have the spare capacity to deal with the regulatory “crisis of the day”. The legal risks of such conflict can quickly get out of control – and insurance is simply not a viable option economically. If we must bear these heightened risks, we will have to revisit our business model.
I hope the agency will not dare the children’s product industry to go belly up just to prove this point.
f. Companies, acting in good faith, are generally INCAPABLE of adopting the new standard as a practical matter. Everything can be made of low lead materials. Zippers can be made of platinum, alphabet blocks can be made of wood, cotton fibers or rhodium. Use of recycled materials can be discontinued (the anti-green movement). Durable and inexpensive materials used for years without incident can be discarded in favor of “purer” materials. All of these things are possible. But they are not practical and they are not economic. If we are to indulge the fantasy of the money-oblivious CPSIA, then whatever we can imagine is possible and money doesn’t matter. This is regrettably unrealistic – businesses exist in the real world and money DOES matter. Thus, companies operating in good faith can’t adopt the new standard if their business model is scrambled.
g. Dealers in our goods can be expected to adopt their own standards to create a regulatory “cushion”. Distributors and retailers have been building their own safe harbors to provide CPSIA protection over the last two years. We have many customers with unique and wildly variant compliance requirements despite the crafting of thousands of pages of rules from the CPSC under the CPSIA. Our dealers can always beat the CPSC in a game of “Can you top this?” If the agency implements a 100 ppm standard, we fully expect a new outbreak of “regulatory compliance exuberance” among retailers. What will happen to us under those circumstances? With a CPSC-fed mania, we will incur yet more costs and bear yet more risks. Our markets will shrink.
h. We believe these rules will so demoralize and de-motivate our staff that we will face high turnover rates among our employees who know all of your rules. Our regulatory compliance team is not on “work release” from jail. Their jobs are not intended as a form of societal punishment. If, however, compliance with the CPSC’s bureaucratic rules becomes too tedious or risky, or the stress of managing a string of crises and a blizzard of conflicting rules becomes overwhelming, our trusted associates will seek less stressful employment elsewhere. They don’t HAVE TO do this for a living. What is the CPSC planning to do to help small businesses who find themselves back at square one after a costly investment of thousands of dollars in specialized training? Is the new CPSC Small Business Ombudsman going to wave a magic wand to make our problems go away? I think we all know the answer – too bad for us.
Here are the answers to your questions:
1. Materials that are consistently under 100 ppm in lead content. You have previously provided a list of such materials for the 300 ppm standard. This list included some useful concessions, such as wood and cotton fibers, but also included useless and irritating examples like gold and platinum, gemstones and various byproducts of nuclear decay. In our experience, the common substrate materials used in educational products have varying (trace) levels of lead. As noted above, we have seen significant variances in lead content in a single string, and in substrates taken from the same lot. I have no confidence that any material we use can be proven to ALWAYS contain than 100 ppm lead.
2. Strategies or Devices to comply with the new 100 ppm standard. The only strategy we could employ is pre-manufacturing testing on materials with substantially increased testing frequency. As noted above, natural variances among many materials prevent us from creating any reliable safe harbor and cost increases from such testing activity (and the cost of scrapping otherwise acceptable raw materials) will greatly shrink our product line. As a consequence, we would likely have to sharply reduce our product line or go out of business – all thanks to the CPSC and our Congress!
3. Consequences of use of compliant materials meeting the needs of the product. We have not spent any resources evaluating the market demand for educational products made of platinum. We do not intend to switch over to osmium or ruthenium for their purported lead-free properties (we find toxicity to be a greater concern). We have not spent our time figuring out if gold is a suitable material for pattern blocks or our Reading Rods. There is no answer to this ridiculous question. As I mentioned above, more than 98% of our test line items complies with the new standard. The materials and components that fail do not fit a pattern. Tests are inconsistent, too.
4. For products that meet the 300 ppm standard but not the 100 ppm standard, provide data on compliance. As noted, we find that we are already 98%+ compliant with the new standard. The components that fail do so unpredictably and inconsistently. Even the same material out of the same lot produces varying test results, as do multiple tests of the same piece of string. We cannot run a business based on junk science intolerance of the world that G-d created. The crazy new 100 ppm lead standard is incompatible with variances found in the physical world.
I want to reiterate that the 100 ppm standard is entirely arbitrary and will save no lives and will preserve no IQ points.
5. Can such items be made compliant through use of other materials? Sure, of course they could. They would be unsalable because the products were rendered too expensive either by the engineering cost or the new materials cost. Is creating products that no one will buy an acceptable solution to this dilemma? Whether by economics (too costly to buy) or re-jiggering of business models (discontinued products), children will be purportedly “safer” because they will lose access to needed products. What a wonderful result! Does the CPSC advocate that American schools teach physical science with photos of magnets, paper clips and rocks? Perhaps we should revert to rote-and-repetition math education rather than modern techniques of hands-on learning. No doubt the CPSC would singlehandedly solve our national education crisis. Bring on pointless material substitutions and let the fun begin.
6. Best practices to be used to always comply with the new standard. I recommend dropping most products and only making items that are CERTAIN to be compliant. This in practical terms may be impossible, and as noted above, is completely uneconomic. Another good practice to discard everything that isn’t virgin material. I know that’s not “green” but we have to be really, really safe, right? Another super idea is to substantially increase our testing, but of course, we cannot afford the current level of testing as it is. That seems somehow unrealistic. Other strict controls on manufacturing seem equally out of reach. There are so many variables to manage to achieve the new standards – we must control the factory environment as though it were a hospital ICU. That’s just not possible at current cost levels. Our factories would have to be “restructured”. I bet the Small Business Ombudsman can coach us on this!!!
Please note: we don’t have to reorganize our factories because we don’t have to stay in the children’s product market. If the CPSC expects us to reorganize our entire way of doing business to accommodate a phobic standard not based on any observable public health problem, we may opt out. Is this really the purpose of the CPSC – to micromanage markets, to restructure the economy, to substitute for market forces? I think not. Please check the CPSA to see why your agency exists. I hope a Republican-controlled Congress will do exactly the same thing in a few weeks’ time.
7. The lowest technologically feasible lead level below 300 ppm in our products. We can achieve anything for a cost. There are no “lowest” levels. Why not specify entirely lead-free? We can make everything out of gold and osmium! Lay in a few gemstones and diamonds, and you will have a sparkling new toy that cannot poison anyone with lead. It may have other problems (choking hazards? Sharp points?) but at least no one will die from lead poisoning. Not that anyone did previously . . . .
8. The date by which our products can meet the 100 ppm standard. In my opinion, the date is NEVER, because we have no practical ability to control quality to the level you require. Even at our current 98%+ compliance with the new standard, it would be extraordinarily disruptive to attempt to be 100% compliant. After a few episodes of being shut down by the CPSC or sued by some lunatic consumer group over nothing, we would exit the market. If you intend to deprive us of the meaning and pleasure of our work to make children’s lives better, we’ll leave the well-being and education of our nation’s children to you. That would be a very sad day for us.
Thank you for considering my views on this important subject. This letter took me all day; I hope you won’t completely ignore it as you have all my other letters.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061
Monday, September 20, 2010
CPSIA - REMINDER, Comments due on 100 ppm soon!
I wanted to remind you that comments are due on the latest effort of your government and your CPSC to put us all out of business, namely the reduction of the lead standard to 100 ppm. I have previously analyzed this call for comments in this space and have nothing new to add.
As I noted in my last post, the call for comments rules out most sensible replies to the proposed reduction such as
- The cost is unaffordable and will render our products too expensive to produce
- The new limit is suitable for mass market products but will make specialty market products impossible to manufacture (too bad for us, I guess).
- The new limit is needlessly disruptive.
- The new limit substantially increases our liability exposure.
- The new limit creates yet more ways for the CPSC to interfere with our businesses.
- The new limit creates more externalities and randomness in our business results (another "profit prevention" initiative).
- The new limit will have absolutely no impact on human health but will have tremendous implications for business health.
All irrelevant.
If you can't come up with anything to say to save your business under this provision, I still encourage you to send in a comment. Perhaps if we drown them with comments about the unfairness to small business, they might at least pause for a moment before sending us into business oblivion. You can always just thank them for putting you out of business. A "thank you" always goes a long way, just like your Mom used to tell you.
Yeah, thanks CPSC. It's been a great ride . . . .
Thursday, August 26, 2010
CPSIA - Apparently, NONE of Us Knows What We're Talking About
The CPSC just issued its Final Interpretative Rule on the meaning of "Children's Products". For those of you with a pile of reading materials on your desk from the CPSC, this delectable morsel weighs in at 63 pages. Add it to the heap.
Good news, however - you don't need to waste too much time reading it. The time you spent commenting on the prior draft, now THAT was the waste of time. I burned a few hours on that exercise myself - what-a-fool, I will never learn. The REASON you need not waste time reading the final rule is that virtually all comments you (and anyone else) gave were disregarded or discounted. The changes to the rule were minimal or meaningless and there was no reconsideration of the manifold flaws in the "draft" interpretative rule. If you don't believe me, have fun deconstructing the 63 pages of drivel against all the comments noted and unremarked upon.
So what is the story we should tell ourselves about this little incident? Here's a few choices for you:
- Commenting on these rules is a waste of time because the CPSC is tired of the game - they want to get this done, and that means dealing with comments is not in the plan anymore. [Connect the dots with the pending expiration of the testing stay, and you may get a sense of the urgency.]
- The solicitation of comments is compelled by law but there is no obligation for the agency to accept any of our comments. Since they know best, they no longer care what we think and have decided not to even pretend anymore. It's a sham process.
- We're all incompetents, which is perhaps why we need to have a CPSC so desperately.
I bet it's no. 3 - we're all idiots and our comments reflect it. It's hard to face up to one's shortcomings . . . but I appreciate the gentleness of the message from the CPSC. Rather than embarrass us by announcing that we business people know nothing, they just politely ignore our ravings.
And think - now that we've established that they know everything and we know nothing, processing of recalls and other financially-impactful events with the agency will be much easier. They are right, by definition, and we are wrong, by definition. Simple! We'll save a lot on legal fees, too, because there won't be any point in arguing. No, I'm not talking about the PGA. . . .
I love government of the people, by the people, for the people - especially if those people are unchecked regulators!
Sunday, August 22, 2010
CPSIA - CPSC Calls for Comments on 100 PPM Lead Limit
The CPSC recently called for comments on the CPSIA's scheduled reduction in permitted lead limits to 100 ppm on August 14, 2011. This is one of the most disruptive provisions of a truly disruptive law and therefore this call for comments DESERVES YOUR ATTENTION.
Let's review the situation - the CPSIA requires that the lead limit be lowered to 100 ppm if it is "technologically feasible" (Section 101(a)). This determination can be made product-by-product or even by product class. In other words, some of us might get a free pass because the CPSC decides it isn't "technologically feasible" for them, but the rest of us might get screwed. Figure that the big guys with the money to put in comments prepared by highly-paid consultants have an advantage here. Big surprise . . . .
The definition of "technological feasibility" is found in Section 101(d) in the CPSIA.
"(d) TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY DEFINED.—For purposes of this section, a limit shall be deemed technologically feasible with regard to a product or product category if— (1) a product that complies with the limit is commercially available in the product category; (2) technology to comply with the limit is commercially available to manufacturers or is otherwise available within the common meaning of the term; (3) industrial strategies or devices have been developed that are capable or will be capable of achieving such a limit by the effective date of the limit and that companies, acting in good faith, are generally capable of adopting; or (4) alternative practices, best practices, or other operational changes would allow the manufacturer to comply with the limit." [Emphasis added]
To help explain what "technological feasibility" means, I have coined this expression - "If Rolex can do it, you HAVE to do it." Yes, that means that this term has been defined to focus solely on technological capability with an explicit and intentional omission of any economic considerations (how expensive it might be for you to lower your products to this level). A single example of a product produced within these extreme limits is apparently an insurmountable obstacle to an exemption under this provision. No matter that it is extremely expensive. The all-platinum ATV comes to mind.
The meaninglessness of this reduction from a health or safety standpoint is likewise legally irrelevant.
A quick scan of the Request for Comment shows that the CPSC intends to follow its earlier path of exempting materials that are ALWAYS under the 100 ppm limit. I have "criticized" the conclusions of the previous CPSC effort. Expect nothing less than the insights from the CPSC's last try which authorizes the use of super-expensive materials and by-products of nuclear waste in children's products. Anyone for an osmium-laced baby blanket?
You will also note that there is ZERO reference to economics in the Request for Comment. In other words, money factors are totally irrelevant. This might matter to you if you project that this requirement could lead to sudden and deadly losses in your business or otherwise hasten your departure from the children's product market. Not that the Dems (who are driving this thing) or the CPSC give a darn about your little problems.
YOU NEED TO SEND IN COMMENTS ON THE 100 PPM LIMIT. Ideally, you will gather data and make a reasoned argument. PROTECT YOURSELF - this is an important request for comment. Comments are due on SEPTEMBER 27, 2010.
And one last note: despite your government's current attitude, this remains YOUR country. Please consider how you feel about a law like this and its impact on your stakeholders (owners, employees, customers, suppliers, consumers, community). You don't need to accept the fate Mr. Waxman and his merry band have in mind for you. There's an Election Day coming. Don't waste it.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
CPSIA - Happy Birthday CPSIA!!!
And how much safer we have become! In my post "Numbers Don't Lie", I abstracted the injury statistics from CPSC children's product recalls over the prior 11 years. I know from "someone who should know" that the CPSC does not tabulate injury statistics like this - so I am your only source even on the second birthday of the CPSIA. No matter, the spreadsheet indicates that there were 242 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the end of my study, April 21, 2010. By contrast, there were a total of 657 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the randomly-selected end of my study, March 5, 1999. The injuries associated with lead that proceeded the CPSIA were one death and two asserted injuries, and after the CPSIA - one asserted lead injury (in two years). [See "Numbers Don't Lie (Update No. 1)".] What an achievement! It's so, soooo clear we need this tough new law. . . .
By the way, I don't mean to be too "science-y", but a reduction in lead injuries from one death and two asserted injuries in nine years to one asserted injury in two years is simply not a statistically significant reduction. And we must consider additionally that ALL of the injuries, before and after the CPSIA, were ASSERTED BUT NOT VERIFIED. So there may be ZERO recorded actual injuries - we just don't know. This makes our health improvement objectives even fuzzier.
And the cost of the CPSIA "final solution"? Well, I have calculated that, using the HTA's estimate of $5.625 billion in annual CPSIA compliance costs (which I believe is low and in any event was calculated before the CPSIA showed its hand on testing frequency - see below), the 11-year cost of compliance is a mere $61.9 Billion. Using EPA metrics for the economic value of a human life and one lost IQ point, and giving full credit to each of the three asserted but unverified lead injuries, I have calculated the cost of the injuries to be $6.1 million over 11 years. That's pretty symmetrical, don't you think? $62 billion in costs to save $6.1 million.
Spend $10,000 to save a buck. That sums up this era in a single sentence.
Oh, but it gets even better. In case you, or pick any regulator, are too dense to understand the implications of those numbers for the future prospects of the children's product market, the CPSC has recently published a rule for comment on testing frequency and "reasonable testing programs". This rule was due on November 14, 2009 (hence the "15 Month Rule") but was delayed because the CPSC understood the rule's potential to literally kill all small businesses in this market. [That would include our business, btw.] So they held a two-day workshop in December 2009 to hear ideas and industry concerns and then spent months crafting the rule. This rule has been in the works for two years now. You have to figure they're serious.
The CPSC was kind enough to illustrate the costs our business can expect under their sparkling new rule. So I broke out my trusty calculator (again - too math-y? too science-y?) and determined that they intend for us to spend a mere $10,000 per item per year in testing. This includes destroying 54 samples of each item in the process of testing. Anyhow, think of how many products you make - and multiply by $10,000. That's your annual testing bill now.
Drum roll, please . . . our bill will be a mere $15 million per year! Pretty exciting to get off so easy. No doubt our bankruptcy will make American kids safer. Of course, I am pretty sure it won't make them any smarter - our educational products will cease to exist. Then, of course, their ignorance of math and science might qualify to run the CPSC. There's always a bright side to tragedy and catastrophe, I suppose.
It is worth a passing note that this is my 490th blogpost on the CPSIA and its terrible effects. I have submitted comments letters by the bushel basket, testified numerous times at the CPSC (often at their request), testified in front of Congress, been on national TV and radio, wrote Op-Eds and been featured innumerable times in various publications, held a rally on Capitol Hill, met with Commissioners, Congressional staffers and members of Congress, and so on. The CPSC's actions are not being taken in ignorance. They are being done in the face of reason. This is not partisanism - this is "know nothing-ism".
So Happy Happy Birthday, CPSIA! Your work is not done, unfortunately. Our company is still breathing.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
CPSIA - Jobs, the CPSIA and me
Michelle Rena Jones, the unemployed person featured in the video is a victim of our economic downturn, and of Michigan's long dependence on the auto industry. She seems intelligent and highly employable. . . yet she is the part of the long term unemployed. She's not alone by a long shot.
We employ about 150 people in our educational toy business. We consider ourselves fortunate to be able to provide these jobs, given the terrible recession, awful State funding prospects, and most importantly, the overhang of the fatal CPSIA. When I thought about Ms. Jones, I asked myself why we aren't hiring right now.
Frankly, our business reflects the punk economy you hear about on TV. Right now, we lack the confidence that we can safely add people, or even more importantly, that we will see the sales volume to support new people. This closes most doors to new jobs at our shop.
Then there's our ole' pal, the CPSIA. What impact does the CPSIA have on our hiring mentality? Hey, I'm the guy who figured out that this government intends to jam me with a requirement to spend $15 million per annum on testing - how do you think it makes me feel? I assume smaller companies, including the crafters comprising the HTA, realize that despite the various promises and wiped-away tears at the CPSC, the new rules offer scant relief to the small fry. The rules mean business death - and that ain't a job program, kids. If we're toast, so are other small businesses. Actually, if we're toast, everyone's toast.
Right now, I cannot abide investing in our business. Expansion is a joke since the federal government has totally abandoned us. Trust has been obliterated, shredded, stomped on. Congress is completely deaf and the CPSC doesn't give a darn - which is why after two years of work and "dialogue", they produced the drivel we were to comment on last week. [For a candid assessment of those rules, please see my comment to Anne Northup's blogpost of August 11.]
Do you think any rational business manager would hire anyone while fearing that costs far exceeding his annual profits are about to be imposed? Forget it - business people suffering under the crushing burden of the wave of Obama hyper-regulation are thinking of how to survive. Bucking the rules won't work, either - don't forget that the agency has the power to press felony charges against anyone who knowingly breaks this law. 2011 is Tenenbaum's "year of enforcement".
Can't wait. . . .
Ms. Jones won't be likely getting a job from a children's product company anytime soon.
Apparently, some people still wonder why voters are angry and why the Dems are being blamed. If anyone seriously can't figure that one out, they're as deaf as the stone deaf members of Congress we will be voting out of office . . . soon.
Very soon.
Monday, August 9, 2010
CPSIA - The Great Set-Up
The two CPSC rulemakings up for comment on August 3rd were on component testing and on the so-called "15 Month Rule". Both are very important rules and both have been long discussed. The "15 Month Rule" relates to testing frequency and defines a "reasonable testing program". The long controversy over these rules relates to their acknowledged potential to be TERMINAL to small businesses. This was the principal reason that Inez Tenenbaum delayed issuing these rules on time in November 2009 as required by law (they can vary from law when it suits their purposes, please note). She called a two-day workshop for December 2009 for the purpose of gathering the feedback of stakeholders. I was asked to appear as a panelist, as were two of my colleagues. These sessions were taped (they were able to hear all the feedback and digest it).
So here's a few things you should know:
a. Component testing will not be useful except for the largest companies and for those rare situations when everything falls neatly into place. The rules as written are too complex, too demanding (full traceability of all components is REQUIRED, which is delusional and completely unnecessary for such simple, innocuous products) and far too risky. The liability risk associated with these very challenging rules will scare off all but the most foolhardy or ignorant companies.
b. Component testing relies on a fantastic assumption, namely that component tests (if desired) will even be available. Why don't we assume they will be available for every paint and for every plastic pellet on the planet? Does that solve the problem? I dare say not. There are many convenient examples of likely missing test reports - think of aluminum foil in a science kit, for instance. If you are missing only a few component certificates, any benefit from the rule is lost.
c. The "15 Month Rule" was apparently NOT CHANGED from the draft discussed in December 2009. In other words, despite the agency's "misgivings" about the rule way back then, and even after two days of comments by more than 200 stakeholders, the agency ended up in the same problematic place - and put the rule out for comment now. Of course, they filled in some holes (see below). In my opinion, this means either that the "feedback" process was a complete sham (the agency gave the appearance of "listening" but did as it pleased anyhow) or else that the agency lacks the temerity to tell Congress that the CPSIA is simply screwed up. Having ducked that punch, the CPSC instead opted to put you and me out of business.
If they were unable or unwilling to listen in the last nine months, I have absolutely no confidence they will listen this time. That bodes badly for me and for you. Consider the following . . . .
d. Using the numbers from the CPSC's rulemaking, I derived that the agency wants me to spend $10,000 per item per year in testing costs (all-in). We have 1,500 items. Do the math - that's $15 million per year in testing. This is for a company with ONE RECALL OF 130 PIECES TO ITS NAME IN 26 YEARS. This is also the rule regulating a "risk" that killed ONE CHILD and MAY HAVE INJURED THREE CHILDREN . . . in 11 years. [You can review the math in my comment letter. It's their numbers, not mine.] Do you think this might be a touch excessive? No matter, that's our problem to resolve.
I can't get this $15 million number out of my head. Do you realize that this rule could become the law shortly? Hey, HTA members, do you get it yet? All that nuzzling up to the CPSC, all their tears over your plight - this rule shuts your doors. If they push forward on this rule (as I anticipate), we will all face a very daunting choice - do we close our doors, sell our companies, go into another business or, breath deep, knowingly break the law by ignoring this rule? Is this a surprise to anyone? This has to be the world's stupidest rule - and we are left with the ultimate Hobson's Choice. Thanks CPSC.
Let's not forget that Bob Adler spoke in stern tones last February when he said he would not vote to extend the stay on the testing and certification rules again. In the absence of further Commission action, the testing stay lapses on February 11, 2011. This rulemaking is intended to put the agency in position to let the stay expire. The next step would be enforcement of this new rule. Ms. Tenenbaum has publicly announced that 2011 will be all about enforcement - you have been warned, the pogroms are coming.
Do you get it . . . yet? IF the agency cannot wrap up this rulemaking in time, it will need to extend the stay. Arguably, that problem is on its doorstep right now. Even they understand that businesses need time to plan, and without final rules, no planning or preparation can take place. IF they cannot get this done in time (soon), they will have to extend the stay AGAIN. This would be incredibly damning of the agency, as it would be an apparent concession that the awful CPSIA cannot be implemented, perhaps ever. Of course, that only confirms what you and I have known for a long time - the law can't be fixed by this agency and is fatally flawed. In the absence of dynamic Congressional action, we're all toast (this is old news).
I urge you to take this battle to the political arena. The CPSC and the Dem-controlled Congress have shown that they just won't listen. They don't care about our problems. I say that if they are intent in putting us out of business, all of our productive businesses making contributions to our community and our markets every day, then it's time to return the favor. We need to put THEM out of business first.
Time's a-wastin'.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
CPSIA - Comment Letter on the "15 Month Rule"
Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 820
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0038 Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification.
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0038) published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).
The End of (Business) Life As We Know It:
As I sit down to record my comments on this rule, I take comfort in knowing that the CPSC admits what it is doing here. In a section entitled “Caveats and Possible Market Reactions to Third Party Testing Requirements”, the agency acknowledges the severe impact of its new rule on manufacturers:
a. Significantly increased costs,
b. Incentive to redesign (presumably successful) products,
c. Incentive to reduce features on products,
d. Incentive to eliminate (presumably useful) components in finished goods,
e. Incentive to reduce product lines,
f. Exit the market altogether,
g. Go out of business,
h. Create barriers to entry for future business expansion, especially in specialty markets (non-mass market),
i. Devastate niche markets (noting particularly the “special needs” educational market – sorry, blind kids!), and
j. Incentive to delay or forgo product or manufacturing process improvements (to avoid testing costs).
Quite a stimulus program! Of course, the CPSC knows we can’t meet this challenge alone. In “The Potential Effects of the Proposed Rule”, the agency advises us to hire a few helpers:
a. Lawyers to review CPSC regulations,
b. Engineers and chemists to develop product specifications, conduct tests and design a program for production testing,
c. Statisticians or consultants to determine the frequency, sample size and collection method for production testing, and
d. Technicians, “perhaps working under the supervision of an engineer, chemist or similar professional”, to perform production tests.
This certainly is a Brave New World for us. Luckily we have the CPSC to tell us what to do. Unfortunately, we can’t afford an in-house legal department or teams of engineers, chemists or statisticians. We don’t even have technicians. Incredibly, somehow we bumble on in our blissful, almost charming ignorance, having had only one recall of 130 pieces (we recovered every unit) out of perhaps 1,000,000,000 units sold in the last 26 years. No doubt all the pain the CPSC is promising us will be worth it . . . gotta keep everyone so safe.
Seriously, Is Anyone Listening?
On page 28338 of the Federal Register, the Proposed Rule reproduces the “reasonable testing program” as it stood before the December 10-11, 2009 workshop at the CPSC. The workshop (which we attended with three people who were each asked to appear as a panelist) was ostensibly for the purpose of giving “stakeholder feedback” on the so-called “15 Month Rule” (the Proposed Rule) and the component testing rule (also up for comment today, posted under separate cover). We gave detailed feedback on these rules – none positive – yet the Proposed Rule seems to have preserved the original, deeply-flawed concepts intact.
It is difficult not to conclude that the process of providing feedback to this CPSC is a sham. While Chairman Tenenbaum has long touted her “policy” of seeking feedback from all stakeholders including industry, judging from this rule, the commitment to seeking feedback does not involve maintaining an open mind. It appears that the most likely feedback to be well-received is feedback that ratifies what the agency already plans to do. Other feedback is “wrong”, I guess. I doubt you will find this letter useful.
As time ebbs on and as the drumbeat of a CPSC bent on our destruction becomes more and more clear, the incentive to waste a few days preparing detailed comments also ebbs. Nevertheless, owing to the importance of this Proposed Rule, I am hereby submitting comments. I have no reason to be optimistic that you will consider my point of view with an open mind. This rule has all the earmarks of a fait accompli.
Deeply Flawed Economic Analysis.
The Proposed Rule devotes pages and pages to a tortured analysis of its purported compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”). This section of the Proposed Rule is a virtual admission of how unworkable the rule is (and the CPSIA testing scheme in general). As a starting point, the rule states: “The objective of the rule is to reduce the risk of injury from consumer products, especially from products intended for children aged 12 years and younger.” In my recent study of CPSC recall data posted on its website, I have found exactly ONE DEATH and THREE ASSERTED INJURIES from lead or lead-in-paint from 1999-2010. Please keep this statistic in mind as I review the economics of your “injury reduction” effort.
The flaws in the RFA analysis are clear in its discussion of testing costs for toys. The analysis acknowledges that it only accounts for out-of-pocket testing costs, nothing else. Significant additional (and ignored) costs include samples destroyed or damaged in testing, transportation of samples, administrative costs for managing testing, administration costs for managing the testing data, administrative costs for managing recordkeeping, an allocation of general management time, legal expenses relating to testing and so on. Depending on the scale of the business, I estimate that these costs (and distractions) will add 15%-50% to the out-of-pocket testing costs.
The RFA analysis concludes that testing a typical toy will cost $1,262 per product. As an average, this might be a good number for our business. I would note, however, that the Proposed Rule posits that we will test multiple samples, sending in perhaps four separate samples per item to satisfy the bizarre “required high degree of assurance” standard. [The rule states clearly that testing one sample is never enough. Interestingly, we have never had the experience in the last 20 years that multiple safety tests of the same product reveals anything useful other than rapidly approaching poverty.] The rule’s four-sample regime takes the testing cost per toy up to $4,848 (by the calculation in the document) plus another $2,500 for mechanical tests (because the rule posits that we will submit FIFTY samples for mechanical tests). That brings us up to $7,348 per item, plus 54 destroyed samples. This implies a rough “all-in” cost of $10,000 per item. We have 1,500 catalog items in our product line. Without a “reasonable testing program” in place (see below), we will have to test each item annually. This is a cost of $15 million for our company EVERY YEAR. [We also sell custom items, a business that would presumably be terminated by this testing rule. That’s several jobs down the drain.]
Does it surprise you to know that $15 million in testing costs exceeds our annual profit? By far?
The RFA analysis is deeply flawed in other ways, too. The rule duly reports that “[a]ccording to a representative of a trade association, there are an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 individual toys on the market.” Oh, really? Perhaps the CPSC shouldn’t have consulted the International Hubcap Manufacturers Association for this information. A quick visit to the Amazon.com website reveals listings of 808,465 toys and games on August 3rd (http://amzn.to/djtTVX). Amazon is a customer of ours – I estimate that they list about one-third of all toys and games sold in the consumer market. Call it 2.5 million toys and games available to consumers in the U.S. But that’s not all – the category also includes specialty items not present on consumer sites. For instance, our industry, the education industry, is largely invisible on consumer sites. I estimate that about one million SKUs are available to purchase at the annual convention of the International Reading Association. Millions of other SKUs are displayed at the national math show, the national science show and the national early childhood show. Add in special needs and other sub-markets – and you get well in excess of 4-5 million toys and games. So the RFA analysis might be off by 100x in its assessment of the toy market ALONE. That’s not close. . . .
The RFA analysis goes on to conclude that the ENTIRE MARKET of products affected by the rule is 100,000–150,000 products. This includes “wearing apparel, accessories, jewelry, juvenile products, children’s furniture, etc.”, plus non-children’s products and other children’s products like ATVs, bikes, bunk beds and so on. It is hard to dignify this ridiculous data with a retort, except to note that it is absurd on its face. The apparel industry ALONE offers as many as 8,000,000 different children’s SKUs for sale. The RFA analysis is fatally flawed.
At $10,000 per SKU, the projected children’s product testing costs will easily exceed $50 billion per year. Remember the 11-year CPSC statistic on lead deaths and injuries – one death and three ASSERTED injuries? [There are no recorded injuries from phthalates or cadmium, by the way.] The 11-year compliance cost will exceed $550 billion (in 2010 dollars), expended by U.S. companies to “reduce” this risk of injury. It would cost a lot less to wrap every American child in bubble wrap.
Small Businesses CANNOT SURVIVE THIS RULE.
Assuming we are supposed to take this rule seriously, the Proposed Rule is perhaps the best friend of the mass market yet invented by an agency seemingly bent on the destruction of the small business community. This letter documents again and again the unrealistic expectations and assumptions made by the authors of this rule with respect to businesses in general and small businesses in particular. Thousands of small businesses of every stripe and color will be affected by this rule. Are you seriously thinking that they will all hire statisticians, chemists and engineers to prepare the reams of data, plans and reports the CPSC expects? Once this massive, herculean effort is completed, who will be safer anyhow? I can think of someone – mass market companies who have been handed a game-ending cost advantage on a silver platter by the CPSC. This, combined with mass market companies’ ability to create certified firewalled in-house labs, favors the big guy dramatically. No wonder the rule states again and again how prejudicial this rule is to small business. The CPSC knows what it’s doing.
Small businesses will strain to even understand what is expected of them. The rule is obtuse, long-winded and full of arcania. Small business people may not have the time or skills to master this complex rule. When the CPSC turns to its attention to enforcement (as promised for 2011) and selects a few small businesses to whip into shape, the market will take note of the pain and a mass exit will result. I realize, however, that Cassandra-like predictions haven’t influenced the CPSC in recent times. One of the Commissioners has even been quoted as saying that “anecdotes aren’t evidence”. It feels like we have to die to prove we were right. A few small businesses might just do that, if the agency waits long enough.
The Commission has asked for feedback on how to address these issues. The complexity of the CPSIA safety rules proves that they are unworkable. To repair this damage, the Commission must ask Congress to restore its ability to assess risk. I am assuming that the Commission would exercise this discretion with more common sense than is embodied in this rule. CPSC rules should be trimmed back to things that MATTER, only. Second, the agency should build its rules and its enforcement activity around DATA. Injury statistics tell the agency what is important. If a particular hazard generates ONE DEATH AND THREE ASSERTED INJURIES OVER 11 YEARS, you can safely relax your rules quite a bit (there are worse problems out there). Education might make a difference, however.
Finally, the Commission should NOT take ANY step if there is EVEN A SHRED OF DOUBT about the impact on small business. Small business is the major jobs creator in America. When you promulgate rules that choke the life out of small business or sharply reduce their incentive to invest, you are killing our economy. You have a heavy responsibility to keep this place running, even if it’s an imperfect world. While it’s sad that a child ever dies, the pain and suffering imposed on countless families from lost jobs, lost capital, lost access to needed products, and so on likely far exceeds it.
Reasonable Testing Program – Busy Work to Keep Us From Running Our Businesses.
The “Reasonable Testing Program” (“RTP”) represents a choice presented to manufacturers of children’s products under this rule. If we endure the expense and disruption of a RTP, we can cut our testing frequency (read, testing costs) in half. A very tempting prospect but the cost of a RTP seems too high, leaving us with a Hobson’s Choice. We can’t afford annual testing and we cannot afford a RTP. What should we do? What will anyone do?
Owing to the burden and complexity of RTPs, I predict EVERY REGULATED COMPANY will violate these rules. Since Ms. Tenenbaum has promised to turn to enforcement in 2011, the CPSC regulators should have a pretty easy time finding juicy targets. Every company will provide wonderful enforcement opportunities.
Although our testing program has been highly-effective over the last 26 years, our program would never meet these standards. We do not maintain the volume of paperwork that the new CPSC rule now requires. We know what we’re doing, but we have not organized our files into a how-to manual. Perhaps the agency thinks every company in the country is an ISO 9001 company. They’re not, and this kind of documentation is rare and breathtakingly expensive to prepare.
Having endured the CPSIA spectacle for two years now, I do not trust the seemingly flexible definition of necessary documentation. The pattern is that these seemingly open-ended terms (which may or may not describe our current recordkeeping) will mature into something rigid down the line. Even if they don’t, we still face the risk that we will not measure up to the expectations of the CPSC enforcement officer at the time of reckoning. The feeling that we are being set up is inescapable. As noted above, given our record of performance, the agency should have NO concerns about how we go about our business. Nonetheless, I feel certain that these rules will bite me in the future.
Sample selection under the rule should not be based on any statistical formula (per the baffling presentation of Dr. Michael Greene at the December 2009 workshop). If the overall safety results of the company are strong, the choice of samples by the company or factories should be presumed compliant without further inquiry. Random selection (taking one off the shelf . . . without the assistance of a statistician) works just fine in our experience, and there is no evidence that testing multiple samples will accomplish anything but will certainly raise costs. Better sampling won’t lower injury rates that already approach zero.
We currently do not use production testing and have zero production testing plans in place. With one recall in 26 years, I would assert this kind of testing is superfluous in our business and basically useless from a safety standpoint. It will significantly raise costs, however. The tedious exercise of preparing a pallet load of production testing plans to meet the new requirements is just plain busy work. One must ask what the CPSC was thinking when it penned this description of a production testing plan: “A production testing plan may include recurring testing or the use of process management techniques such as control charts, statistical process control programs, or failure modes and effects analysis (FMEAs) designed to control potential variations in product manufacturing that could affect the product’s ability to comply with the applicable rules, bans, standards or regulations.” Fancy words but . . . what planet are they from?
The requirement to list all the tests applicable to our items, again and again, to satisfy the RTP requirements is typical of mindless busy work asked of us. Does the CPSC think this will make ANY difference? Most businesses confirm safety tests with their testing lab partners anyhow. More bureaucracy, taken to new heights.
We don’t have any remedial plans in place either. We are quite familiar with how to appropriately resolve compliance and quality issues, and have never had a problem with regulators in the exercise of our business judgment. The requirement to prepare a detailed written plan, just in case we have another recall in the next 26 years, is pure officiousness. This is yet another waste of our time, our money, our resources and our intellect.
The recordkeeping requirements of a RTP is well beyond our ability or interest to preserve for 1500 products produced in thousands of lots over the course of a year. Taking a “Dear Diary” approach to how we source, test, move, remediate, repair, investigate and otherwise manage children’s products is completely unreasonable. This is especially ridiculous given our track record.
The Commission has asked what a RTP might cost us. I have a hard time estimating it because all the fun in our business would be gone. If we had to endure the bureaucratic nightmare this rule envisions, if anyone actually expects us to do all this to make simple plastic toys for schools, I would have to seriously consider our alternatives. So it might cost us our entire company. That’s the whole enchilada, guys.
Remember, we don’t have to make children’s products, nor do we have to stick around for the next act of this tragedy. If the CPSC persists in ruining what was once a rather safe industry with a strong track record, the cost will be the entire market for children’s products.
Is that a high enough price to give you pause? I know, I know, more anecdotes . . . .
The Requirement to Document Procedures against Undue Influence is Unreasonable.
The “Undue Influence Procedures” requirement (“UIP”) is essentially a requirement to document efforts to avoid fraud. If you’re not inclined to commit fraud, there’s little reason to set out your plan to not commit fraud. Here’s our current policy – “Don’t break the law or commit fraud”. This has worked well for us, as we have never exerted undue influence in the last 26 years and have no plans to start now.
I am really sorry that there are bad people in the world, some small number of which may have at one time attempted to exert undue influence over one or more test labs. Perhaps the CPSC should concern themselves with the bad guys and leave the rest of us alone.
Material Change Rules Place Too Much Risk on Manufacturers.
The CPSC’s rule on when to test after a “material change” is sufficiently open-ended to render the judgment on when to test fairly obvious – ALWAYS TEST. Deep within the Proposed Rule, Section 1107.10(b)(2)(ii) instructs “A material change is any change in the product’s design, manufacturing process, or sourcing of component parts that a manufacturer exercising due care knows, or should know, could affect the product’s ability to comply with the rules . . . .” “Due care” is defined as “the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”
In other words, the agency’s 20-20 hindsight can construct a case for testing for a material change for just about anything that “might” or “could” affect results or that a hypothetical “prudent person” might think of investigating. Of course, this issue only comes up in the context of an injury or a recall, so what are the odds that any judgment to NOT test would withstand inquiry by an angry CPSC? Zilch. So either you always test or you take a big risk. This is completely unfair and unreasonable.
Testing Frequency Must Be Left to the Manufacturer and to the Market.
A rule requiring manufacturers to test according to these standards every year is going to kill us and many other businesses. No one can afford the testing scheme outlined above, we least of all. If we must test according to these standards, we will be out of business quickly. It is equally unrealistic to imagine that testing cost savings from maintaining a RTP will hold much appeal since that project is so wasteful and gargantuan. Of course, a firewalled in-house lab would be nice for all of us small businesses, but that’s unrealistic, too (not to mention undesirable). We have no realistic way to moderate these costs. Please see my other August 3 comment letter for an explanation of why I believe component and composite testing will likewise provide no relief.
Testing is supposed to assure product quality and compliance. If we have a good, long term record of safety, why can’t we just carry on as we have, and deal with issues as they arise? That worked for 26 years. The new way is just unaffordable.
The “High Degree of Assurance” Standard is Unreasonable and Not Derived from the CPSIA.
The rule seems to conclude that a “high degree of assurance” is a necessary element of any “reasonable testing program”. The importance of the “reasonable testing program” which was incorporated into the CPSIA as an alternative to third party testing for non-children’s products, has been imputed to the children’s product area as a way to reduce testing frequency, and with it, the “high degree of assurance” standard (“HDA”) was likewise imputed. Thus, sliding down this slippery slope, the HDA standard has become part and parcel of the “15 Month Rule”. Abracadabra.
The Commission has requested feedback on the meaning of the definition of HDA in Section 1107.2. Happily, the agency has rejected a strict statistical interpretation requiring “95% probability” of compliance. What should the definition be interpreted to mean? The “high degree of assurance” should be based on an overall assessment of the safety record of the company. It should NOT be based on the results of an individual product, even if recalled or deemed dangerous. In our case, we have done business for 26 years, had one recall of 130 pieces of out of about 1,000,000,000 pieces sold. All of these units were recovered. Thus, we believe there is zero probability that a recalled product is in the market. Our historical recall rate is approximately 130/1,000,000,000 or 0.00001% over a 26-year period.
With this record over so many years, our company should be deemed to have satisfied this HDA requirement and be endorsed as having a reasonable testing program without further inquiry. And if we DON’T deserve the HDA designation, then the CPSC should articulate what level of safety achievement would earn the designation.
Notably, the entire children’s product industry also meets this requirement. Of the 899 recalls of children’s products from 1999-2010, only one death and three asserted injuries from lead were recorded by the CPSC. Thus, the probability of being injured from lead by a children’s product is nearly zero, given that literally billions of children’s products are sold every year. [The apparel and footwear industry claims annual sales of about 4 billion units ALONE.] Industry recall rates are likewise well under 1% per annum. With injury statistics and recall rates in hand, the CPSC should GREATLY loosen the strictures of the “high degree of assurance” standard to focus its resources on activities that might actually injure someone.
One-to-One Product Testing Will Punish the Smallest Companies.
The prophylactic approach to testing adopted by the CPSC will inevitably put many small or micro businesses into bankruptcy, or drive them into unregulated markets to avoid the CPSIA’s wasteful bureaucratic costs. If the law does not permit the agency to adopt sensible rules that allow businesses to manage their compliance risk as best they can (where the standards remain in place, but the government stops trying to tell businesses HOW to comply), then the Commission must finally tell Mr. Waxman what he doesn’t want to hear – that his law is broken and can’t be fixed. [Notably, these mini businesses most at risk have an exemplary record of safety and very low recall rates. NOTHING is gained by rules that crush the little guy.]
We in the small business community have suffered for two solid years while regulators have sought any possible way to avoid delivering this “unpleasant” message. I get the impression that the demise of our businesses would not be too great a cost for the agency to incur to avoid telling Congress what it doesn’t want to hear. If the Commission is genuinely interested in a fix, it must take action with Congress. I do not believe the agency can devise sensible regulations to fix this problem short of a legislative change.
Ban on Retesting Will Unnecessarily Create Crises at Small Businesses.
In our experience, test labs are neither infallible nor definitive in their understanding of U.S. safety laws and regulations. It is not unusual to experience failed test reports for reasons besides safety problems. In addition, children’s products are not so pure and perfect in their composition that every test produces the same result. The CPSC itself instructed manufacturers to audit their test labs in the ironically-dated April 1, 2010 version of the Proposed Rule in response to industry complaints that test results varied from test lab to test lab. By forbidding retesting, the Proposed Rule removes discretion and appropriate problem resolution techniques from a commonplace quality event. You don’t need to manage a very large portfolio of products before the probability of an ordinary course testing problem rises exponentially. This is a matter of mathematics. If retesting is banned, the CPSC is legislating a crisis of the week.
Again, CPSC injury data informs us that the nature of the problem is extremely modest. Historical injury rates are VERY low. This retesting rule is completely unnecessary and penal to all companies except perhaps mass market companies with greater resources. Small businesses won’t have teams of engineers or statisticians around to save the day. Many small businesses will naively call the CPSC for “help”, only to find out that they have created a worse crisis. Some small businesses may miss this point in the Proposed Rule and continue to retest, only to be punished later when the CPSC finds evidence of retesting at the time of a recall. Is this really how you want to regulate?
I would note that the justification for all this is bad acts: “[Retesting] may tempt unscrupulous parties to attempt to ‘test the product into compliance’. . . .” To my knowledge, this behavior has little precedence and even so, it is an abuse that can be dealt with other ways. If honorable and law-abiding companies use retesting to resolve honest problems, no harm is being done. Punishing good guys because you are afraid that otherwise bad guys might benefit is excessive and inappropriately harsh.
The 10,000 Piece Limit for One-Time Testing is Arbitrary and Unfair.
The CPSC has failed to persuade that the 10,000 limit is an appropriate break point for testing. First of all, the limit is cumulative, not related to sales in a period or per annum. Second, the threshold bears no relationship to risk of injury. In other words, it’s completely arbitrary. Why 10,000? Why not? In my view, that’s not enough to justify this rule. Many of the micro businesses that might benefit from this rule have NEVER had a recall. These are the people this rule will restrict. And the logic of this is . . . what, exactly?
Even more remarkable is the rule’s insistence that these low volume items be tested annually after passing the 10,000 piece threshold. Small companies will never have a RTP so annual testing (or more frequently, if for instance the item is hand-assembled) will be mandated. Consider a product selling 2,000 piece per year. Under these rules, the incentive to drop it once it crosses the 10,000 threshold will be powerful. This reminds me of the incentive on small businesses to not hire a 26th employee to avoid an onslaught of Obamacare obligations. A tacit cap on sales will be imposed by this rule. Nice!
The solution to this problem is to require one-time testing before sale, and thereafter according to the business judgment of the manufacturer. Remember, the retailers that buy from the manufacturer will also have something to say about testing frequency, too. Not all solutions are better if imposed by the government.
Alternative Testing Technologies.
The ability to test at low cost with XRF is attractive. For our business, it is tempting to use an XRF gun but for two reasons: (a) cost, and (b) health risk. XRF guns cost $30,000 each and have high annual maintenance costs (several thousand dollars a year). We might need several guns to manage our inventory volumes, a very costly prospect. XRF guns are portable x-ray machines. Notwithstanding the assurance of XRF gun manufacturers, I am quite reluctant to place an x-ray machine in the hands of a warehouse worker in our facility. This is an invitation to disaster. We likewise have no interest in hiring a highly-paid technician to wield the gun, or technicians to wield the guns. In any event, we cannot expose our employees to a possible risk of x-ray genetic damage. I am surprised that the CPSC doesn’t take this risk more seriously. Is lead a worse problem than x-rays?
In any event, I fail to understand what would be accomplished by a XRF solution for small businesses. The process of XRF testing may be inexpensive, but would be disruptive. In any event, I don’t see a connection to safety so I prefer a solution that restores sanity to our safety practices. Burning in a wasteful and disruptive process will only bog down our economy and our competitiveness. Until the CPSC can point to a risk factor relating to the little guys, one cannot rationally conclude that XRF makes this regulation better, just somewhat less worse.
In sum, the Proposed Rule is a dangerous rule with the acknowledged prospect of doing severe market damage. The CPSC knows this, having admitted it in writing in the text of the rule. There is no excuse to push forward with a defective rule on this scale. The Commission must talk honestly with Congress . . . before it’s too late.
Thank you for considering my views on this important subject.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061
CPSIA - Component Testing Rule Comment Letter
Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 820
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0037 Conditions and Requirements for Testing Component Parts of Consumer Products.
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on the Conditions and Requirements for Testing Component Parts of Consumer Products (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0037) published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).
This request for comments comes after, among other things, a two-day workshop held at the CPSC on December 10-11, 2009. Our company incurred the expense of sending three people (all panelists on multiple panels) to attend this “sold out” event which was purportedly to solicit stakeholder feedback on this rule and the so-called “15 Month Rule” (also up for comment today). There is little evidence from the Federal Register that any of our feedback was taken or possibly even heard. I have lost track of how many comment letters I have filed, panels or hearings I have appeared at and essays or letters I have written about the CPSIA and these issues. So far, my comments have added up to . . . nothing. Nevertheless, I am filing this letter in the vain hope that perhaps this will be my lucky day and you may listen to me, finally.
I would like to make some general comments first.
a. Some Positives in the Proposed Rule. I am in favor of the concept of component testing and applaud the Commission for taking steps to make it a reality, however flawed. In addition, I am also enthusiastic about composite testing. Regrettably, however, the devil is in the details.
b. CPSC Data Demonstrates that Risk is Low, so the Proposed Rule does not Need to be so Strict. I have analyzed the recall data published on the CPSC website and determined that from 1999 – 2010, the CPSC can account for ONE DEATH and THREE ASSERTED INJURIES from lead or lead-in-paint. If the goal of these rulemakings is to reduce deaths and injuries from lead, then these data must be borne in mind. With so few incidents involving lead injury of any kind in children’s products (less than occurs on AN AVERAGE DAY from swimming pools and spas in the U.S.), there is no justification for building such an ornate rule for something simple and logical like component testing or composite testing. Likewise, incidents of fraud in testing are equally infrequent and in any event, already addressed by other statutes. Congress did not require this complicated regulatory scheme, and the data cannot justify it.
c. The Proposed Rule Puts Compliance First, Before Safety. This rule seems to place a very high emphasis on the need to comply, as opposed to the need to make children safer. One is not necessarily the equivalent of the other. My favorite example is our company’s record of compliance. Founded in 1984, our company has recalled a grand total of 130 pieces in its history, all recovered, out of perhaps one billion pieces sold. Not bad. Were we to meet the myriad requirements of this rule, I cannot fathom that our products would be safer. Does all that extra compliance benefit anyone? It certainly will cost a lot (we pay, you don’t). As I read your rule, I wondered why you didn’t list the wire transfer instructions for the top testing companies. You might as well . . . . Still, the casual waste of our resources cannot make anyone safer – they were already completely safe.
Safety is the reason the CPSC exists. This document fails because it confuses the desire to powerfully enforce the CPSIA with actually making people safer. The only thing that may be accomplished is business death for many companies, principally small ones. Swashbuckling enforcement may make great headlines but no one will be any safer. Compliance is not safety.
d. Science Has Apparently Been Rendered Moot at the CPSC. While I accept that Congress has banned certain phthalates in toys, I do not accept that the ban is a SCIENTIFIC CONCLUSION. It is legislation, not science. Notably, the CPSC has twice investigated phthalates and held that phthalates were safe in toys. Yet, on page 28213 in the Federal Register, the Proposed Rule discusses the “risk” presented by a product that might have a violative concentration of phthalates in a component, but with an overall concentration that wouldn’t violate the ban. It goes on to assert that a component-based rule is “more protective of human health”, as though the agency had reached the scientific conclusion that phthalates were dangerous – which is not true. Re-characterizing the legislative ban as an assessment of “risk” may appear to legitimize your rule, but it is certainly not an accurate statement of the historical position of the agency. I object to the rule’s equating of a ban by politicians to a scientific judgment. Science is under enough assault without the stamp of approval of the CPSC announcing its death.
My specific comments on this proposal:
1. Component Testing Looks Better Than It Is. I wish I felt we (or anyone else) would use component testing extensively in the future. There are several reasons why this option will be of little use to anyone, particularly the small companies that it was intended to benefit. [Companies with enough scale may find the Proposed Rule useful – one of the many ironies of the CPSIA is that its principal beneficiaries may be the companies that prompted its passage.]
a. Limited Market Availability for Component Certificates. While some high volume components of children’s products may quickly be tested to meet these requirements, many other kinds of components are not likely to be tested:
i. Low volume components
ii. Components made in small lots
iii. Components made by small suppliers (many fabrics)
iv. Components which derive only a tiny percentage of revenues from regulated products or which principally cater to other industries (e.g., paper clips or aluminum foil in a science kit)
Unfortunately, it appears to me that the logic of this rule is that if we can be certain that some certificates will be widely available (e.g., paint, plastic pellets), therefore all other certificates will be available. That’s plainly ridiculous.
b. Complexity. The subdividing of compliance testing into component parts and the whole, some tests done on parts and some on the whole, with tests of varying dates substituting from time to time, is simply a mindboggling mess. I cannot imagine that this can be successfully managed on any scale (how many products need to take advantage of this rule before test reports develop big and inconsistent holes?). And how will retailers be able to interpret this patchwork quilt of tests? This scheme will be self-defeating on all levels.
Add to this the requirement that components need to be traceable, and you basically rendered the component testing opportunity moot. Of course, I am presuming that industry will take your rules seriously. To me, it’s completely inconceivable that anyone will build your traceability system. [Traceability will not raise revenues, only mindless complexity, and as noted above, cannot conceivably improve safety.] If you take these rules seriously, you will cry, laugh/scream – or walk away. The paperwork required for this exercise is well beyond almost all companies’ capabilities. [Does the CPSC have ANY tangible evidence that its requirements can be met by anyone . . . other than Mattel and Wal-Mart? Presumably, no one at the agency living in the real world thinks that traceability rules can be met by the typical Handmade Toy Alliance member, or other small businesses like ours.]
c. Unrealistic Expectations on Manufacturing Control and Traceability. To take advantage of this rule, a manufacturer must take responsibility at the sub-micro-level for manufacturing quality. Let’s recall for a moment that we are not making drug treatments here, nor are we building the Space Shuttle. We are making simple plastic toys and games, children’s shoes, pens, shirts, books, educational materials and so on. Consider this instruction from your new rule: “The manufacturer must exercise due care that the manufacturing process does not add a prohibited chemical from an untested source, such as the material hopper, regrind equipment, or other equipment used in the assembly of the finished product.” Our company has several hundred vendors producing thousands of SKUs – do you honestly believe we could possibly manage how all these independent companies wash out their molding machines or manage their regrinding operations? Is this some kind of sick joke?
By the way, this verbiage will end the use of recycled materials in children’s products. This is completely unjustified for safety reasons and is certainly very unfriendly to the environment. As noted above, your agency’s responsibility is to manage safety. You have no basis in fact for asserting that these theoretical sources of lead are or could constitute a public safety risk.
d. Liability Risk. The Proposed Rule goes to great length to ram home the message that all the risk is on our shoulders. The monotonously repetitive use of the term “due care” throughout this document makes abundantly clear that the CPSC is perfecting a myriad of claims to be made against any and all manufacturers of children’s products when it suits the purpose of the agency. Many of the claims may be perfected with the agency’s 20-20 hindsight. The Proposed Rule minces few words on this preservation of rights: “The above information is needed so that, if noncomplying products are found, the Commission can use this information to determine whether a finished product certifier, component part certifier, or third party conformity assessment body is not complying with the appropriate requirements.” Under the Proposed Rule, even a missing piece of paper can be the basis of charge of failed due care. A fear of criminal charges seems realistic.
Will aggravating letter writers be the first to suffer under this hammer? The answer is – it’s entirely up to YOU under your rule. Small companies will see how the deck is stacked against them and steer far from the component testing option (if they understand the obtuse wording of the rule).
2. If Few Companies Can or Will Use Component Testing, Has the Agency Provided “Relief”? Of course, the answer is NO. The Proposed Rule may look like good policy, but if the practical impact of the rule is that few people can or will take advantage of it, it is simple window-dressing. The impact on small businesses, exemplified by the well-known and sympathetic Handmade Toy Alliance, will be severe. They are not the only ones in need of help, either. If small companies like HTA members cannot take advantage of these rules in large part or would be too scared to take a chance in the face of the awesome display of governmental power in the rule’s terms, then they will suffer and shrink. I would note that the Notice on the “15 Month Rule” explains how a failure to protect small companies could play out badly (see “Caveats and Possible Market Reactions to Third Party Testing Requirements” on page 28358). Those negative impacts could result from a failure of policy here, too.
3. Maintenance of Records for the Life of a Product Plus Five Years Is Unduly Burdensome (Not to Mention Pointless). Please consider our case: We still produce certain items from our original product line in 1984. Clocks don’t go out of style in education, even if Tickle Me Elmo and Furby last only one year. The requirement that we must retain records for the life of the product plus five years could theoretically be forever in our case. Perhaps the CPSC can provide us free unlimited warehouse space for all these records. In any event, our case also makes clear how pointless this requirement is. We have only had one recall in 26 years, which we successfully administered without the assistance or guidance of the thousands of pages of rules and legislations that befell us under the CPSIA. How, precisely, will decades of records improve the public weal in OUR case? Your rule is very good at spending our money, our resources and our time, but doesn’t make a reasoned connection to safety in any way. We are not Mattel and in any event, they don’t define the market. Had you listened to us in December 2009 at your workshop, you would know this already.
4. Composite Testing Rule for Paint LOWERS the Lead Standard to Sub-trace Levels. In yet another example of overly risk-averse rulemaking, the agency’s new composite testing rule for paints requires that lead content must never exceed that for any individual component paint in the composite. This slices the 90 ppm limit by two-thirds for a three-paint sample and by 75% for a four-paint sample. This super-stringent rule ensures that it is literally a gamble to use composite testing – so why would anyone bother? Even more bothersome, since the new policy of the agency is to impose strict liability for lead-in-paint violations, this new rule demonstrates the ascendency of the debunked notion that there is “no safe level for lead”. If the agency really wants to take this position, it should not permit composite testing for paints. Too risky . . . .
5. The Regulatory Flexibility Analysis is Flawed and Self-Justifying. The analysis justifying this Proposed Rule is a “best case” scenario, and takes none of the foregoing into account. If in fact the rule will hard or impossible to use, or will create too many legal risks or recordkeeping burdens and thus go largely unused, the reasoning in this section will be completely inapplicable.
6. The Burden of Recordkeeping is FAR GREATER than Asserted in the Proposed Rule. At our company, we produce about 1500 “catalog” items and several thousand other SKUs and custom products through a network of hundreds of factories in various countries. We do not control these factories – they are generally family businesses like our company, and are independent of us. Typically, we provide only a small share of annual revenue of any of our factories and thus have limited leverage over their business practices. Like many small businesses, we have a very limited infrastructure in place to supervise factories “on the ground”, although it is worth noting that our safety record indicates that our business methods have worked well for more than two decades.
To implement the recordkeeping set forth in this rule, I estimate that we would have to spend $50,000 - $100,000 in software development expenses to store and manage the desired records. In addition, we would need to expand our staff significantly. To reach out to all of our factories, negotiate and monitor many new business practices, will take a significant increase in staff. I posit that we would need to open an Asian office with as many as 5-10 local employees. A Chinese office would cost us at least $500,000 per annum. In addition, we would have to increase our clerical and management staff in the U.S. to help with data input, software management, project management, audits, vendor relations and general management. This would cost us at least $250,000 per annum. We anticipate that this intrusion on the business practices of our vendors would cost us business relationships and would lead to significant cost increases. The total cost of these disruptions would add another $500,000 or more per annum. It is not inconceivable that we ALONE could incur annual expenses of $1.5 million and certainly at least 10 man-years of labor (more than 20,000 hours) to comply with these rules. There are THOUSANDS of companies affected by this rule. We estimate that the assessment of cost and man-hours in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of the Proposed Rule is LOW by a factor of 100x-5,000x.
I would suggest that this rule be greatly simplified by making the following changes:
a. Eliminating the Requirement for Traceability Recordkeeping. As noted above, this ornate rule architecture is completely inappropriate for the minimal, almost non-existent threat, demonstrated by the CPSC’s own injury data. Recordkeeping requirements should minimized or dropped altogether.
b. Encourage the Exercise of Business Judgment. The presumption that only the CPSC (or Congress) can make sound judgments when considering safety issues is simply not supported by the data. Again, our company is a good example of that – we scrupulously maintained our safety record without the CPSC’s oversight, coercion or even encouragement since 1984. The concept of “business judgment” is well-defined in U.S. common law and has real meaning under the law. I think the concept of using components supported by GCCs is simple enough. Given that the restrictions on lead are clear under the CPSIA, why not let businesses exercise their judgment on how to meet those requirements and then measure them on their success in doing so? What is to be gained by inserting the CPSC into all aspects of how we conduct business? We were doing just fine before you arrived on the scene.
Given the few lead injuries noted in the CPSC’s historical data, the agency could save its scarce resources and remain effective as a safety administrator by focusing on known safety issues and incidents and leave the vast majority of law-abiding and safety-conscious companies ALONE. The data suggests that higher and higher mountains of regulations will never reduce injuries from the historically miniscule levels documented on the CPSC website.
c. Allow Composite Testing Using the Overall Concentration as the Pass/Fail Measure. Again, this is justifiable based on the historically minimal risk posed by the regulated substances. The already low lead levels specified in the CPSIA have not reduced injuries or deaths from the negligible levels that predated it. Since the number of recalls is so dramatically affected by agency policy (e.g., strict liability or not, how recalls are accounted for, etc.), the only reliable measure of the effectiveness of policy is injuries. Composite testing holds the promise of real savings to the many law-abiding companies affected by the CPSIA. Loosen the noose and they may actually save some money.
Component testing can be a simple and effective way to lower costs, but a different approach is necessary to get to that result. A sharp reconsideration of the Proposed Rule will be required to achieve this goal.
Thank you for considering my views on this important subject.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061
