CPSIA - What Exactly Happened at the July 20th CPSC Commission Meeting?

What happened on July 20th at the CPSC Commission hearing?  I wish I knew. We must rely on a BNA article and gossip from those who were present or happened to be wasting their morning watching the spectacle live online.  Apparently Inez Tenenbaum made some blanket statements rejecting the President's Executive Order of July 11 relating to cost-benefit analysis of provisions of the CPSIA. 

Of course, how would I know what she said?  The video at the Sunshine State of the CPSC is not available to me.  Two days later . . . .  Hmmm.  Do you think they are waiting for me to forget about it???

While I cannot tell you exactly what Ms. Tenenbaum said during the meeting (yet), I do know a couple things.  First, BNA in an article entitled "CPSIA: Discord Between CPSC Commissioners Comes to Head but Fails to Halt Productivity" dated July 20 quoted Ms. T as follows: 

"And in a July 20 public meeting on the agency's priorities for 2013, Tenenbaum felt the need to say to Northup and other critics of the commission that the rules under the CPSIA are exempt from cost/benefit analyses, and therefore the agency is not required do them. 'To have this fiction that we are required to do cost/benefit analysis under CPSIA cannot go unaddressed.'  She said CPSC has committed to conducting a retrospective review of its regulations, per Obama's Executive Order, and 'we will begin our retrospective review and we will solicit comment.'"  [Emphasis added]

Fiction, eh?  Ms. T also made the same point in her statement on the newly adopted 100 ppm lead standard:

"Despite our clear and strict statutory instructions on this issue, some of my colleagues have raised a concern that the Commission’s actions run contrary to an Executive Order issued by President Barack Obama on July 11, 2011. Their position is not correct. In that Order, the President has asked independent agencies, to the extent permitted by law, to make decisions only after taking into account several considerations, but also to remain true to their statutory mandates. I am confident that the Commission has met and exceeded its mandate under the CPSIA. As such, the decision reached by the Commission today is consistent with the President’s Executive Order, because we have followed the law as mandated in the CPSIA, and as clearly intended by its Congressional authors."  [Emphasis added]

Ms. T seems to be saying that the agency was not permitted to follow the Executive Order because this setting of standards is not a "regulation" but is instead a "statutory mandate".  There is no such thing as a "mandate" in this context from a legal point of view.  See the definition of "mandate".  Essentially, what the regulators are referring to as a "mandate" is the directive by Congress to take certain steps and exercise judgment coupled with a public inquiry process, meaning that it must be a well-informed process taking into account the feedback of interested stakeholders. 

[It's okay, let it out.  I just doubled over in laughter myself.]

What DID Congress tell the CPSC to do about 100 ppm in the CPSIA?  The law instructs the CPSC as follows:

Section 101(a)(2)(C):  "100 PARTS PER MILLION.—Except as provided in subparagraphs (D) and (E), beginning on the date that is 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act, subparagraph (B) shall be applied by substituting ‘100 parts per million’ for ‘300 parts per million’ unless the Commission determines that a limit of 100 parts per million is not technologically feasible for a product or product category. The Commission may make such a determination only after notice and a hearing and after analyzing the public health protections associated with substantially reducing lead in children’s products."

Section 101(a)(2)(D):  "ALTERNATE REDUCTION OF LIMIT.—If the Commission determines under subparagraph (C) that the 100 parts per million limit is not technologically feasible for a product or product category, the Commission shall, by regulation, establish an amount that is the lowest amount of lead, lower than 300 parts per million, the Commission determines to be technologically feasible to achieve for that product or product category. The amount of lead established by the Commission under the preceding sentence shall be substituted for the 300 parts per million limit under subparagraph (B) beginning on the date that is 3 years after the date of enactment of this Act."

Section 101(e):  "PENDING RULEMAKING PROCEEDINGS TO HAVE NO EFFECT— The pendency of a rulemaking proceeding to consider— (1) a delay in the effective date of a limit or an alternate limit under this section related to technological feasibility . . . shall not delay the effect of any provision or limit under this section nor shall it stay general enforcement of the requirements of this section."

[Emphasis added]  Section 101(e) refers to the process that just concluded as a "rulemaking proceeding".  I don't know how you feel about this, but this section of the CPSIA sure sounds like an instruction to administer a rulemaking proceeding to me.  This is not a direction to reach a particular conclusion - if it is a "mandate" at all, it is a "mandate" to go through a classic regulatory process.  Read the instructions yourself, it's right there.

President Obama's Executive Order reads as follows (in relevant part):

"By the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and the laws of the United States of America, and in order to improve regulation and regulatory review, it is hereby ordered as follows:  Executive Order 13563 of January 18, 2011, 'Improving Regulation and Regulatory Review,' directed to executive agencies, was meant to produce a regulatory system that protects 'public health, welfare, safety, and our environment while promoting economic growth, innovation, competitiveness, and job creation.' Independent regulatory agencies, no less than executive agencies, should promote that goal. . . . Executive Order 13563 set out general requirements directed to executive agencies concerning public participation, integration and innovation, flexible approaches, and science. To the extent permitted by law, independent regulatory agencies should comply with these provisions as well."  [Emphasis added]

Ms. T interpreted the words "to the extent permitted by law" as "to remain true to their statutory mandates".  Ms. T, a lawyer, is blatantly wrong, laughably so.  Unfortunately, it's not funny.

Ms. Tenenbaum has taken the position that cost-benefit analysis is not relevant to the CPSIA.  Of course, you know I think that's a bunch of bunk.  The President's Executive Order is plainly applicable to this rulemaking process and Tenenbaum may be daring you or me to sue her.  I would like to point out, however, that when rules of legislative interpretation are applied to the CPSIA, her shoddy legal conclusions look even worse. 

Does the CPSIA mention "cost-benefit" anywhere?  I am glad you asked . . . .  The CPSIA uses the term "cost-benefit" only once (outside of the Table of Contents):

"SEC. 233. COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS UNDER THE POISON PREVENTION PACKAGING ACT OF 1970.  Section 3 of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970 (15 U.S.C. 1472) is amended by adding at the end thereof the following: ‘(e) Nothing in this Act shall be construed to require the Consumer Product Safety Commission, in establishing a standard under this section, to prepare a comparison of the costs that would be incurred in complying with such standard with the benefits of such standard.'"

If Congress was so concerned that cost-benefit should never apply to these provisions, why didn't they say it?  They weren't silent on cost-benefit - Congress thought enough of the issue to mention it in context of the Poison Prevention Packaging Act of 1970.  But as it relates to lead and phthalates, Congress was silent on cost-benefit.  Why might they have been silent?  Perhaps the authors of the law believed it was an illegal provision as applied to these rules.  Perhaps the Dems behind the law felt the CPSIA wouldn't pass if such an obnoxious term were included in this critical part of the law.  Perhaps those people figured no one would call their bluff, and that later, politically-aligned appointees would simply make up the law the authors couldn't write themselves. 

As this week's WSJ Editorial implies, we are powerless to stop Tenenbaum, Adler and Moore.  They can run rampant over our laws, our companies, our markets, our jobs, our lives.  They are the law, they are the judges, they are the jury.  They know what's best for us, and no public hearings are going to change their minds. 

Oops, make that no Presidential Executive Order will change their minds . . . .

CPSIA - Do Accidents Happen?

Accidents happen. It's an old saying.

Once upon a time acts of fate were no one’s fault and we each bore the risk individually. Today, things seem different – when bad things happen, the search begins for someone to blame. The media and politicians feed this trend in hysterical tones (they profit by doing so). Individual responsibility is passé. In the case of children’s products today, blame is often laid at the feet of the product or its manufacturer by the CPSC. In some cases, the fault is clear (the hazard is “substantial”); in other cases, it’s not nearly as clear. In this article, I am only interested in those more ambiguous cases where there is an element of fate or other factors outside the control of the manufacturer. Should we be satisfied with how the CPSC draws the line?

CPSC as Allocator

The CPSC’s assignment of responsibility for injuries (in the form of recalls) is an inherently “legal” process. Our laws allocate risk and responsibility in society in the form of rights. About 75 years ago, legal theorists developed a field of inquiry known as “law and economics” which held that legal systems incorporate economic principles which ensure efficient allocation of resources and promote economic activity. “Rights” are essentially factors of production in economic terms. Ronald Coase of the University of Chicago Law School won the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1991 for his seminal work on law and economics over the preceding 50+ years. Notably, Obama regulations “czar” Cass Sunstein is an ex-University of Chicago Law School law professor, as is President Obama himself.  Sunstein is closely associated with the study of law and economics.

The issues confronting the CPSC over injuries to children are not emotional in nature at all. They are actually purely economic issues because the CPSC is a market regulator. It is an objective fact that injuries to children or other consumers are a cost we bear in exchange for the benefits of economic activity (availability of innovative manufactured products, the provision of jobs, etc.). Naturally, as a community we want to bear as few such costs as is efficient, again to promote growth, hence a societal interest in reducing injuries. The interest in reducing injuries is economic, however; we are not indifferent to cost and judge them in light of corresponding benefits. For instance, this explains why you do not wear a crash helmet on the way to work despite your awareness that fatal auto accidents happen every day. The costs outweigh the benefits.

As a regulator, the agency brokers costs among a large group of parties. Consumer costs related to injury (including emotional loss and lost income, among other things) are weighed against manufacturer and market costs (recall costs, damage to brands, decreased growth, lost jobs, etc.). Whether the CPSC does the math properly or not, their decisions allocate resources by directing that one party incur costs to protect other parties from incurring costs. These decisions are purely economic even if stated in emotional terms. It is therefore clear that CPSC regulators have the capacity to promote economic growth or stifle it.

Is the Goal “No Injuries” Ever?

The CPSC has a legal responsibility to differentiate between a product hazard that causes accidents and accidents caused by the hand of fate. Congress limited the authority of the agency to regulate only those product hazards deemed “substantial” (a term of art under the CPSA and FHSA). As stated here many times previously, I believe the CPSC under current leadership regularly exceeds its legislative authority in this regard. The CPSC acts as though its role is to move society toward a Utopian ideal in which children are never injured or die prematurely. While I certainly don’t endorse injuries to children, the Utopian ideal of injury-free childhoods is illusory. In fact, an injury-free childhood could only be achieved at a very high cost. If the CPSC attaches an almost infinite value to preventing injuries, their allocation decisions will always constitute a transfer (a tax) and cause economic inefficiency (depress economic activity).

This over-appraisal of the cost and consequence of childhood injury is illustrated by recent remarks of Chairman Inez Tenenbaum about a recall of one million pool drain covers. Ms. Tenenbaum appears to justify the recall on the possibility of injury despite media reports confirming that no deaths had occurred since 2009:

"I want to make it clear that this recall announcement does not mean that one million drain covers will need to be replaced or repaired. The recalled covers were marked with the wrong flow rating . . . . Now for those public pools and spas that need their covers replaced or fixed, I have an obligation to advise that those facilities be closed at this time. They should reopen as soon as the work is completed that addresses the recall and brings the facility into compliance with the law. I know this is a very difficult message for many communities to hear so close to Memorial Day weekend, but we cannot risk a child becoming entrapped in a recalled drain cover." [Emphasis added]

This unstated policy attaching infinite value to childhood injury is much more than a strict liability standard because the CPSC only acts after an assessment of fault (rather than simply assigning responsibility). Isn’t the agency saying that the actions or inactions of manufacturers cause accidents?

Recent Recalls Allocate Uncontrollable Costs to Manufacturers

Consider some recent recalls for perspective:

a. Big Lots recalls bunk beds recalled after a three-year-old child died when caught under a futon.
b. Maclaren recalls one million strollers sold over 11 years because of more than a dozen fingertip amputations caused by a hinge.
c. Mattel recalls more than 7,000,000 children’s trikes sold over 14 years because of genital injuries to ten young girls jumping on the trike.

While it may be hard to look past these sometimes grisly childhood injuries, each of these cases calls into question whether the injuries were really the fault of the manufacturer. It’s not worth defending the product designs – let’s concede that in retrospect the products could have been better designed. Parental supervision appears to be an issue in each case. Manufacturers are typically unwilling to resist CPSC recalls by blaming consumers for injuries incurred using its products. That route is very risky and may in fact be more costly than going along with the CPSC’s dictates. As a result, the record in these cases is usually very one-sided – the CPSC has the first and last word on the subject, often on TV. Why would anyone stand up for these companies in public? There’s no incentive to do so; after all, the costs are paid by only one party, and that party isn’t talking.

There is a fundamental error in routinely blaming manufacturers for accidents or fate. It is widely accepted that laws operate efficiently when they allocate responsibility for risk to the party in the best position to address the risk. Manufacturers can efficiently bear many such costs – but not all. For instance, product safety is best assigned to manufacturers rather than consumers. This is fairly obvious – manufacturers know their own products better than consumers do and are best able to take steps to keep products safe at the lowest possible cost (most efficient). This is the reason why the common law tort system assigns product liability costs to manufacturers.

So who is in the best position to control costs associated with accidents or fate? Risks associated with acts of fate are difficult to control.  In fact, many foreseeable risks leading to childhood injuries are completely outside the control of manufacturers:

1. Fate
2. Failures of adult supervision
3. Product abuse or misuse
4. Mental deficiencies or mental illness (e.g., pica)
5. Risks well-known to the user (e.g., knives are sharp).

I would advance that good adult supervision is the lowest cost way to prevent accidents with children’s products. There are significant limitations to what a manufacturer can achieve on behalf of consumers who don’t adequately supervise their children. Of course, drawing the line is a big issue here. But can’t an argument be made that adult supervision of the toddlers using the Mattel trike could have prevented foreseeable injuries from jumping on the trike? That a parent must carefully supervise the location of a child’s hands before closing a stroller? This is a simple point – manufacturers cannot control these factors from their offices or warehouses. The cost for a manufacturer to do so would be excessive.

Some people might argue that assigning blame for matters of fate to manufacturers of consumer products is a neat way to efficiently spread cost among the community. Why not make the manufacturer pay the uncontrollable cost of fate relating to their products, and let them pass the costs along to consumers in the form of higher prices? Manufacturers can be converted into involuntary insurers by public policy, risk intermediaries for events of misfortune. The appeal is irresistible; after all, it doesn’t cost tax dollars to pay for these losses if we force responsibility on manufacturers. Of course, if you are a careful consumer, you might resent paying more to subsidize free-riding consumers who don't take appropriate precautions.  But money aside, doesn’t it reflect a hardening of our society if if we ignore heart tugs when kids are injured? Is this heartless . . . or sensible? Is the CPSC doing the American public a favor by increasingly pushing responsibility for uncontrollable risks to manufacturers?

The Important Role of Economic Efficiency in Laws Governing Children’s Products

I believe bad things do sometimes happen to good people. What is the economic effect of assigning these costs to manufacturers by default? Unfortunately, this invariable result is not economically efficient and will have the effect of a tax on the children’s market. In other words, the economic incentive to participate in markets will shrivel as manufacturer returns on investment decline because of legal risks (costs) they cannot control. This is basic stuff, folks – the reduced economic incentive causes market participants to withdraw, just as high taxes cause people to stop taking risks (trading).

Ronald Coase addressed this subject in two articles that led to his Nobel Prize. In a 1937 paper on the nature of the firm, Coase articulated what became known as the Coase Theorem which holds that if trade in an externality is possible (in this case, childhood injuries) and there are no transaction costs, bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome regardless of the initial allocation of property rights. Translated into English and applied to the facts here, Coase theorized that it would not matter which party was responsible to pay the costs of an injury (victim or tortfeasor) if there was no cost to bargaining between the parties. This of course is not the case in the real world. Coase returned to the subject in a 1960 article entitled “The Problem of Social Cost” and explored the role of regulations in achieving economic efficiency when economic activity creates social costs. This eminently readable article is a foundation stone of modern legal theory.

Considering the social costs of human activity (such as pollution or injuries from the use of children’s products), Coase concluded that efficient allocation of resources would be achieved regardless of allocation of rights relating to social costs (responsibility to pay those costs) provided that trading can be conducted without transaction costs. In other words, in an efficient market, economic factors (resources) will always be put to their highest and best use through allocation of resources and bargaining. Through bargaining in an efficient market, the party with the most productive use of economic factors will ultimately possess the resources, thus ensuring compensation for social costs regardless of who has been assigned legal rights.

Coase cites numerous examples (including torts) in making this point. Coase notes the symmetry of these disputes in his analysis. When cattle overrun crops causing economic losses, there would be no damage without the cattle, and likewise no damage without the crops! Causation is not black-and-white to an economist interested in efficient outcomes. As he notes, a smoothly operating pricing system ensures that “the fall in the value of production due to the harmful effects would be a cost for both parties.”

Nevertheless, Coase recognized that there ARE transaction costs in the real world (e.g., legal expenses, bargaining holdouts, etc.). These costs of altering and recombining rights allocated by the legal system can interfere with the ability to bargain and thus prevent the efficient allocation of resources in the market. He argued therefore that regulations are justified to the extent they allocate rights to the most efficient risk-bearer. Regulations can supersede market transactions by imposing the most efficient outcome. This is presumably the underpinning of President Obama’s call for more federal regulation. According to him, this will be good for us.  Coase might demur, noting that it all depends on the facts as we shall see below.

Coase was realistic in his assessment of the inherent dangers of regulation: “But the governmental machine is not itself costless. It can, in fact, on occasion be extremely costly. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that the restrictive and zoning regulations, made by a fallible administration subject to political pressures and operating without any competitive check, will necessarily always be those which increase the efficiency with which the economic system operates. Furthermore, such general regulations which must apply to a wide variety of cases will be enforced in some cases in which they are clearly inappropriate. . . . It is my belief that economists, and policy-makers generally, have tended to over-estimate the advantages that come from government regulation.” Coase’s solution: perform a cost-benefit analysis to make sure that regulations increase economic output (the all-in costs must be less than the all-in benefits when reduced to dollars).

We encounter situations regularly in which the party causing a legal nuisance does not bear the consequential costs. For instance, a home remodeler does not have to pay compensation to neighbors for noise and debris that may adversely affect them. He may feel a social obligation to give them freshly-baked cookies but is under no legal obligation to do so. This is one of many legalized nuisances. Why is this the legal rule? The allocation of rights takes into account that as a society, we want to encourage investment and capital improvements. The small cost of dealing with these inconveniences is considered a cost we all should bear in exchange for the benefits received from the economic activity. This rule does not apply to exceptional cases of nuisance where the costs outweigh the benefits. Not every instance of damage is remediable under our legal system for good reason.

Coase cites a fascinating real world example of this rule carried to a surprising extreme: under traditional English law, railroads are protected from liability for fires caused by sparks from their engines. Coase devotes considerable ink to prove that this legal rule creates an efficient allocation of resources (a positive effect for society) notwithstanding that there are “winners” and “losers”. This result would be very difficult to achieve through bargaining. Clearly a railroad would have a very difficult time working out a deal with every landowner along its lines as a precondition to laying down track.

Importantly, Coase points out that the opposite rule (where the railroad must pay for the fires its engines cause) does much more than just transfer liability. It also shifts incentives to everyone’s detriment. A farmer along the track now can gamble with the railroad’s money – he can get a market price from market buyers if he can harvest his crops or from the railroad if there is a fire. The farmer’s return is thus guaranteed, the incentive to take care is removed, and he will be rewarded for planting crops likely to be burned. This alternative rule’s transfer of costs to the railroad will simultaneously reduce the potential reward for constructing tracks and likely result in fewer train lines, reducing the broadly-distributed economic benefits that come with the expansion of the rail system. In other words, shifting liability in this case makes everyone along the train line poorer.

Coase notes that “nuisances” are not always against our interest: “[Pigou] is wrong when he describes these actions as ‘anti-social’. They may or may not be. It is necessary to weigh the harm against the good that will result. NOTHING COULD BE MORE ‘ANTI-SOCIAL’ THAN TO OPPOSE ANY ACTION WHICH CAUSES ANY HARM TO ANYONE.” [Emphasis added] CPSC, are you listening?

Placing the cost for nuisances on the producers’ shoulders may be well-intentioned but it is not necessarily the right result because it does not provide any incentive to consumers to take steps to prevent injury. “A tax system which was confined to a tax on the producer for damage caused would tend to lead to unduly high costs being incurred for the prevention of damage.”  The CPSC’s tendency to blame products via recalls and bans is the equivalent of a tax in this case. The “unduly high costs” leads to a reduction or suspension of economic activity. We can observe this in the children’s market over the past three years – the agency and Congress have both received considerable testimony on this topic (and seemingly ignored it). Coase won the Nobel Prize for pointing out that regulators often neglect to look at the full economic picture and thus fail to achieve optimal social results.

It goes without saying that the regulators may nevertheless achieve optimal newspaper headlines.

Conclusion

Why is it inefficient to invariably push costs to manufacturers for injuries associated with children’s products? As Prof. Coase notes, in a raucous marketplace, transaction costs can distort the allocation of resources. In this case, the prospect of liability and uncontrollable losses are a high transaction cost that affects the efficient allocation of resources by trade. Coase posits that a cost-benefit analysis must be performed to make sure that efficiency is achieved. The rule for such analyses is quite clear – the all-in cost of the regulation must be less than the all-in economic benefits achieved.

The best way to understand the formula in this case is to look at all marginal children’s recalls as a class. Let’s agree that there actually are some “substantial” product hazards out there and exclude them from our analysis.  [Manufacturers are in the best position to evaluate and prevent "substantial" hazards on behalf of consumers.]  We must also assess all the money spent as a result of CPSC action as a group. It does not matter who spends the money – we want to tote up all the costs and lay them off against all the benefits. The benefits are easy to calculate – there is an economic value to a life and also to injuries. This type of analysis is not only common, it is a requirement of federal law (as a result of Coase’s work outlined above). The government has tables of these values. Likewise, the costs are pretty easy to tote up: out of pocket costs for the recall, replacement of inventory, damage to reputation and brand, legal and regulatory costs, lost jobs, reduced investment, etc.

In the case of accidents or other uncontrollable factors leading to injury, the CPSC’s calculus is defective. It is quite telling that the regulators are not interested in my point that no victims have been identified. Lead-in-substrate victims – NONE. Phthalates victims – NONE. The ledger on the benefits side is undocumented, vague and untested, but the regulators' indifference suggests that they place an almost infinite value on injury or even the possibility of injury. On the cost side, the regulator also seems to largely ignore the impact on markets. As noted by Coase, the regulators are not subject to competitive pressures so they can easily overlook these costs. The math does not add up, and as a result, their decisions inevitably will choke the market. The CPSC acts as though not subject to the laws of economics.

The legislative fix for this misguided regulatory effort is clear – mandate economic analyses as a justification for any CPSC regulation. It is also necessary to restore (actually, to mandate the use of) risk assessment by the CPSC. Risk is all about cost allocation and cost management. By removing the ability to assess risk, Congress essentially removed the wiring necessary for the CPSC to make an intelligent assessment of the economics of their decisions. While the CPSIA was clearly written and passed into law in anger, enough time has passed to expect cooler heads to prevail. Congress, it’s time to act!

CPSIA - The Senate Wants to Save ATVs . . . What about the Rest of Us???

Yesterday Senators Klobuchar and Tester offered an amendment to S. 493, a moving bill to reauthorize the small business administration ("SBIR/STTR Reauthorization Act of 2011").  This amendment is intended to exempt ATVs, dirt bikes, motocross and snowmobiles ("All-terrain vehicles") from the lead restrictions of the CPSIA.  To my knowledge, this amendment has not been voted on yet.  The text of their amendment reads as follows:

SA 259. Ms. KLOBUCHAR (for herself and Mr. TESTER) submitted an amendment intended to be proposed by her to the bill S. 493, to reauthorize and improve the SBIR and STTR programs, and for other purposes; which was ordered to lie on the table; as follows:

On page 116, after line 24, add the following:

SEC. 504. EXEMPTION OF OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLES FROM BAN ON LEAD IN CHILDREN'S PRODUCTS.

(a) Exemption.--Section 101(b) of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (15 U.S.C. 1278a(b)) is amended-- (1) by redesignating paragraph (5) as paragraph (6); and (2) by inserting after paragraph (4) the following:

(5) EXCEPTION FOR OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLES.--

(A) IN GENERAL.--Subsection (a) shall not apply to an off-highway vehicle.
(B) OFF-HIGHWAY VEHICLE DEFINED.--For purposes of this section, the term `off-highway vehicle'-- (i) means any motorized vehicle--(I) that is manufactured primarily for use off of public streets, roads, and highways; (II) designed to travel on 2 or 4 wheels; and (III) having either -- (aa) a seat designed to be straddled by the operator and handlebars for steering control; or (bb) a nonstraddle seat, steering wheel, seat belts, and roll-over protective structure; and (ii) includes a snowmobile.

(b) Additional Amendment.--Such section is further amended in paragraph (1)(A) by striking ``any''.

This is pretty stunning, really.  Did you notice that they are "fixing" the CPSIA by making two changes (one surmises that they think these are the only needed fixes), exempting All-terrain Vehicles from the law, and ALSO knocking out the word "any" from the lead exemption process.  If their amendment were to become law, the CPSIA Section 101(b)(1)(A) lead exemption would read as follows:

"The Commission may, by regulation, exclude a specific product or material from the prohibition in subsection (a) if the Commission, after notice and a hearing, determines on the basis of the best-available, objective, peer-reviewed, scientific evidence that lead in such product or material will neither— (A) result in the absorption of any lead into the human body, taking into account normal and reasonably foreseeable use and abuse of such product by a child, including swallowing, mouthing, breaking, or other children’s activities, and the aging of the product . . . ."

I must be stupid, but in this context, I don't think anything is achieved by deleting "any" (assuming "plain English" is the language of choice for legislative interpretation).  The word "any" is implied in "the absorption of lead into the human body", at least I think it is.  This is the kind of legislative change I am used to from the Dems in the last three years, a change that brings no relief whatsoever.  After all, they are plainly deaf.

Perhaps more interesting is why they chose to make these changes now.  I have long asserted that ATVs have no business being regulated under the CPSIA.  Klobuchar was a prime mover for the CPSIA but apparently found out later that her state of Minnesota is deeply affected by this awful law because of the ATV ban.  Oops!  Minnesota is home to several large manufacturers of these products.  Jobs, jobs, jobs are the key nowadays, especially if you are running for reelection.  Oh no, did I say that?  How cynical of me!  Tester is also running for reelection - last time, he won by by 3,662 votes.

There must be some reason why Klobuchar and Tester think legislation relieving these industries from the burden of regulation.  Since I know the Senators are ALL ABOUT safety, I can only conclude that they figured out that these products are already safe.  Aha.  I wonder how they made this determination.  Perhaps they took note of the fact that lead in these products has never injured any children EVER.  That fact suggests that it is wasteful to regulate the presence of lead in these products - it would not make anyone safer.  Even if there were one or two injuries, wouldn't the argument be the same?  After all, we are a country of 300 million, with 50 million-plus kids in the age range enveloped by the CPSIA.  A tiny handful of injuries over a decade of use by perhaps 75-80 million children passing through the age range would hardly justify the billions in expense and disruption caused by the CPSIA. Good thinking, Senators!

Have I ever mentioned that the CPSC cites one death and three unverified injuries from lead over an 11-year period from 1999-2010?  Hmmm.

If THAT'S the standard now, then I think Senators Klobuchar and Tester should expand their amendment to exempt ALL other products classes and components that have the same safety profile.  Rhinestones?  T-shirts and shoes?  Educational products?  Rocks and fossils?  Books?  Pens?  Musical instruments?  CDs and DVDs?  Steel and other metal parts? 

Isn't this proposed amendment just what we have always wanted - a concession by zealot Democrats that the law makes no sense and needs to be sharply revised?  If they are rational legislators (that's a big "if"), let them tell us WHY it makes sense to NOT regulate All-terrain Vehicles and STILL regulate everything else for lead in children's products.

Senators Klobuchar and Tester, you owe us an explanation!  This regulatory torture has gone on for three years, not in small part because of your unwillingness to do the right thing.  Now that you are sufficiently motivated to propose giving a pass to certain favored products and industries, you must tell the Electorate why this is GOOD LAW and why the rest of us deserve to stay in Purgatory.

'Fess up - we've had enough!

CPSIA - ICPHSO Update on Recall Law and Procedures

This panel discusses technical legal issues. You need to hire a lawyer to explore these issues. This blog is not a substitute for qualified legal representation. As previously noted, I am working off my notes, too. Please proceed with due and appropriate caution.

Panel included

• Eric Stone, K&L Gates LLP
• Georgia Ravitz, Arent Fox LLC
• David Baker, Law Offices of David Baker LLC

Eric Stone: Section 15(a) of CPSA limits the agency's authority to pursue only items presenting a substantial risk of injury or death. The agency has the right to sue for the same thing under Section 15(c) (mandatory recalls, very rare).

The prior law allowed manufacturers to elect the form of recall program. The CPSIA changed that, and gives the CPSC the authority to make those choices now.

Under Section 15(j), the agency can make a "substantial product hazard" findings across an entire product category, essentially by way of rulemaking. There are certain prerequisites to taking this action. The poster child for this is drawstrings in hoodies.

New violations of law INCLUDES reselling recalled items EVEN IF it was wholly voluntary or initiated entirely by the company without CPSC judgment. That recall is also enforceable in 51 jurisdictions. [Something to think about before you climb on the Fast Track Recall freight train . . . .] False statements or "attempting to mislead" the CPSC has dramatic implications under the new law. Don't go there . . . .

New penalty factors include a failure of the violator to respond "in a timely or complete fashion to the CPSC's requests for information and immediate action". Hmmm. Felony penalties now include asset forfeiture. Yep, that baby's raising its head again. In theory, the government can take your assets which it believes you have gotten through ill-gotten gains, like your house, your business, your buildings or plant. Hmmm. Love that CPSIA . . . .

David Baker:

1. "Substantial Risk of Injury" - no definition in the statute or in the legislative history. CPSC and the courts (Mirama Enterprises case) have interpreted it. Factors include death, grievous bodily injury (mutilation, dismemberment, severe burns, injuries likely to require extensive hospitalization). He asserts that MANY of the recalls initiated last year do NOT meet this standard. [RW: Where have I heard that before???] More than 1/3 of recalls do not involve injury AT ALL and many of the others fall far short of "grievous bodily injuries". DB: Should the CPSC be taking these cases? Should they simply say thanks for the report but no action is required? [Corrected at David Baker's request 4-11-11.]
2. Fast Track versus Slow Track - Express lane to a press release. No "finding" of a defect, possibly helpful in a product liability case. Fast Track cases aren't always so "fast". Are there cases in FT that because they have no injuries shouldn't be there? Is there still a slow track?
3. Penalty phase - "NO GOOD DEED GOES UNPUNISHED." Every recall files is reviewed by the General Counsel's office for late reporting, including those without injuries. There are MANY civil penalty cases being prosecuted out there now. [This could be you, baby.] Is the CPSC going after its own constituency? There is a very accomplished ex-U.S. Attorney now on staff at the CPSC (I think he is referring to Mary Murphy).

Ouch.

Last to present is Georgia Ravitz on Section 6(b) (unilateral press releases by the CPSC and their coercive power). Information that manufacturers submit to the CPSC are protected from disclosure to the public. Section 6(b) is the section governing procedures for releasing such information. [This is why Sectionn 6(b) is continually under attack by consumer groups. Their need for information trumps the interest of manufacturers in this confidentiality pledge. . . or at least so they say.]

CPSIA amendments to Section 6(b) gives the agency the right to issue unilateral press releases. The CPSC must "find" that the situation is so urgent that public interest in immediate release of information about a product hazard over the time permitted for review under Section 6(b).

Gives examples of such unilateral releases. The first one related to Simplicity bassinets. [They were already bankrupt and their assets had been auctioned off.] Other examples include the Witco "Recall to Repair" stadium light poles. GR notes that there is some concern that this release evidenced the CPSC acting in a rushed manner.

GR wondered aloud whether the right to preemptively issue press releases is being used "appropriately". [Georgia is very polite.] She quotes from the legislative record to note that Congress wanted to give the CPSC the ability to inform the public about "hazardous products". In other words, there must be certainty that the product is actually hazardous. She quoted from a speech from Chairman Tenenbaum where she indicated that the agency will use its powers to get its way, and then quoted from my December 2010 Senate testimony on coercive incidents at the agency. . . .

GR says that if the new powers under 6(b) are being used to coerce agreement, then the provision is being misused or being used in a way not intended by Congress. [I agree.] Coercion stifles meaningful dialogue. She thinks this provision should be used as a last resort and only use when there is no responsible party left (bankruptcy) or when the violator is clearly abusing the process through foot dragging.

GR calls for a return to "the way it used to be", namely a more open and less coercive deliberation at the agency over disputes. David Baker indicates that he has NEVER overturned a Preliminary Determination letter. [CPSC as judge and jury. That's a tough combo to overcome.]

Eric Stone: How do you overcome the impression that a company is "evil"? Baker - meetings at the agency are much rarer today, most communciations by phone call or email. Leads to more disagreements and makes disputes harder to resolve. Speed leads to this manner of communication. GR: My experience is that expressing a cooperative attitude with CPSC compliance officers will typically be reciprocated.

Gotta go catch my plane . . . .

CPSIA - ICPHSO Mock Civil Penalty Jury Exercise

There has been only ONE court decision relating to late reporting penalties, and it was a resounding victory for the government. A juice company lost a case in California in federal court. Since there is no little law on the subject, the presenters today assert that there is no way to predict how a future case might be decided.

The panel today:

• Eric Rubel, Arnold & Porter LLP
• Cheryl Falvey, GC of CPSC
• Sean Laane, Arnold & Porter LLP
• Richard Levie, retired Judge and current arbitrator/mediator
• Mary Murphy, Asst GC, Div. of Compliance, CPSC

The panel presentation was designed as a mock trial. Both sides of the case will be presented, and you can clearly how both sides will portray this incident and both are compelling.

First to present was Mary Murphy on behalf of the government. She emphasized the facts of the injury to the child. This is clearly how you and your company will be made to look worst. This is no surprise and is standard fare for a plaintiff in a lawsuit. She likewise related the prior reporting of the risk or incidents (to the company and to the CPSC) that suggested the hazard.

Needless to say, this is the reason that consumer groups want the database. They want to create a body of evidence to coerce product changes ahead of injuries. Of course, any responsible company monitors market data (such as consumer reports) to do just that sort of thing. The database, however, is fodder for lawsuits and facilitates this kind argument. The likely impact is that the cases of plaintiffs will be strengthened and awards will grow.

Shall we take a trip down memory lane and remind ourselves of the principal source of funding for the consumer groups active in children's product safety? Are you surprised to know that it is trial lawyers and the plaintiffs bar?

Back to the presentation of Ms. Murphy. She's doing a good job making the manufacturer look bad, almost venal. She links the injury back to a failure to report. This is because of the asserted critical role of the CPSC in keeping America safe. She poses the question "would this injury have occurred but for the failure to report?" She argues that ten reports from consumers (of the hazard, loose beads on a high chair, not injuries) created an obligation to report based on a substantial risk of injury or death. She likewise anticipates that the defense will be that the manufacturer had no duty to report. She says that the late reporting only took place when the manufacturer's back was "up against the wall". Again, Murphy emphasizes her story about the motivation or mental state of the company.

More evidence used against the company included multiple written reports by the CPSC to them of consumer complaints. Ms. Murphy is painting a clear picture of a company that is not acting on a known safety issue. She indicates that the company ignored this information based on poor advice, despite internal admissions that "this was an accident waiting to happen".

You can see that the facts of this hypothetical case opens manufacturers up to bad behavior portrayals. I applaud the effort to make this clear - you need to take this on board. The facts of this case appear extreme and objectionable. Media and political over-reaction to this kind of corporate behavior sent the REST OF US down the river under the CPSIA.

The defense was offered by Sean Laane. He noted the responsible behavior of the company by repeatedly testing the goods using CPSC standards and CPSC-accredited independent labs. Noted that the CPSC tested the product TWICE after reports of incidents from consumers - and the products passed! [Note that any safety system that overly depends on testing will ALWAYS expose a company to risk if it is distracted from or chooses to ignore contrary information from the market. This is a basic flaw in the reasoning of the consumer groups and the folks behind the CPSIA.] He goes on to note that the CPSC can't have it both ways, since it never concluded that action was required based on the incidents it was aware of. After all, the CPSC had several reports and did nothing. Claims the CPSC takes a "gotcha" approach because although it claims "late reporting", it was well-aware of the issue long before the injury - and did nothing.

Laane notes the extensive investment of this company in safety. He questions whether there was a reasonable basis to conclude that there was an unreasonable risk of injury or death. Clearly the CPSC didn't feel it was an unreasonable risk itself! Also notes that you don't have to tell the CPSC about information the agency already possesses. Notes repeatedly that the CPSC's actions or inaction are based on their expertise and fact findings, thus confirming the reasonableness of the company's approach. Notes that companies have no obligation to make products utterly indestructible.

Laane noted that the person inside the company who called the condition "an accident waiting to happen" was not a QC person or responsible manager. Instead, he was a customer service rep, and relayed that message to the QC department for their evaluation. Child who was injured later fully recovered, and the company chose to immediately initiate a Fast Track recall.

An interesting point made by Levie is that the company's awareness of similar issues in similar products can be held against them. If they knew or SHOULD HAVE KNOWN about other recalls or notorious injury incidents reflects on their later decisions or inaction. [I am glad I don't make baby monitors . . . . This is a good lesson on the reality of the problem of "emerging hazards". Note that you are going to be judged not just on what you know, but also on what they assert you SHOULD have known.]

CF: One of the most persuasive arguments made by defendants is a track record of reporting to the CPSC. This shows a commitment to safety and cooperation with the CPSC, demonstrating trust that the CPSC will not recall product everytime.

Levie agreed that this fact pattern will also be persuasive to a judge.

All market participants need to think about this kind of issue and how they might fare if they face a similar dilemma.

CPSIA - Nancy Nord Chimes in on Baby Monitors

You gotta read Nancy Nord's blog on the baby monitor recall. It speaks for itself and is basically on the topic of why they call certain actions "recalls" and others something else. In the controversial recall of Summer Infant baby monitor, Ms. Nord notably admits the involvement of the CPSC in this recall. Check it out. This is NOT my imagination.

CPSIA - ICPHSO Database Panel

Cheryl Falvey, Moderator - I am so excited about this panel because I know how much everyone loves the database.

I assume she was joking. Of course, she might have been thinking of the New York Times . . . .

Members of the panel:

• DeWayne Ray, Dep. Dir., Hazard Identification and Reduction, CPSC
• Mark Schoem, Dep. Dir., Office of Compliance
• Melissa Hampshire, Asst. GC, Div of Enforcement and Information, CPSC
• Scott Wolfson, Dir., Information and Public Affairs, CPSC

Won't accept anonymous submissions but will only share the info if the reporter ("consumer") checks a box to allow it. Will prosecute false filings. Won't publish for ten days after sending out the info to the manufacturers. You get the "whole" ten days.

RW: I am feeling all tingly now!

I just received a comment on my blog: "I think the coming government shutdown is good in so many ways."

CF: First picture submitted to the database was of a baby's behind.

And I thought it would be of a horse's behind . . . .

SF: We are a data-driven agency. Where have we typically received our data? DR: We get data electronically from hospitals and buy death certificates. Put up a bizarre slide with arrows, clouds, pointers, illegible type and so on. This apparently outlines where the data comes from and goes. They call this slide the "cartoon".

I am getting too much material here. . . .

DR: We really this new data warehouse which will bring real value to the CPSC. This is where they get the tools they need to "do the job".

The description of the database did not incorporate any response to the vigorous and legitimate concerns of industry. Wayne Morris referred to the database as a "blog". Ahem - CPSC, any reply?

Which reports of harm will be "public-facing"? MH: Many specific requirements before they can move forward with notifying the manufacturer or publish in the database.

MS: Rarely will postings result in a call to a company. There will be a "triage" team to sort through the data looking for serious issues.

What kinds of "product incidents" will be included in the database? DR: We have an internal process for "material inaccuracy".

What if they identify the wrong manufacturer? MH: It would be so "great" if you register, since you will get immediate notice after we complete our review of the data for meeting minimum manufacturer. We don't want to identify the wrong manufacturer.

[RW: Most of the time, manufacturers will not have sufficient data to evaluate that information, nor does ten days provide sufficient time to get this work done. Let's not forget that there's a lot to do in running a business. It is not acceptable that this database becomes the top priority of our company. It's just not fair or sensible to make filings in this database a daily emergency. In addition, very often, identification of the product is the least of the worries. What about the substance of the accusation? What happened to "findings of fact" or determinations of responsibility? The database is very likely to become a standard part of litigation strategy. There's a shocker for you!!]

How can manufacturers make comments on the "report of harm"? MH: Manufacturers can make any comment it wants. In addition, you can object to the inclusion of "confidential information". Can also claim that the filing is "materially inaccurate".

[RW: The latter two objections are as likely to be successful as an exemption from the "any lead" requirement. What, there are exemptions possible - look at the CPSIA . . . . So far, there are zero exemptions issued in three years. And there will be very few or no legitimate objections that stand up in the database process.]

CF: We rarely if ever receive confidential information from consumers. Todd Stevenson says it has happened twice since 1972. Staff will scrub the information to prevent this, too. Material inaccuracy is defined as false and misleading and so substantial as to materially mislead consumers. Burden of proof is on the manufacturer to supply EVIDENCE to support their claim of materially inaccuracy. The issue they will be most concerned about is materially inaccuracy relating to hazards. The agency EXPECTS manufacturers to call consumers in those ten days to figure out whether the claim is legitimate.

CF: We have received so many pictures during the soft boot of the database that we need new servers. It's pretty astounding.

[RW: OMG. This is going to be a feeding frenzy when Scott Wolfson puts his machinery into motion. Why do we need the government to play this role in the market? How are we going to stay in business when the government is encouraging litigation and brand destruction???]

CF: The database has a disclaimer that the agency can't verify or stand behind the accuracy of the database. We have no opinion on "causation".

RW: We are SOOOO screwed.

CF: Mentioned the DryMax diaper crisis that took a full year to resolve. [Under the database, every single claim would appear for a year until it emerges that each and every one was false and wrong. Too bad for P&G, I guess.]

RW: So so so screwed.

MH: Discussed link between the database filings and Section 6(b) disclosures. Ditto for FOIA process. [Based on my experience, FOIA couldn't take much of their time, since finishing off FOIA responses is . . . not a priority.]

Tell us about "education and outreach" about the database. SW: This is a tool for consumers. It's all about the back end.

RW: Now you know where you'll be getting it.

SW: It is extremely important to sign up for the portal. "Snail mail" won't work "as effectively". Think of the ten day window. 700 companies have signed up but it should be in the thousands.

RW: Maybe Aston Kutcher can help!

SW: On the consumer side, Hotline should take fewer calls. Watns to see the reports shift to the database. Will use the Twitter platform to publicize the database, plus blogs. Will continnue to promote the database because they see it as a benefit to consumers. Expects the database to start filling in March but it may as long as a month to have enough "data" to make the searching function to become "useful".

RW: Plaintiff lawyers, take note! Don't worry, they have . . . .

No questions taken. Apparently there's nothing to discuss. Maybe later . . . . Thanks, Cheryl! We get it.

CPSIA - My Remarks at House Working Session on CPSIA

STATEMENT OF RICHARD WOLDENBERG
Subcommittee on Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection
Committee on Energy and Commerce
United States House of Representatives
January 6, 2011

Thank you for the opportunity to present my views today. My name is Richard Woldenberg. I am Chairman of Learning Resources, Inc., a Vernon Hills, Illinois-based manufacturer of educational materials.

Despite its lofty goals, the CPSIA has had little impact on safety while severely disrupting markets and sharply raising operating costs. I have previously testified that our testing costs rose 8 times between 2006 and 2009 and are expected to multiply again. We have also cut back on our marketing and sales expenses to pay for the increase in our QC department from one to five.

This so-called “toy law” was designed to solve a problem that frankly didn’t exist. In 2007/8, there were some notorious toy recalls for lead-in-paint violations – yet there were almost no injuries. The CPSIA was an almost hysterical over-reaction to a simple compliance issue concerning a small number of companies.

Ironically, the CPSIA has already “cured” the compliance problem in the toy industry despite the glacial pace of implementation. Today, 30 months after passage of the law, lead-in-substrate testing is still not mandatory – yet toy recalls have fallen dramatically. How did it happen? I believe publicity, industry outreach and the commitment of new resources by industry improved compliance. Revised lead standards had NOTHING to do with it.

The CPSIA is causing a lasting trauma in our market. Small businesses left the market in droves. For instance, we decided not to enter the toddler market with new educational products. While foregone business opportunities don’t produce a pile of bodies, the economic damage is still severe. In an efficient marketplace, capital is redeployed and products and companies just move elsewhere. We need to fix this problem pronto.

The solution to the CPSIA problem lies in fixing the four horsemen of this apocalypse: (a) cost, (b) complexity, (c) risk and (d) government intrusion.

The worst CPSIA cost impact relates to needless and repetitive testing. Mandatory testing for everything but lead-in-paint should be dropped. An amended CPSIA should apply ONLY to those products specifically identified as presenting a substantial risk of injury or death from lead or lead-in-paint at the specified mandatory standards. This will sensibly knock out the vast majority of products subject to this law. The CPSC Commission should be mandated by law to rigorously apply this rule – the agency should bear the burden of proof.

The excesses of the current “precautionary principle” era cannot be allowed to continue. Lax application of the “substantial product hazard” law has created real doubt about the meaning of our safety laws. Strict adherence to this rule should be mandated by Congress to eliminate the many artificial crises spawned by the CPSIA. Discretion to set age limits, the applicability of the phthalates ban, tracking labels and the reduction of the lead standards should be subject to the same rigorous rule.

To preserve the competitiveness of American schools, special exemptions must be made for educational products (particularly science and special needs items).

The phthalates ban should be limited to products for children three and under to sharply reduce CPSIA compliance costs. This is a reasonable compromise pending resolution of any remaining doubts over the safety of these specific chemicals.

Complexity must be sharply reduced. The old rules were a manageable 100 pages or so but now top 3000 pages and growing. We need to return to a “keep it simple” set of rules with limited reporting requirements. Congress or the CPSC must choose top priorities, and promulgate limited and focused rules. I can assure you that no one understands the moving target of CPSC rules anymore. This MUST be remedied in any amendment of the CPSIA.

Needless bureaucracy should be eliminated, such as CPSC certification of labs, including in-house labs. Fraud and/or incompetence in testing have always been rare. Customs involvement in the CPSC supply chain should be shaped by a cost-benefit basis. Dealing with product safety like the prevention of terrorism is absurdly disproportionate to the risk and far too costly.

Implementation of the public database should be delayed until reasonable protections of due process rights of manufacturers are in place. Congress never intended to create an indistinguishable mixed bag of truths, half-truths and falsehoods – that’s what we have the Internet for. The adopted “anything goes” rules went way too far, and will accelerate market exits.

Government intrusion and excessive government power casts a pall over the children’s product market now. Open-ended penalty provisions allow for emotional and disproportionate punishments. The Commission has also asserted unprecedented powers to retroactively ban products and to mandate their replacement. Clearly, strict procedural controls and protections are missing. The era of “death penalties” without oversight must end.

Some CPSIA fixes are not legislative. Among other things, the CPSC needs to embrace industry as its partner in safety. As the past two years demonstrates, engaging industry is the key to long term improvements in safety.

Notwithstanding the media’s misrepresentation of our industry, we have an enviable record of safety. This is not a case of bad people, venal companies or lazy regulators. The problem is one of misapplied resources and ineffective regulatory strategy. The solution doesn’t require more money or more chest thumping. A well-designed law, combined with good education and industry outreach practices, will create the safer market that everyone wants.

Thank you for considering my views today. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

CPSIA - My Written Testimony at Senate Hearing 12-2-10

As you may know, there will be a Senate CPSC oversight hearing tomorrow. The hearing will be held by the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety and Insurance of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. You can see the witness list here. The subject of the hearing is "Oversight of the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Product Safety in the Holiday Season"

I have submitted the following written testimony. I will not be testifying at this hearing.

STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. WOLDENBERG
Chairman, Learning Resources, Inc.
Vernon Hills, Illinois

December 2, 2010


As an operator of a small business making educational products and educational toys, I have had a front row seat for the implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). On the occasion of your CPSC oversight hearing, I want to highlight the economic damage wrought by the CPSIA without achieving any material improvement in safety statistics. I also want to bring to your attention the open hostility of the CPSC toward the corporate community in the implementation and enforcement of the CPSIA, and conclude with my recommendations for legal reforms to restore common sense to safety administration without reducing children’s safety.

Children are our business. As educators, as parents and as members of our community, we have always placed the highest priority on safety. We would not be in the business of helping children learn if we didn’t care deeply about children and their safety. The CPSIA has dramatically impacted our business model, reduced our ability to make a profit and create jobs, pared our incentive to invest in new products and new markets, and generally made it difficult to grow our business. We would gladly accept these burdens if the law made our products safer, but the fact is that it hasn't. Our company, Learning Resources, Inc., has recalled a grand total of 130 pieces since our founding in June 1984 (all recovered from the market). Our management of safety risks was highly effective long before the government intervened in our safety processes in 2008.

The precautionary approach of the CPSIA attempted to fill perceived “gaps” in regulation by making it illegal to sell children’s products unless proven safe prior to sale. Yet the law has yielded few quantifiable safety benefits other than a reduction in recent recall rates for lead-in-paint (already illegal in children’s products for decades). Ironically, this progress in reducing recalls has taken place in a 27-month period in which, like the time before the CPSIA, testing of children’s products prior to sale was not mandatory. Consumer confidence wasn’t dented by the lack of mandatory testing. The justifications for the over-arching and excessively expensive CPSIA regulatory scheme just don’t hold water.

In any event, the reduction in recall rates is only a minor triumph and was not due to mandatory testing or harsh new lead standards, but most likely a (hyper) energized regulator and a great deal of publicity. Recall statistics can be highly misleading because the rate and number of recalls depend on many factors and do not generally correlate to injuries to children. In other words, product recalls are not tantamount to childhood injuries. The purpose of the CPSIA is to reduce injuries, not product recalls – yet CPSC recall statistics show that there have been almost no reported injuries from lead or phthalates in children’s products in the last decade (one death and three unverified injuries from 1999-2010, all from lead or lead-in-paint). The billions of dollars now being spent by the corporate community annually on testing and other compliance activities have not reduced injuries – there weren’t any to reduce. Whatever peace of mind has been generated by lower recall rates comes at a very high price.

The CPSIA significantly broadened the reach of federal safety regulation well beyond what was needed to deal with the lead-in-paint toy violations of 2007 and 2008. Under the CPSIA, the definition of a “Children’s Product” subject to regulation now encompasses ALL products designed or intended primarily for a child 12 years of age or younger (15 U.S.C. §2052(a)(2)). This definition ensures that virtually anything marketed to children will be subject to the restrictions of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), irrespective of known or quantifiable risk of injury. Put another way, this definition ensures that many product categories with a long tradition of safety are now subject to the withering requirements of this law for the first time simply because they fall within the overly broad definition of a Children’s Product. The affected safe products span the U.S. economy books, t-shirts and shoes, ATVs, bicycles, donated or resale goods, musical instruments, pens and educational products. The CPSC declined to use its discretion to narrow this definition in its recent “final rule” interpreting “Children’s Product”, thus ensuring continued market chaos and economic waste.

The consequences of the change in the consumer safety laws to a precautionary posture has had notable negative impacts and promises to create further problems, namely:

a. Increased Costs. The new law creates a heavy burden for testing costs. From 2006 to 2009, our company’s testing costs alone jumped more than eight-fold. We estimate that our testing costs will triple again after the CPSC (as anticipated) lifts its testing stay in 2011, and could multiply again if the CPSC enacts (as anticipated) its draft “15 Month Rule” on testing frequency and “reasonable testing programs”. Testing costs are often thousands of dollars per product. Having employed one person to manage safety testing and quality control for many years, we now have a department of five, including me, plus an outside lawyer on retainer. These jobs are funded by discontinuing sales, marketing and product development jobs – the CPSIA is NOT an ersatz stimulus program. Personnel, legal and other out-of-pocket safety expenses (besides testing) have more than quadrupled in the last three years – all without any change in our super-low recall rates or injury statistics.

b. Increased Administrative Expenses. The CPSIA requires that all products include tracking labels on both the packaging and the product itself. Rationalized as “analogous” to date labels on cartons of milk, tracking labels are in reality nothing but pure economic waste as applied to the vast array of “Children’s Products” under the CPSIA. As noted, our company has a virtually unblemished 26-year track record of safety so tracking labels promise to add little value in the event of recalls that are unlikely to occur. Ironically, with the strict new rules governing product safety, we believe the already low chance of a product recall has been reduced further. As noted above, the money to pay for all this administrative busy work comes from foregone business opportunities. We are being forced to shrink our company to apply tracking labels that no one will use.

An equally frustrating bureaucracy has sprung up around recordkeeping under this law. Burdensome requirements spawned by the government’s new involvement in our quality control processes forced us to make large new investments in information technology with no return on our investment. In addition, the pending CPSC draft policy on component testing promises to convert the simple task of obtaining a complete suite of safety test reports into a major recordkeeping chore. We will now be forced to manage each component separately, tracking test reports on each component one-by-one. This promises to multiply our recordkeeping responsibilities – and the related risk of liability for failing to comply – by more than an order of magnitude.

c. Reduced Incentive to Innovate. The increased cost to bring a product to market under the CPSIA will make many viable – and valuable – products uneconomic. To cover the cost of developing, testing and safety-managing new products, the prospective sales of any new item (“hurdle rate”) is now much higher than under prior law. This means that low volume “specialty market” items are less likely to come to market and many new small business entrants may find themselves priced out of the market. The CPSIA makes it much harder to start a new business serving the children’s market because the rules so heavily favor big business. Because of CPSIA transactional costs, high volume items now have a huge cost advantage over low volume items. This will hurt many small but important markets like educational products for disabled children. Our company, with its 1500 catalog items, is probably now a dinosaur under the CPSIA –the law provides a strong economic incentive to restructure our business around 50-150 items and to focus on high volume markets only. Schools would suffer from the loss of niche educational products.

d. Crippled by Regulatory Complexity. Our problems don’t end with testing costs or increased staffing. We are being crippled by regulatory complexity. Almost 28 months after passage of the CPSIA, we still don’t have a comprehensive set of regulations. Please consider how mindboggling the rules have become. There were fewer than 200 pages of safety law and CPSC rules that pertained to our business until 2008. These rules clearly defined our responsibilities and could be taught to our staff (in fact, many were rarely applicable to us). Today, the applicable laws, rules and interpretative documents exceed 3,000 pages. As a practical matter, it is simply not possible to master all of these documents – and yet it’s potentially a felony to break any of these rules. Sadly for us, the rules and CPSC staff commentary keep changing, are still being written and are rarely if ever conformed. How can we master and re-master these rules and teach them to our staff while still doing the full-time job of running our business? Ironically, the recalls of 2007 and 2008 were never a “rules” problem – those famous recalls were clearly a compliance problem. Imagine what will happen now with an unmanageable fifteen-fold increase in rules. No small business “ombudsman” can make that problem go away.

e. Small Business Will Certainly Suffer. The CPSIA was written in response to failings of big companies, but hammers small and medium-sized companies with particular vengeance. Our small business has already lost customers for our entire category on the grounds that selling toys is too confusing or too much of a “hassle”. This is our new reality. The highly-technical rules and requirements are beyond the capability of all but the most highly-trained quality managers or lawyers to comprehend. Small businesses simply don’t have the skills, resources or business scale to manage compliance with the CPSIA. For this reason, small businesses bear the greatest risk of liability under the law, despite being responsible for almost no injuries from lead in the last decade. The double whammy of massive new regulatory obligations and the prospect of devastating liability are driving small businesses out of our market.

In implementing and administering the CPSIA, the CPSC created a harsh regulatory environment for the business community over the past 28 months. Consider the following:

1. Unjustified Recalls. In June, in response to an inquiry by a Congressman and followed up by media inquiries, the CPSC pressed McDonalds to recall 12 million Shrek glasses for “high” cadmium content, despite the agency’s admission on Twitter that the glasses were not toxic. The recall effort was justified as being done “out of an abundance of caution”, a frightening regulatory standard when applied to products acknowledged to be safe by the regulator itself. McDonalds lost millions of dollars as a result, not to mention suffering from widespread and persistent bad publicity.

2. Unjustified Penalties and Coercive Tactics. The CPSC assessed a $2.05 million penalty against a hapless Japanese dollar store chain (Daiso) for five separate tiny recalls involving 698 units and 19 items. These items sold for between $1 and $4 each. There were no reported injuries from sales of the Daiso trinkets. Ms. Tenenbaum bragged about this extraordinarily excessive prosecution in a speech in March 2010 to the Consumer Federation of America: “We secured an injunction that completely stops Daiso from importing children’s products into the country. . . . Daiso has a very high hurdle to jump over to ever get back in the import business again.” Regulated companies take stunning examples like Daiso as a warning that outsized and disproportionate force may be used by this agency with little provocation.

The regulated community has also expressed alarm over the threatened use by the agency of unilateral press releases “to warn the public” about alleged dangers in specific products as a way to coerce “voluntary” recalls. Such threats have been used where facts may be in dispute to justify a recall. Under the law, the CPSC may only implement mandatory recalls subject to a court order, a slow process perhaps but also expensive and labor-intensive. “Voluntary” recalls can be much quicker and cheaper, only requiring “agreement” between the agency and the subject company. In more than one case, CPSC has threatened unilateral releases to try to "convince" a firm to undertake a "voluntary" recall but after the firm took the risk of standing up to the staff and the staff conducted further investigation, the CPSC decided that recalls were not even necessary. Not all firms can bear the expense of such a process or take the risk of calling the staff's bluff because issuance of a release would likely damage the firm and their brand, possibly irrevocably. Many supposedly "voluntary" recalls have resulted. Abusive tactics of this nature have severely damaged trust between the CPSC and the regulated community.

3. Disregard of Public Comments. The agency has garnered considerable criticism for overlooking or disregarding comments from the corporate community solicited in its public rulemaking processes. Ignoring or disregarding inconvenient public comments contrary to the agenda of the controlling party makes a mockery of the legally-mandated public comment process. Notable instances include the recent approval of interpretative rule on “Children’s Products” and the rules implementing the public database of safety incidents. The database debate was so fouled by the majority’s refusal to entertain the legitimate concerns of industry that the two minority Commissioners proposed their own draft rule – which the CPSC at first refused to post on its website.

4. Unjustified Hostile Rulemakings. The CPSC has implemented rules governing the public database that adversely affect the Constitutionally-guaranteed due process rights of our businesses. There is no adequate public policy justification for the erosion of the remarkable civil rights that distinguish the American legal system among all international legal systems – yet the Commission voted 3-2 to allow falsehoods to be posted without recourse in a database the CPSC will maintain. In other cases, the agency has published draft rules (yet to be acted on) which could force companies like ours to spend as much as $10,000 per item per year to meet ARBITRARY rules on testing frequency or “reasonable testing programs” – notwithstanding strong evidence that these rules are wasteful, unnecessary and financially irresponsible. The pendency of rules like this creates destabilizing market uncertainty and forces business decisions that have no basis other than fear of future regulation. For instance, Wal-Mart has already instituted a 100 ppm lead standard months ahead of the POSSIBLE implementation of the standard by the CPSC – simply because the CPSC has been so slow to act.

The CPSIA went off track by taking away the CPSC’s authority to assess risk. If the CPSC were again required to regulate based on risk, safety rules could focus on those few risks with the real potential to cause harm to children. All risks were not created equal.

I recommend several steps to reduce cost, liability risk and complexity all without sacrificing children’s product safety:

A. Mandate that the CPSC base its safety decisions, resource allocation and rules on risk assessment. Restore to the Commission the discretion to set age and product definition criteria for the 300 ppm lead standard and phthalate ban. Freeze the lead standard and lead-in-paint standard at their current levels unless the CPSC determines that a change is necessary to preserve public health and safety.

B. The definition of “Children’s Product” should not include anything primarily sold into or intended for use in schools or which is used primarily under the supervision of adults. Other explicit exceptions should include apparel, shoes, pens, ATVs, bicycles, rhinestones, books and other print materials, brass and connectors. Exclusions from the definition should take these products entirely outside the coverage of the CPSIA (including mandatory tracking labels).

C. Lead-in-substrate and phthalate testing should be based on a “reasonable testing program”, not mandated outside testing. The tenets of a reasonable testing program should be set by the reasonable business judgment of the manufacturer. Resellers should be entitled by rule to rely on the representations of manufacturers. Phthalate testing requirements should explicitly exempt inaccessible components, metals, minerals, hard plastics, natural fibers and wood.

D. Definition of “Children’s Product” should be limited to children six years old or younger and should eliminate the difficult-to-apply “common recognition” factor of Section 3(a)(2)(c) of the CPSA. Definition of “Toy” (for phthalates purposes) should be limited to children three years old or younger and should explicitly refer only to products in the form used in play.

E. Eliminate CPSC certification of laboratories (rely on the market to provide good resources). Fraud has only very rarely been a problem with test labs and is already illegal.

F. Impose procedural limits to insure fairness in penalty assessment by the CPSC under the CPSIA. Completely reformulate penalties to restrict them to egregious conduct (including patterns of violations), reckless endangerment or conduct resulting in serious injury.

G. Rewrite the penalty provision applicable to resale of used product so that violations are only subject to penalty if intentional (actual knowledge or reckless endangerment) and only if the violation led to an actual injury. Eliminate the “knowing” standard with its imputed knowledge of a reasonable man exercising due care.

H. Mandatory tracking labels should be explicitly limited to cribs, bassinets, play pens, all long-life “heirloom” products with a known history of injuring the most vulnerable children (babies or toddlers).

I. Public injury/incident database should be restricted to recalls or properly investigated incidents only. Manufacturers must be given full access to all posted incident data, including contact information. The “due process” civil liberty interests of the corporate community MUST BE PROTECTED.

I urge your committee to address the fundamental flaws in the CPSIA to restore order to the children’s product market and to protect small businesses from further damage. I appreciate the opportunity to share my views on this important topic.

CPSIA - What Are We Trying Achieve?

787 days have passed since ANY Democrat in Congress did ANYTHING to help us on the CPSIA. There are only 23 days left until Election Day.

Sean Oberle published a lengthy contemplation of the issue raised in my last post on the relationship between compliance and safety as objectives for regulators and for industry. Mr. Oberle's essay speaks for itself, so I will not attempt to summarize it. He concludes with the following message: "Therein lies the frustrating and frightening aspect of product safety. Those of you tasked with ensuring product safety – industry rep, consumerist, and regulator alike – are trying to quantify ambiguity amid a chaos of demands … all of them in flux … I don't envy you."

Sean, boy are you right!

I think it's worth discussing a few issues on compliance versus safety since Mr. Oberle devoted so much ink (or electrons) to the topic.

1. The law defines what the CPSC can and cannot do. It's a shame no one told them . . . .

First and foremost, the CPSC exists because of the CPSA and its activities are governed by the CPSA. Recall authority is governed by Section 15 which limits the agency's recall authority to "substantial product hazards", namely a product that ". . . creates a substantial risk of injury to the public". [Section 12 gives the agency additional powers to seek a court order for "imminent hazards".] In other words, the CPSC does not have the legislative authority to tilt at windmills - it cannot demand recalls for anything unless it presents a "substantial risk of injury to the public".

Consider recalling 12 million glasses that the CPSC acknowledges in writing are SAFE. Substantial risk of injury?

Consider recalling more than seven million trikes sold over 14 years that caused six children to cut themselves. Children who were under three years of age and should have been under the care of attentive adults. Substantial risk of injury?

Consider recalling more than 400,000 Sarge cars because the little yellow dot on the wheel hubcap violated the lead-in-paint ban, and those dots were produced from two cans of paint. Substantial risk of injury?

One must distinguish between legerdemain and reality, between policy and what the law intended. It is a little focused-upon responsibility of the agency to exercise this judgment. Is it even possible for everything that happens to be a "substantial" risk? We know of cases where a single broken toy without an injury provoked an official investigation at the agency. Fair? Is this an activity that the CPSA authorizes? It is . . . if you are running the agency and you say it is. Arguably, the recall of the 480,000 Mattel Wheelies on September 30 was just such a case. Consumers apparently reported two broken cars with wheels that fell off, and no injuries were reported or implied. Substantial risk of injury? I question that.

2. The notion that we need all this supervision flies in the face of injury statistics. But it sure makes the CPSC look irreplaceable, doesn't it?

I have already published and discussed ad nauseum the historical injury statistics from lead based on CPSC recall notices - ONE DEATH and THREE UNVERIFIED INJURIES over 11 years (1999-2010). If we were facing such a dire public health crisis, why weren't kids dropping like flies from lead poisoning over such a long time period of "lax regulation"? If the harm was so widespread and so devastating, why aren't any of these actual victims known? Names, addresses, photos, case histories?

A friend replied to me recently reasoning that there is no safe level of lead. Okay, I concede that lead can be dangerous but it is absolutely true that lead in present throughout our environment and in the air, food and water that we consume every minute of every day. So since we take in lead from several sources all the time, we know we are building up lead and this leads to several questions. If lead is so harmful at all levels, why aren't we ALL showing the effect of our cumulative build-up of lead? How can you demonstrate that children's products contribute meaningfully to the asserted "problem"? How can you prove that "fixing" children's products will meaningfully change lead blood levels? And if you could prove those things (which cannot be done), how can you measure the return on investment of our multi-billion dollar annual investment? Remember, we can only spend those dollars one time - so is flushing them down the toilet on test reports REALLY our best use of scarce and irreplaceable dollars? How would you measure that?

But the more that the CPSC enforces the law against "bad" corporations, the more they scam the public into thinking they needed the help all along. They talk about recall statistics but never put them in the context of injury statistics. The proponents never compare lead injury statistics to other injury statistics like swimming pools.

[Is a child injured by lead "worse" that a child killed in a pool? It better be - because we are spending billions to prophylactically eliminate the possibility of purported lead injuries while leaving swimming pools open to continue a continuing skein of killings of more than one child each day. That's okay according to our Democrat-run Congress. Tell that to the family of drowning victim - they can take comfort in knowing that their child didn't have lead poisoning thanks to the relentless and remorseless enforcement of the CPSIA . . . .]

So as the regulators abuse and confuse the definition of hazard, they create an atmosphere of dependence. Oh thank you Mother Government for saving me! What would I do without you?!

3. Mr. Oberle reminds us that "Lack of incidents may not mean a product is safe." And just because you're paranoid doesn't mean they AREN'T out to get you.

Mr. Oberle does not take an offensive stance on this topic, btw. He is right, you can sometimes catch something dangerous before it creates harm. Presumably a quicker recognition of the hazard in Magnetix might have prevented injuries. Responsible companies need to always keep a lookout for insights that reveal latent hazards.

On the other hand, injury statistics are a useful tool. If, as is the case for lead, the assertion is that the hazard is widespread and present over a lengthy period of time, injury statistics become QUITE relevant. So, if lead was such a terrible problem in children's products (putting lead-in-paint aside, long ago banned), injury statistics over many years would reveal a latent problem. Think of the breadth of the definition of "Children's Products" and think of the years of recall data available for study. We are looking at TRILLIONS of interactions with children every year in the United States alone. Where are all the lead victims? We cannot say that we don't know the scale of this problem. We have apparently been running an "experiment" on the U.S. public for decades in the period the zealots label as "lax regulations" or "lax enforcement". If lead-in-substrate were so dangerous, wouldn't you expect to see SOME evidence of it?

If we must imagine the scale of the danger, can we spend imaginary dollars to deal with it?

4. The compliance hawks want to frame this as a financial question - how much is your safety worth? I think that's the wrong question - I think the question is "how long do you want to have a job?"

I have already reported that our compliance group is currently up to six people from a historical one or two, and of course, our products are no safer today than in the past. They were always safe and still are, but it costs us a lot more to operate. That's not good for you or for me.

So how do we pay for all this new bureaucracy? We have not raised prices, that's impossible these days. We are lucky to have customers and cannot spit in their faces with a price increase. Think of your business - it won't fly.

We also need to hit profitability targets because we need to remain financable. We do not get money from "money fairies" - we have to deal with a bank, just like you. Our bank prefers to see that we make money. I know that doesn't seem very civic-minded but I can't fault them for their POV. In any event, I think it's elementary that a business needs to make a profit to have the model sustain itself. Therefore, we cannot commit ourselves to ever-eroding profitability. When our costs rise, we cut elsewhere . . . just like you do.

Needless to say, we have skinnied up a lot since 2007. We have a much-reduced headcount and operate far more efficiently. This is how everyone behaved during the financial crisis and the jobs have not returned, in part because the economy remains sluggish. With our rising overhead relating to pointless regulations, what can we do? We must recover the money from activities that are focused on raising revenues. In effect, we are discontinuing activities that create growth to fund activities that are pure costs.

What's the math behind this? Consider how we recover a dollar of bureaucratic cost from productive activities. If you are already operating efficiently and cannot wring out big productivity gains (as may be the case post-financial crisis cost reductions), then how do you pay for an additional dollar of overhead cost? When you eliminate a "productive" dollar of cost to pay for an unproductive dollar of cost (e.g., you trade a dollar of marketing promotion for a dollar of test costs), it's not an even trade. No, because your dollar of productive cost creates gross margin whereas your overhead produces no profit whatsoever. Your productive dollar of cost produces gross profit which defrays your operating costs and produces marginal net profit on top of that. Wiping out the dollar of productive cost also wipes out the contribution to operating costs, so effectively, only the associated marginal net profit can defray the unproductive cost. Since profit percentages are generally low for most of us, the ratio of productive cost dollars needed to be sacrificed to cover unproductive costs is probably on the order of 2:1 or 3:1. Hire another QC person and fire the equivalent of two people elsewhere. In our case, we do it by attrition. We just shrink away.

As if this weren't bad enough, it's also a recipe for disaster or business death in a worst case. The continued erosion of productive spending to finance unproductive spending has a dramatic impact on growth. Revenue flattens out or stays in a downward trend. It's no surprise - you are starving your company of investment dollars as you spend at constant levels. You have simply shifted your spending from productive uses favoring growth to unproductive uses that will not create growth. Presumably, those of you with children have discussed the merits of eating fruits and vegetables versus eating potato chips. It's no different for a business and how it consumes dollars. We will never grow up to be big and strong if Mother Government restricts our financial diet this way.

Sean's right. I don't envy you . . . or me. This makes me very pessimistic about the future.

I hope you are mad as hell and won't take it anymore. In 23 days, you will get to vote. DO IT!