Hope you haven't assumed that the "15 Month Rule" has gone away. Apparently, the CPSC is mobilized to "finalize" this misbegotten rule in the next two weeks. Brace for the impact - it promises to be cataclysmic. Remember, our friends at the agency are sure you are about to start "dosing" kids with lead and have so informed Congress in writing. All the better to scare the general populace. They know no one can "stop you" except them.
Jobs and economic recovery be damned, here comes the "15 Month Rule"!
Showing posts with label 15 Month Rule. Show all posts
Showing posts with label 15 Month Rule. Show all posts
Wednesday, April 27, 2011
Monday, March 21, 2011
CPSIA - Response to Questions by Nancy Nord (100 ppm Hearing February 16th)
This is my Response for the Record to a supplemental question posed by Commissioner Nancy Nord to the CPSC's February 16th Hearing on the pending 100 ppm Lead Standards:
Response to Commissioner Nancy Nord's Request
for Comment in the Federal Register
1. You stated reduction from 300 ppm in substrate to 100 ppm in substrate removes the margin of error for low tech manufacturers. Would you elaborate on this with some of your own testing experience?
When we consider the impact of the lower standard, we first ask how we would manage a failure. As (presumably) rational business people, we want to allocate our capital to maximize our returns, and thus, risks to those returns must be weighed and addressed as appropriate. We have tried to understand our risks under the new lower lead standard – and the results are not encouraging. Once a failure (failed test) is discovered, it is often incurable. A failed test on a completed item including an integrated failed component (e.g., a zipper) likely means a total loss under the CPSIA. Failures of components already subject to valid passing component tests cannot be ruled out and in fact, are likely to occur. Our inability to solve this problem for even trivial violations introduces a new and significant risk of random (unpredictable and uncontrollable) losses to our business.
The agency’s stance on re-testing is not encouraging either. The draft rules on re-testing in the “15 Month Rule” are best described as unworkable. The doubt raised over the consequences of a failed test under pending rules only elevates our concern over how we might deal with a failed test. At present, there seems to be few options. For this reason alone, the proposed reduction of lead standards to 100 ppm is extremely threatening.
Given the dire consequences of a failed test, we must assess whether we can control our supply chains and raw materials/components to always comply with the new lower standard. In my testimony before the Commission, I noted that 98.3% of our passing test reports in a two-year period (2701 CPSIA test reports) were compliant with the new standard. Unfortunately the 1.7% in the range of 100-300 ppm scatters randomly across our many products and components. Thus, we don’t know how to predict which components are prone to risk of non-compliance and the consequences of finding them at the wrong time can be devastating. [It goes without saying that 2701 tests in a two-year period is a strong demonstration of both the devotion of resources and the huge expenditures required by the CPSIA to obtain passing tests reports – continual clean bills of health, over and over and over again.]
Our testing results reveal two troubling trends. First, we have found a material number of our items with one or more components that fall into the 100-300 ppm zone, sometimes just barely above 100 ppm. For a “miss” of as little as 5 ppm of lead entombed permanently in a substrate, an entire lot can be relegated to the garbage heap. Failed components might be as insignificant as a label or a lens cap. We also know from experience that retesting the same unit or units from the same lot may result in a passing test report but do not anticipate that we will be afforded this option to “comply”. In any event, retesting to obtain a clean passing test report does not change the product. If this law is truly about safety, I fail to see what is being accomplished by piling up the test reports to the profit of the test labs. The occurrence of failures under the new standard for a few ppm of lead will raise our costs significantly.
Second, we have encountered significant variability in our testing results. I have attached three test reports as examples of the variability problem. The first report (submitted with my comments on the 100 ppm standard) shows the test results on a single piece of string from a mesh bag holding dominoes. We cut the string into ten pieces and then tested each segment. The lead content results ranged from 239 – 275 ppm. A representative of the bicycle industry gave similar evidence (wide variability in multiple tests on different parts of a single component) at the 100 ppm hearing on February 16th. In the attached test report on tape measures, we found lead levels in coatings in the same tape measure lot ranging from 79-97 ppm, which is more than a 20% variability range. Finally, I have attached three test reports showing yellow plastic substrate from the same lot of educational products at 23, 88 and 139 ppm lead levels. Our success in obtaining passing test reports will apparently depend on LUCK when lead levels are near the 100 ppm concentration. We don’t have a solution to this problem. In our experience, this problem strikes randomly and often absurdly. We have found, for instance, lead levels between 100-300 ppm on zipper housings on the inside of a sewn bag. Lizard tongues might be able to reach it but fortunately, none of our customers are lizards.
None of this randomness or massive expense can be tied to safety – just to the enrichment of testing companies and lawyers. I am hopeful that the Commission will see that action is needed to stop the reduction of the lead standard to 100 ppm to help preserve the value our company brings to schools and families throughout the United States.
Response to Commissioner Nancy Nord's Request
for Comment in the Federal Register
1. You stated reduction from 300 ppm in substrate to 100 ppm in substrate removes the margin of error for low tech manufacturers. Would you elaborate on this with some of your own testing experience?
When we consider the impact of the lower standard, we first ask how we would manage a failure. As (presumably) rational business people, we want to allocate our capital to maximize our returns, and thus, risks to those returns must be weighed and addressed as appropriate. We have tried to understand our risks under the new lower lead standard – and the results are not encouraging. Once a failure (failed test) is discovered, it is often incurable. A failed test on a completed item including an integrated failed component (e.g., a zipper) likely means a total loss under the CPSIA. Failures of components already subject to valid passing component tests cannot be ruled out and in fact, are likely to occur. Our inability to solve this problem for even trivial violations introduces a new and significant risk of random (unpredictable and uncontrollable) losses to our business.
The agency’s stance on re-testing is not encouraging either. The draft rules on re-testing in the “15 Month Rule” are best described as unworkable. The doubt raised over the consequences of a failed test under pending rules only elevates our concern over how we might deal with a failed test. At present, there seems to be few options. For this reason alone, the proposed reduction of lead standards to 100 ppm is extremely threatening.
Given the dire consequences of a failed test, we must assess whether we can control our supply chains and raw materials/components to always comply with the new lower standard. In my testimony before the Commission, I noted that 98.3% of our passing test reports in a two-year period (2701 CPSIA test reports) were compliant with the new standard. Unfortunately the 1.7% in the range of 100-300 ppm scatters randomly across our many products and components. Thus, we don’t know how to predict which components are prone to risk of non-compliance and the consequences of finding them at the wrong time can be devastating. [It goes without saying that 2701 tests in a two-year period is a strong demonstration of both the devotion of resources and the huge expenditures required by the CPSIA to obtain passing tests reports – continual clean bills of health, over and over and over again.]
Our testing results reveal two troubling trends. First, we have found a material number of our items with one or more components that fall into the 100-300 ppm zone, sometimes just barely above 100 ppm. For a “miss” of as little as 5 ppm of lead entombed permanently in a substrate, an entire lot can be relegated to the garbage heap. Failed components might be as insignificant as a label or a lens cap. We also know from experience that retesting the same unit or units from the same lot may result in a passing test report but do not anticipate that we will be afforded this option to “comply”. In any event, retesting to obtain a clean passing test report does not change the product. If this law is truly about safety, I fail to see what is being accomplished by piling up the test reports to the profit of the test labs. The occurrence of failures under the new standard for a few ppm of lead will raise our costs significantly.
Second, we have encountered significant variability in our testing results. I have attached three test reports as examples of the variability problem. The first report (submitted with my comments on the 100 ppm standard) shows the test results on a single piece of string from a mesh bag holding dominoes. We cut the string into ten pieces and then tested each segment. The lead content results ranged from 239 – 275 ppm. A representative of the bicycle industry gave similar evidence (wide variability in multiple tests on different parts of a single component) at the 100 ppm hearing on February 16th. In the attached test report on tape measures, we found lead levels in coatings in the same tape measure lot ranging from 79-97 ppm, which is more than a 20% variability range. Finally, I have attached three test reports showing yellow plastic substrate from the same lot of educational products at 23, 88 and 139 ppm lead levels. Our success in obtaining passing test reports will apparently depend on LUCK when lead levels are near the 100 ppm concentration. We don’t have a solution to this problem. In our experience, this problem strikes randomly and often absurdly. We have found, for instance, lead levels between 100-300 ppm on zipper housings on the inside of a sewn bag. Lizard tongues might be able to reach it but fortunately, none of our customers are lizards.
None of this randomness or massive expense can be tied to safety – just to the enrichment of testing companies and lawyers. I am hopeful that the Commission will see that action is needed to stop the reduction of the lead standard to 100 ppm to help preserve the value our company brings to schools and families throughout the United States.
Wednesday, February 9, 2011
CPSIA - Unpublished Article Highlights CPSIA Benefits Felt by Testing Companies
Intertek Presses Toy Rules as U.S. Scrutiny Aids Testing Firms
2011-02-02 05:00:02.1 GMT
By Mark Drajem
Feb. 2 (Bloomberg) -- When the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission last May proposed rules on how toymakers must test their products, Toys R Us Inc., Lego A/S and retail groups urged
the regulators to ease off.
One company took a different tack.
London-based Intertek Group Plc, the world's largest consumer-goods testing company, argued that the rules should be expanded to require manufacturers to submit to further "engineering, chemical and biological analysis," to ensure that the design of any toy is safe.
The filing demonstrates one consequence of increased government scrutiny of product safety: For Intertek and other testing companies such as Bureau Veritas SA and SGS SA the very rules that manufacturers and retailers say burden them with undue costs and paperwork mean more business.
"It's just another opportunity to test," said Larry Lynn, compliance manager at Learning Resources Inc., a Vernon Hills, Illinois-based maker of educational toys such as the Zoomy handheld microscope. The company estimates its testing costs jumped 10-fold since 2006.
"All the labs have seen a significant increase in the business because of the requirements of the CPSC," said Rick Locker, a lawyer for the Toy Industry Association in New York. In the first months after a previous law went into effect in 2009, testing costs tripled, he said. While the expenses and delays have receded, pending new requirements mean "you could see that issue come back again," he said in an interview.
Back to Edison
Intertek, which traces its corporate heritage to Thomas Edison's Lamp Testing Bureau, has more than 1,000 labs in 100 countries. In addition to analyzing consumer products such as apparel and toys, it tests or certifies chemicals, foods and minerals. It earned 103.7 million pounds ($167.3 million) on revenue of 652.6 million pounds in the first half of 2010, its most recent published results.
The U.S. testing requirements followed a rash of recalls in 2007 of Chinese-made toys, sold by companies such as Mattel Inc., which were found to contain lead paint. In response, Congress passed legislation in 2008 mandating that all toymakers curb lead and other harmful materials in their products and redouble testing.
While the rules apply to toys sold in the U.S., much of the testing takes place in China and Hong Kong, where many U.S. toys are made. The U.S. imported $25 billion in toys from China in 2009, making it the third-largest category of imports from the country, behind computers and household goods such as clocks.
European Testers
The largest consumer-testing companies are based in Europe. Among the bigger ones in the U.S. are Northbrook, Illinois-based Underwriters Laboratories Inc. and Consumer Testing Laboratories Inc. in Bentonville, Arkansas. Both are closely held.
Intertek, Bureau Veritas and SGS, the world's three largest testing companies, all say their revenue jumped after the new toy requirements began in January 2009. Intertek's revenue from consumer-goods testing in the first six months of that year climbed more than 20 percent, almost double the overall company revenue growth, to 162.5 million pounds.
Its profit margin in consumer products was 33 percent, double that of the company as a whole. Intertek has more than doubled in London trading since the U.S. law took effect, and has risen 45 percent in the past 12 months.
Both Bureau Veritas, based in Neuilly-sur-Seine near Paris, and Geneva-based SGS are bigger than Intertek in revenue from all testing. Bureau Veritas shares have increased 54 percent in the last year. SGS, the world's biggest overall product inspector, is up 15 percent.
Growth Ahead
While Intertek's consumer-testing revenue fell 0.4 percent to 161.9 million pounds in the first half of 2010, the company predicts a U.S. requirement that a government-certified, outside testing company examine each children's product will boost profits again over the next two years.
The new U.S. rule, as well as a European Union initiative in toy safety, "present further opportunities for growth in 2011 and 2012," the company said in a presentation to investors in August. The Consumer Product Safety Commission voted yesterday to delay the next round of testing requirements until 2012 from later this year as initially planned.
Anticipating an increased need for testing, Intertek has introduced computer software for sale to manufacturers so they can meet the analytical and paperwork requirements the consumer-safety agency is scheduled to implement.
Intertek also is making sure its voice is heard in Washington. It hired former CPSC chief of staff Joseph Mohorovic as a vice president, and paid the firm of former CPSC chairman Hal Stratton $240,000 last year to lobby on its behalf, according to government records.
No Regrets
Gene Rider, president of Oak Brook, Illinois-based Intertek Consumer Goods in North America, said a combination of increased consumer awareness and growing global outsourcing is sparking demand for Intertek's testing services.
"One of the misconceptions is that regulation drives our revenues," Rider said in an interview. "All the rules are asking manufacturers to do is to demonstrate good manufacturing practice."
As for its petition to the CPSC, Rider said he has no regrets. Most recalls are caused by design flaws, not faulty materials such as lead paint, and those won't be found without new government requirements, he said.
"It's all about designing the product to avoid injuries or fatalities," Rider said.
To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Drajem in Washington at +1-202-624-1964 or mdrajem@bloomberg.net.
2011-02-02 05:00:02.1 GMT
By Mark Drajem
Feb. 2 (Bloomberg) -- When the U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission last May proposed rules on how toymakers must test their products, Toys R Us Inc., Lego A/S and retail groups urged
the regulators to ease off.
One company took a different tack.
London-based Intertek Group Plc, the world's largest consumer-goods testing company, argued that the rules should be expanded to require manufacturers to submit to further "engineering, chemical and biological analysis," to ensure that the design of any toy is safe.
The filing demonstrates one consequence of increased government scrutiny of product safety: For Intertek and other testing companies such as Bureau Veritas SA and SGS SA the very rules that manufacturers and retailers say burden them with undue costs and paperwork mean more business.
"It's just another opportunity to test," said Larry Lynn, compliance manager at Learning Resources Inc., a Vernon Hills, Illinois-based maker of educational toys such as the Zoomy handheld microscope. The company estimates its testing costs jumped 10-fold since 2006.
"All the labs have seen a significant increase in the business because of the requirements of the CPSC," said Rick Locker, a lawyer for the Toy Industry Association in New York. In the first months after a previous law went into effect in 2009, testing costs tripled, he said. While the expenses and delays have receded, pending new requirements mean "you could see that issue come back again," he said in an interview.
Back to Edison
Intertek, which traces its corporate heritage to Thomas Edison's Lamp Testing Bureau, has more than 1,000 labs in 100 countries. In addition to analyzing consumer products such as apparel and toys, it tests or certifies chemicals, foods and minerals. It earned 103.7 million pounds ($167.3 million) on revenue of 652.6 million pounds in the first half of 2010, its most recent published results.
The U.S. testing requirements followed a rash of recalls in 2007 of Chinese-made toys, sold by companies such as Mattel Inc., which were found to contain lead paint. In response, Congress passed legislation in 2008 mandating that all toymakers curb lead and other harmful materials in their products and redouble testing.
While the rules apply to toys sold in the U.S., much of the testing takes place in China and Hong Kong, where many U.S. toys are made. The U.S. imported $25 billion in toys from China in 2009, making it the third-largest category of imports from the country, behind computers and household goods such as clocks.
European Testers
The largest consumer-testing companies are based in Europe. Among the bigger ones in the U.S. are Northbrook, Illinois-based Underwriters Laboratories Inc. and Consumer Testing Laboratories Inc. in Bentonville, Arkansas. Both are closely held.
Intertek, Bureau Veritas and SGS, the world's three largest testing companies, all say their revenue jumped after the new toy requirements began in January 2009. Intertek's revenue from consumer-goods testing in the first six months of that year climbed more than 20 percent, almost double the overall company revenue growth, to 162.5 million pounds.
Its profit margin in consumer products was 33 percent, double that of the company as a whole. Intertek has more than doubled in London trading since the U.S. law took effect, and has risen 45 percent in the past 12 months.
Both Bureau Veritas, based in Neuilly-sur-Seine near Paris, and Geneva-based SGS are bigger than Intertek in revenue from all testing. Bureau Veritas shares have increased 54 percent in the last year. SGS, the world's biggest overall product inspector, is up 15 percent.
Growth Ahead
While Intertek's consumer-testing revenue fell 0.4 percent to 161.9 million pounds in the first half of 2010, the company predicts a U.S. requirement that a government-certified, outside testing company examine each children's product will boost profits again over the next two years.
The new U.S. rule, as well as a European Union initiative in toy safety, "present further opportunities for growth in 2011 and 2012," the company said in a presentation to investors in August. The Consumer Product Safety Commission voted yesterday to delay the next round of testing requirements until 2012 from later this year as initially planned.
Anticipating an increased need for testing, Intertek has introduced computer software for sale to manufacturers so they can meet the analytical and paperwork requirements the consumer-safety agency is scheduled to implement.
Intertek also is making sure its voice is heard in Washington. It hired former CPSC chief of staff Joseph Mohorovic as a vice president, and paid the firm of former CPSC chairman Hal Stratton $240,000 last year to lobby on its behalf, according to government records.
No Regrets
Gene Rider, president of Oak Brook, Illinois-based Intertek Consumer Goods in North America, said a combination of increased consumer awareness and growing global outsourcing is sparking demand for Intertek's testing services.
"One of the misconceptions is that regulation drives our revenues," Rider said in an interview. "All the rules are asking manufacturers to do is to demonstrate good manufacturing practice."
As for its petition to the CPSC, Rider said he has no regrets. Most recalls are caused by design flaws, not faulty materials such as lead paint, and those won't be found without new government requirements, he said.
"It's all about designing the product to avoid injuries or fatalities," Rider said.
To contact the reporters on this story: Mark Drajem in Washington at +1-202-624-1964 or mdrajem@bloomberg.net.
Friday, January 28, 2011
CPSIA - CPSC's Shameful Failure of Leadership
On Monday, the CPSC will decide whether or not to extend the testing and certification stay that has been in place for two years. The 16-page document which sets out the parameters of the decision does not mention risk anywhere. That's because the law prohibits the CPSC from considering safety in its work under the CPSIA. [Ironically, the CPSC warns users that use of its http://www.saferproducts.gov/ website is at their own risk (see par. no. 2 in the user's agreement) - and ironically, we're talking about a "dot gov" website, too!]
The CPSC explains that extension of the stay is only one of its options. It can do nothing, it can roll all the existing stays forward, or just some of them (to heck with the ATV'rs and the bike industry). Presumably, they will choose to roll all of it forward to September 14, 2011. We can all be screwed on the same day. I like the symmetry of that!
The CPSC has not lost sight of the issues. They know they haven't finished their work. They note that two years ago on February 9. 2009 when the Commission first extended the testing stay. it was because delaying implementation of the testing requirement by a year "give[s] us the time needed to develop sound rules and requirements as well as implement outreach efforts to explain these [new] requirements of the CPSIA and their applicability."
How time flies! That didn't happen, so the Commission again extended the stay by another year on December 8, 2010. Why? Chairman Tenenbaum: "I voted to extend the stay on lead content testing and certification until February 10, 2011, in order to allow component testing adequate time to develop and to give our stakeholders adequate notice of new requirements." Commissioner Robert Adler: "One of the primary rationales advanced for extending the stay is to await the effective date of the so-called 15-month rule."
Where does the time go?? None of that ever happened. Hey, CPSC, take all the time you need!
So now the Commission is poised to kick the can down the road until September 14, 2011. Why that date? The CPSC Staff report notes that this gives the Commission time to sort out the new, lower lead standard due to be imposed on August 10, 2011. The CPSC is holding a hearing on February 16 on the feasibility of the 100 ppm standard. As Staff notes, if the Commission doesn't determine that 100 ppm is feasible, then they will have to set a standard between 300 ppm and 100 ppm that is feasible. "Feasibility" was defined in the CPSIA, lest there should be any disagreement, to exclude ANY consideration of economics. In other words, if it's possible at any price or under any condition, it is considered "feasible" and thus mandated by the law. I can save the CPSC some time - under that definition, it's definitely feasible. Completely unreasonable and unnecessary but "feasible".
The idea promoted in the Staff memo is that we will time to get used to all this if the stay lifts a month after the implementation of the new lead standard. [The concept of "learning disability" floats through my head. Have we heard this song before?] "Staff recommends that the Commission extend the stay to allow time for the Commission to determine whether it is technologically feasible to lower the amount of lead in children's products to 100 ppm." I guess once the Commission makes up its collective mind, the CPSC will wave a magic wand and make your business, your supply chain and your sales channel comply with the new rules in a matter of days. The fact that the rules are hazy after almost three years is no concern of theirs. Is it a concern of yours?
I love magical rules and magical plans! It must be a job requirement for Commissioners to be wizards, too.
All concerns over the "15 Month Rule" seem to have evaporated. This is presumably Robert Adler's doing (see his statement above, which is a rant that the 15 Month Rule and the stay are separable issues). The Staff report intones: "While a Commission decision to extend the current stay of enforcement will give industry an opportunity to test and certify finished products and components according to the final rule and provide the Commission time to clarify any confusion regarding the new rule, it is not necessary for the testing rule to be complete to lift the stay as to the initial test for lead compliance." Can't see any problem there, can you???
The CPSC doesn't want you to worry, however. They have apparently promulgated several documents that set out their policy and whatnot on lead, namely "Statement of Commission Enforcement Policy on Section 101 Lead Limits" (February 6, 2009) (6 pages); "Children's Products Containing Lead: Interpretative Rule on Inaccessible Component Parts" (August 7, 2009)(32 pages); "Statement of Policy: Testing and Certification of Lead Content in Children's Products" (October 2009)(5 pages); and "Interim Enforcement Policy on Component Testing and Certification of Children's Products and Other Consumer Products to the August 14,2009 Lead Limits" (December 28, 2009) (4 pages). If these four documents totalling 47 pages don't clear up everything, the CPSC is ready for you. "Manufacturers of children's products can seek guidance for what the Commission considers reasonable and representative testing in these rules."
You may have to wait a few years for a reply, but darn it, they're going to answer your question. And that's because they really CARE. We're the government and we're here to help!
A few more cock-ups aren't deterring the agency. The phthalates standard is still undrafted, likewise the certification procedures for phthalate testing labs. Oopsie! Well, they've been busy . . . and the much fantasized-over component testing "market" has failed to materialize. Imagine that, businesses that inadvertently serve the children's market with components or which derive a small percentage of sales from children's products aren't volunteering to test their items and expose themselves to the ravages of a crazy and out-of-control federal agency. Shocking!
Those of you who live in the past may recall my mentioning this very issue on November 6, 2008 (yes, 2008) when I addressed the CPSC Lead Panel. [It's a safe assumption no one was listening at the agency - opportunities for stakeholder feedback is not for listening, it's for venting.] I talked about the futility of expecting our suppliers of aluminum foil (widely used in schools in science kits) to test their products. After all, they are allowed to sell it for use with food without testing, so why should they test for me? If I asked them for a test for compliance with the CPSIA, they would certainly refuse and then ask in outrage why I was selling aluminum foil to kids anyway. As I said, who could see this coming? No one . . . .
For all the outrages that this sick situation brings to mind, NOTHING is as shameful as the CPSC's refusal to admit that this is all administrative, bureaucratic nonsense (or use your own word for "nonsense") that has nothing to do with SAFETY. Oh yeah, safety - isn't that word in the name of this agency - the Consumer Product SAFETY Commission. What about safety, guys? Are you concerned about that anymore? This failure of leadership is the basic issue I have with the folks running the agency today. There's a reason that bureaucrats are called "soul-less".
The fact is that this administration at the CPSC (Democrats) will not stand up for what's right - they are prepared to go down with the ship. It's ironic that they remain so strident and so stubborn. Mr. Obama can smell change in the air and even he has called for reconsideration of the deluge of regulations. The Republicans in the House have declared war on over-regulations and the House Energy and Commerce Committee has made reform of the CPSIA the top priority of Mary Bono-Mack's subcommittee.
As I have said again and again - this is YOUR government at work. Their shameful acts which are harming your markets and your business are destroying jobs, discouraging innovation and hurting children by impairing the activities of businesses devoted to children's welfare. This intolerable situation will only be fixed when you MAKE it change. You can do it and you must. There is a new Congress in town and they need to hear from you. Don't let the Democrats keep on wrecking your industry. This isn't about safety and never was. This is politics, pure and simple.
Make them pay for their sins. Call your Congressman.
The CPSC explains that extension of the stay is only one of its options. It can do nothing, it can roll all the existing stays forward, or just some of them (to heck with the ATV'rs and the bike industry). Presumably, they will choose to roll all of it forward to September 14, 2011. We can all be screwed on the same day. I like the symmetry of that!
The CPSC has not lost sight of the issues. They know they haven't finished their work. They note that two years ago on February 9. 2009 when the Commission first extended the testing stay. it was because delaying implementation of the testing requirement by a year "give[s] us the time needed to develop sound rules and requirements as well as implement outreach efforts to explain these [new] requirements of the CPSIA and their applicability."
How time flies! That didn't happen, so the Commission again extended the stay by another year on December 8, 2010. Why? Chairman Tenenbaum: "I voted to extend the stay on lead content testing and certification until February 10, 2011, in order to allow component testing adequate time to develop and to give our stakeholders adequate notice of new requirements." Commissioner Robert Adler: "One of the primary rationales advanced for extending the stay is to await the effective date of the so-called 15-month rule."
Where does the time go?? None of that ever happened. Hey, CPSC, take all the time you need!
So now the Commission is poised to kick the can down the road until September 14, 2011. Why that date? The CPSC Staff report notes that this gives the Commission time to sort out the new, lower lead standard due to be imposed on August 10, 2011. The CPSC is holding a hearing on February 16 on the feasibility of the 100 ppm standard. As Staff notes, if the Commission doesn't determine that 100 ppm is feasible, then they will have to set a standard between 300 ppm and 100 ppm that is feasible. "Feasibility" was defined in the CPSIA, lest there should be any disagreement, to exclude ANY consideration of economics. In other words, if it's possible at any price or under any condition, it is considered "feasible" and thus mandated by the law. I can save the CPSC some time - under that definition, it's definitely feasible. Completely unreasonable and unnecessary but "feasible".
The idea promoted in the Staff memo is that we will time to get used to all this if the stay lifts a month after the implementation of the new lead standard. [The concept of "learning disability" floats through my head. Have we heard this song before?] "Staff recommends that the Commission extend the stay to allow time for the Commission to determine whether it is technologically feasible to lower the amount of lead in children's products to 100 ppm." I guess once the Commission makes up its collective mind, the CPSC will wave a magic wand and make your business, your supply chain and your sales channel comply with the new rules in a matter of days. The fact that the rules are hazy after almost three years is no concern of theirs. Is it a concern of yours?
I love magical rules and magical plans! It must be a job requirement for Commissioners to be wizards, too.
All concerns over the "15 Month Rule" seem to have evaporated. This is presumably Robert Adler's doing (see his statement above, which is a rant that the 15 Month Rule and the stay are separable issues). The Staff report intones: "While a Commission decision to extend the current stay of enforcement will give industry an opportunity to test and certify finished products and components according to the final rule and provide the Commission time to clarify any confusion regarding the new rule, it is not necessary for the testing rule to be complete to lift the stay as to the initial test for lead compliance." Can't see any problem there, can you???
The CPSC doesn't want you to worry, however. They have apparently promulgated several documents that set out their policy and whatnot on lead, namely "Statement of Commission Enforcement Policy on Section 101 Lead Limits" (February 6, 2009) (6 pages); "Children's Products Containing Lead: Interpretative Rule on Inaccessible Component Parts" (August 7, 2009)(32 pages); "Statement of Policy: Testing and Certification of Lead Content in Children's Products" (October 2009)(5 pages); and "Interim Enforcement Policy on Component Testing and Certification of Children's Products and Other Consumer Products to the August 14,2009 Lead Limits" (December 28, 2009) (4 pages). If these four documents totalling 47 pages don't clear up everything, the CPSC is ready for you. "Manufacturers of children's products can seek guidance for what the Commission considers reasonable and representative testing in these rules."
You may have to wait a few years for a reply, but darn it, they're going to answer your question. And that's because they really CARE. We're the government and we're here to help!
A few more cock-ups aren't deterring the agency. The phthalates standard is still undrafted, likewise the certification procedures for phthalate testing labs. Oopsie! Well, they've been busy . . . and the much fantasized-over component testing "market" has failed to materialize. Imagine that, businesses that inadvertently serve the children's market with components or which derive a small percentage of sales from children's products aren't volunteering to test their items and expose themselves to the ravages of a crazy and out-of-control federal agency. Shocking!
Those of you who live in the past may recall my mentioning this very issue on November 6, 2008 (yes, 2008) when I addressed the CPSC Lead Panel. [It's a safe assumption no one was listening at the agency - opportunities for stakeholder feedback is not for listening, it's for venting.] I talked about the futility of expecting our suppliers of aluminum foil (widely used in schools in science kits) to test their products. After all, they are allowed to sell it for use with food without testing, so why should they test for me? If I asked them for a test for compliance with the CPSIA, they would certainly refuse and then ask in outrage why I was selling aluminum foil to kids anyway. As I said, who could see this coming? No one . . . .
For all the outrages that this sick situation brings to mind, NOTHING is as shameful as the CPSC's refusal to admit that this is all administrative, bureaucratic nonsense (or use your own word for "nonsense") that has nothing to do with SAFETY. Oh yeah, safety - isn't that word in the name of this agency - the Consumer Product SAFETY Commission. What about safety, guys? Are you concerned about that anymore? This failure of leadership is the basic issue I have with the folks running the agency today. There's a reason that bureaucrats are called "soul-less".
The fact is that this administration at the CPSC (Democrats) will not stand up for what's right - they are prepared to go down with the ship. It's ironic that they remain so strident and so stubborn. Mr. Obama can smell change in the air and even he has called for reconsideration of the deluge of regulations. The Republicans in the House have declared war on over-regulations and the House Energy and Commerce Committee has made reform of the CPSIA the top priority of Mary Bono-Mack's subcommittee.
As I have said again and again - this is YOUR government at work. Their shameful acts which are harming your markets and your business are destroying jobs, discouraging innovation and hurting children by impairing the activities of businesses devoted to children's welfare. This intolerable situation will only be fixed when you MAKE it change. You can do it and you must. There is a new Congress in town and they need to hear from you. Don't let the Democrats keep on wrecking your industry. This isn't about safety and never was. This is politics, pure and simple.
Make them pay for their sins. Call your Congressman.
Wednesday, December 22, 2010
CPSIA - The Worm Continues To Turn
The day we all feared, the day we knew would come someday . . . well, the Federal Register says it's coming soon. According to a notice of "Final Rule Stage" published on December 20, the CPSC is moving forward on the so-called "15 Month" Rule.
You have to chuckle at the "15 Months" part. This rule was legally mandated to be enacted 15 months after the CPSIA was signed into law. The presumed date of enactment would then have been November 14, 2009, a mere 14 months ago now. They didn't even published a first draft until May 2010. If the agency can somehow finish this project by January 14, it could be called the "15 Months Times Two" Rule. Then again, it's basically inconceivable that they will make it. Eventually they'll need another name for this thing.
The urgency behind finishing up this rule is that the testing and certification stay expires on February 10, 2011. Remember that Bob Adler already said he wouldn't vote an extension of this stay because . . . he hates stays. Perhaps he prefers market chaos and economic depression instead. Anyhow, to avoid the showdown, they need to get their ducks in a row, hence the need to get this rule going.
I sent in comments on the first draft of this rule on August 3. I wasn't a big fan . . . and I guess other people had reservations, too. According to www.regulations.gov, the CPSC received 112 comments letters (that may overstate the number, because regulations.gov seems to have some duplicates). I haven't read them myself, but I assume I am the only one who saw any flaws in this rule. The rest of the letters are probably just "thank you" notes.
Anyhow, it's worth noting that the Chinese New Year occurs on February 3, 2011 so take my word for it, all the Chinese factories will be closed on Feb. 3rd and probably won't reopen until Feb. 10 at the earliest after a two-week holiday. Some workers are gone three or even four weeks for this holiday. In a "best case" scenario, the CPSC can't take action on this rule until they officially acknowledge the public comment "thank you" notes and hold a public Commission meeting. Do the math - if they choose to take action on this rule now, we will get about ten minutes notice to begin conforming. I can't see any risk of market chaos again . . . can you?
Here's a fairly obvious fact for you - we have not incorporated any of the pending rules into our supply chain or manufacturing processes. Why? You tell me what I'm supposed to do. The rule that has been published is deeply flawed and, basically, stupid. It is not a final rule. 112 comment letters were filed on it. It could change . . . it BETTER change. How am I supposed to implement rules that haven't been published or possibly even written? Telepathy? I don't read minds and I haven't implemented the unknowable, either.
If this does not make your blood boil enough, consider these excerpts from the notice of Final Rule Stage:
You have to chuckle at the "15 Months" part. This rule was legally mandated to be enacted 15 months after the CPSIA was signed into law. The presumed date of enactment would then have been November 14, 2009, a mere 14 months ago now. They didn't even published a first draft until May 2010. If the agency can somehow finish this project by January 14, it could be called the "15 Months Times Two" Rule. Then again, it's basically inconceivable that they will make it. Eventually they'll need another name for this thing.
The urgency behind finishing up this rule is that the testing and certification stay expires on February 10, 2011. Remember that Bob Adler already said he wouldn't vote an extension of this stay because . . . he hates stays. Perhaps he prefers market chaos and economic depression instead. Anyhow, to avoid the showdown, they need to get their ducks in a row, hence the need to get this rule going.
I sent in comments on the first draft of this rule on August 3. I wasn't a big fan . . . and I guess other people had reservations, too. According to www.regulations.gov, the CPSC received 112 comments letters (that may overstate the number, because regulations.gov seems to have some duplicates). I haven't read them myself, but I assume I am the only one who saw any flaws in this rule. The rest of the letters are probably just "thank you" notes.
Anyhow, it's worth noting that the Chinese New Year occurs on February 3, 2011 so take my word for it, all the Chinese factories will be closed on Feb. 3rd and probably won't reopen until Feb. 10 at the earliest after a two-week holiday. Some workers are gone three or even four weeks for this holiday. In a "best case" scenario, the CPSC can't take action on this rule until they officially acknowledge the public comment "thank you" notes and hold a public Commission meeting. Do the math - if they choose to take action on this rule now, we will get about ten minutes notice to begin conforming. I can't see any risk of market chaos again . . . can you?
Here's a fairly obvious fact for you - we have not incorporated any of the pending rules into our supply chain or manufacturing processes. Why? You tell me what I'm supposed to do. The rule that has been published is deeply flawed and, basically, stupid. It is not a final rule. 112 comment letters were filed on it. It could change . . . it BETTER change. How am I supposed to implement rules that haven't been published or possibly even written? Telepathy? I don't read minds and I haven't implemented the unknowable, either.
If this does not make your blood boil enough, consider these excerpts from the notice of Final Rule Stage:
- "The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission is charged with protecting the public from unreasonable risks of death and injury associated with consumer products." [Emphasis added] The CPSIA makes consideration of RISK by the CPSC illegal. Bummer, huh? Someone should have told the CPSC because they still claim to be concerned with "risk" of injury.
- "When deciding which of these approaches to take in any specific case, the Commission gathers and analyzes the best available data about the nature and extent of the risk presented by the product." And then ignores it??? See also the final bullet below.
- "As for exemptions [from the "15 Month Rule"], the statute does not appear to give the Commission the authority to exempt firms from the testing or certification requirements, so it may not be possible to exempt firms within section 14 of the CPSA." In other words, HTA, you can lump it. And the CPSC is telling you who to blame - Congress.
- "The congressional mandate to issue this regulation does not require the Consumer Product Safety Commission to do a cost/benefit analysis for this regulation. Therefore, a cost/benefit analysis is not available for this regulatory action." Head-in-sand syndrome. I bet you'll be able to do a cost/benefit analysis pretty quickly when your costs go up again by 20x.
- "[It] is not possible to provide an analysis of the magnitude of the risk this regulatory action addresses." Ahem. And it's okay to put forward a rule of this complexity and far-reaching impact while flying entirely blind because . . . why???
Let's not forget that there's a new Congress being sworn in January 5th. The incoming Republican House majority has pledged to shrink the federal government and to closely examine how regulatory agencies are governing. Hmmm. Help may be on the way . . . soon.
Wednesday, December 1, 2010
CPSIA - My Written Testimony at Senate Hearing 12-2-10
As you may know, there will be a Senate CPSC oversight hearing tomorrow. The hearing will be held by the Subcommittee on Consumer Protection, Product Safety and Insurance of the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation. You can see the witness list here. The subject of the hearing is "Oversight of the Consumer Product Safety Commission: Product Safety in the Holiday Season"
I have submitted the following written testimony. I will not be testifying at this hearing.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. WOLDENBERG
Chairman, Learning Resources, Inc.
Vernon Hills, Illinois
I have submitted the following written testimony. I will not be testifying at this hearing.
STATEMENT OF RICHARD M. WOLDENBERG
Chairman, Learning Resources, Inc.
Vernon Hills, Illinois
December 2, 2010
As an operator of a small business making educational products and educational toys, I have had a front row seat for the implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). On the occasion of your CPSC oversight hearing, I want to highlight the economic damage wrought by the CPSIA without achieving any material improvement in safety statistics. I also want to bring to your attention the open hostility of the CPSC toward the corporate community in the implementation and enforcement of the CPSIA, and conclude with my recommendations for legal reforms to restore common sense to safety administration without reducing children’s safety.
As an operator of a small business making educational products and educational toys, I have had a front row seat for the implementation of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act of 2008 (CPSIA) by the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC). On the occasion of your CPSC oversight hearing, I want to highlight the economic damage wrought by the CPSIA without achieving any material improvement in safety statistics. I also want to bring to your attention the open hostility of the CPSC toward the corporate community in the implementation and enforcement of the CPSIA, and conclude with my recommendations for legal reforms to restore common sense to safety administration without reducing children’s safety.
Children are our business. As educators, as parents and as members of our community, we have always placed the highest priority on safety. We would not be in the business of helping children learn if we didn’t care deeply about children and their safety. The CPSIA has dramatically impacted our business model, reduced our ability to make a profit and create jobs, pared our incentive to invest in new products and new markets, and generally made it difficult to grow our business. We would gladly accept these burdens if the law made our products safer, but the fact is that it hasn't. Our company, Learning Resources, Inc., has recalled a grand total of 130 pieces since our founding in June 1984 (all recovered from the market). Our management of safety risks was highly effective long before the government intervened in our safety processes in 2008.
The precautionary approach of the CPSIA attempted to fill perceived “gaps” in regulation by making it illegal to sell children’s products unless proven safe prior to sale. Yet the law has yielded few quantifiable safety benefits other than a reduction in recent recall rates for lead-in-paint (already illegal in children’s products for decades). Ironically, this progress in reducing recalls has taken place in a 27-month period in which, like the time before the CPSIA, testing of children’s products prior to sale was not mandatory. Consumer confidence wasn’t dented by the lack of mandatory testing. The justifications for the over-arching and excessively expensive CPSIA regulatory scheme just don’t hold water.
In any event, the reduction in recall rates is only a minor triumph and was not due to mandatory testing or harsh new lead standards, but most likely a (hyper) energized regulator and a great deal of publicity. Recall statistics can be highly misleading because the rate and number of recalls depend on many factors and do not generally correlate to injuries to children. In other words, product recalls are not tantamount to childhood injuries. The purpose of the CPSIA is to reduce injuries, not product recalls – yet CPSC recall statistics show that there have been almost no reported injuries from lead or phthalates in children’s products in the last decade (one death and three unverified injuries from 1999-2010, all from lead or lead-in-paint). The billions of dollars now being spent by the corporate community annually on testing and other compliance activities have not reduced injuries – there weren’t any to reduce. Whatever peace of mind has been generated by lower recall rates comes at a very high price.
The CPSIA significantly broadened the reach of federal safety regulation well beyond what was needed to deal with the lead-in-paint toy violations of 2007 and 2008. Under the CPSIA, the definition of a “Children’s Product” subject to regulation now encompasses ALL products designed or intended primarily for a child 12 years of age or younger (15 U.S.C. §2052(a)(2)). This definition ensures that virtually anything marketed to children will be subject to the restrictions of the Consumer Product Safety Act (CPSA), irrespective of known or quantifiable risk of injury. Put another way, this definition ensures that many product categories with a long tradition of safety are now subject to the withering requirements of this law for the first time simply because they fall within the overly broad definition of a Children’s Product. The affected safe products span the U.S. economy books, t-shirts and shoes, ATVs, bicycles, donated or resale goods, musical instruments, pens and educational products. The CPSC declined to use its discretion to narrow this definition in its recent “final rule” interpreting “Children’s Product”, thus ensuring continued market chaos and economic waste.
The consequences of the change in the consumer safety laws to a precautionary posture has had notable negative impacts and promises to create further problems, namely:
The consequences of the change in the consumer safety laws to a precautionary posture has had notable negative impacts and promises to create further problems, namely:
a. Increased Costs. The new law creates a heavy burden for testing costs. From 2006 to 2009, our company’s testing costs alone jumped more than eight-fold. We estimate that our testing costs will triple again after the CPSC (as anticipated) lifts its testing stay in 2011, and could multiply again if the CPSC enacts (as anticipated) its draft “15 Month Rule” on testing frequency and “reasonable testing programs”. Testing costs are often thousands of dollars per product. Having employed one person to manage safety testing and quality control for many years, we now have a department of five, including me, plus an outside lawyer on retainer. These jobs are funded by discontinuing sales, marketing and product development jobs – the CPSIA is NOT an ersatz stimulus program. Personnel, legal and other out-of-pocket safety expenses (besides testing) have more than quadrupled in the last three years – all without any change in our super-low recall rates or injury statistics.
b. Increased Administrative Expenses. The CPSIA requires that all products include tracking labels on both the packaging and the product itself. Rationalized as “analogous” to date labels on cartons of milk, tracking labels are in reality nothing but pure economic waste as applied to the vast array of “Children’s Products” under the CPSIA. As noted, our company has a virtually unblemished 26-year track record of safety so tracking labels promise to add little value in the event of recalls that are unlikely to occur. Ironically, with the strict new rules governing product safety, we believe the already low chance of a product recall has been reduced further. As noted above, the money to pay for all this administrative busy work comes from foregone business opportunities. We are being forced to shrink our company to apply tracking labels that no one will use.
An equally frustrating bureaucracy has sprung up around recordkeeping under this law. Burdensome requirements spawned by the government’s new involvement in our quality control processes forced us to make large new investments in information technology with no return on our investment. In addition, the pending CPSC draft policy on component testing promises to convert the simple task of obtaining a complete suite of safety test reports into a major recordkeeping chore. We will now be forced to manage each component separately, tracking test reports on each component one-by-one. This promises to multiply our recordkeeping responsibilities – and the related risk of liability for failing to comply – by more than an order of magnitude.
c. Reduced Incentive to Innovate. The increased cost to bring a product to market under the CPSIA will make many viable – and valuable – products uneconomic. To cover the cost of developing, testing and safety-managing new products, the prospective sales of any new item (“hurdle rate”) is now much higher than under prior law. This means that low volume “specialty market” items are less likely to come to market and many new small business entrants may find themselves priced out of the market. The CPSIA makes it much harder to start a new business serving the children’s market because the rules so heavily favor big business. Because of CPSIA transactional costs, high volume items now have a huge cost advantage over low volume items. This will hurt many small but important markets like educational products for disabled children. Our company, with its 1500 catalog items, is probably now a dinosaur under the CPSIA –the law provides a strong economic incentive to restructure our business around 50-150 items and to focus on high volume markets only. Schools would suffer from the loss of niche educational products.
d. Crippled by Regulatory Complexity. Our problems don’t end with testing costs or increased staffing. We are being crippled by regulatory complexity. Almost 28 months after passage of the CPSIA, we still don’t have a comprehensive set of regulations. Please consider how mindboggling the rules have become. There were fewer than 200 pages of safety law and CPSC rules that pertained to our business until 2008. These rules clearly defined our responsibilities and could be taught to our staff (in fact, many were rarely applicable to us). Today, the applicable laws, rules and interpretative documents exceed 3,000 pages. As a practical matter, it is simply not possible to master all of these documents – and yet it’s potentially a felony to break any of these rules. Sadly for us, the rules and CPSC staff commentary keep changing, are still being written and are rarely if ever conformed. How can we master and re-master these rules and teach them to our staff while still doing the full-time job of running our business? Ironically, the recalls of 2007 and 2008 were never a “rules” problem – those famous recalls were clearly a compliance problem. Imagine what will happen now with an unmanageable fifteen-fold increase in rules. No small business “ombudsman” can make that problem go away.
e. Small Business Will Certainly Suffer. The CPSIA was written in response to failings of big companies, but hammers small and medium-sized companies with particular vengeance. Our small business has already lost customers for our entire category on the grounds that selling toys is too confusing or too much of a “hassle”. This is our new reality. The highly-technical rules and requirements are beyond the capability of all but the most highly-trained quality managers or lawyers to comprehend. Small businesses simply don’t have the skills, resources or business scale to manage compliance with the CPSIA. For this reason, small businesses bear the greatest risk of liability under the law, despite being responsible for almost no injuries from lead in the last decade. The double whammy of massive new regulatory obligations and the prospect of devastating liability are driving small businesses out of our market.
In implementing and administering the CPSIA, the CPSC created a harsh regulatory environment for the business community over the past 28 months. Consider the following:
1. Unjustified Recalls. In June, in response to an inquiry by a Congressman and followed up by media inquiries, the CPSC pressed McDonalds to recall 12 million Shrek glasses for “high” cadmium content, despite the agency’s admission on Twitter that the glasses were not toxic. The recall effort was justified as being done “out of an abundance of caution”, a frightening regulatory standard when applied to products acknowledged to be safe by the regulator itself. McDonalds lost millions of dollars as a result, not to mention suffering from widespread and persistent bad publicity.
2. Unjustified Penalties and Coercive Tactics. The CPSC assessed a $2.05 million penalty against a hapless Japanese dollar store chain (Daiso) for five separate tiny recalls involving 698 units and 19 items. These items sold for between $1 and $4 each. There were no reported injuries from sales of the Daiso trinkets. Ms. Tenenbaum bragged about this extraordinarily excessive prosecution in a speech in March 2010 to the Consumer Federation of America: “We secured an injunction that completely stops Daiso from importing children’s products into the country. . . . Daiso has a very high hurdle to jump over to ever get back in the import business again.” Regulated companies take stunning examples like Daiso as a warning that outsized and disproportionate force may be used by this agency with little provocation.
The regulated community has also expressed alarm over the threatened use by the agency of unilateral press releases “to warn the public” about alleged dangers in specific products as a way to coerce “voluntary” recalls. Such threats have been used where facts may be in dispute to justify a recall. Under the law, the CPSC may only implement mandatory recalls subject to a court order, a slow process perhaps but also expensive and labor-intensive. “Voluntary” recalls can be much quicker and cheaper, only requiring “agreement” between the agency and the subject company. In more than one case, CPSC has threatened unilateral releases to try to "convince" a firm to undertake a "voluntary" recall but after the firm took the risk of standing up to the staff and the staff conducted further investigation, the CPSC decided that recalls were not even necessary. Not all firms can bear the expense of such a process or take the risk of calling the staff's bluff because issuance of a release would likely damage the firm and their brand, possibly irrevocably. Many supposedly "voluntary" recalls have resulted. Abusive tactics of this nature have severely damaged trust between the CPSC and the regulated community.
3. Disregard of Public Comments. The agency has garnered considerable criticism for overlooking or disregarding comments from the corporate community solicited in its public rulemaking processes. Ignoring or disregarding inconvenient public comments contrary to the agenda of the controlling party makes a mockery of the legally-mandated public comment process. Notable instances include the recent approval of interpretative rule on “Children’s Products” and the rules implementing the public database of safety incidents. The database debate was so fouled by the majority’s refusal to entertain the legitimate concerns of industry that the two minority Commissioners proposed their own draft rule – which the CPSC at first refused to post on its website.
4. Unjustified Hostile Rulemakings. The CPSC has implemented rules governing the public database that adversely affect the Constitutionally-guaranteed due process rights of our businesses. There is no adequate public policy justification for the erosion of the remarkable civil rights that distinguish the American legal system among all international legal systems – yet the Commission voted 3-2 to allow falsehoods to be posted without recourse in a database the CPSC will maintain. In other cases, the agency has published draft rules (yet to be acted on) which could force companies like ours to spend as much as $10,000 per item per year to meet ARBITRARY rules on testing frequency or “reasonable testing programs” – notwithstanding strong evidence that these rules are wasteful, unnecessary and financially irresponsible. The pendency of rules like this creates destabilizing market uncertainty and forces business decisions that have no basis other than fear of future regulation. For instance, Wal-Mart has already instituted a 100 ppm lead standard months ahead of the POSSIBLE implementation of the standard by the CPSC – simply because the CPSC has been so slow to act.
The CPSIA went off track by taking away the CPSC’s authority to assess risk. If the CPSC were again required to regulate based on risk, safety rules could focus on those few risks with the real potential to cause harm to children. All risks were not created equal.
I recommend several steps to reduce cost, liability risk and complexity all without sacrificing children’s product safety:
A. Mandate that the CPSC base its safety decisions, resource allocation and rules on risk assessment. Restore to the Commission the discretion to set age and product definition criteria for the 300 ppm lead standard and phthalate ban. Freeze the lead standard and lead-in-paint standard at their current levels unless the CPSC determines that a change is necessary to preserve public health and safety.
B. The definition of “Children’s Product” should not include anything primarily sold into or intended for use in schools or which is used primarily under the supervision of adults. Other explicit exceptions should include apparel, shoes, pens, ATVs, bicycles, rhinestones, books and other print materials, brass and connectors. Exclusions from the definition should take these products entirely outside the coverage of the CPSIA (including mandatory tracking labels).
C. Lead-in-substrate and phthalate testing should be based on a “reasonable testing program”, not mandated outside testing. The tenets of a reasonable testing program should be set by the reasonable business judgment of the manufacturer. Resellers should be entitled by rule to rely on the representations of manufacturers. Phthalate testing requirements should explicitly exempt inaccessible components, metals, minerals, hard plastics, natural fibers and wood.
D. Definition of “Children’s Product” should be limited to children six years old or younger and should eliminate the difficult-to-apply “common recognition” factor of Section 3(a)(2)(c) of the CPSA. Definition of “Toy” (for phthalates purposes) should be limited to children three years old or younger and should explicitly refer only to products in the form used in play.
E. Eliminate CPSC certification of laboratories (rely on the market to provide good resources). Fraud has only very rarely been a problem with test labs and is already illegal.
F. Impose procedural limits to insure fairness in penalty assessment by the CPSC under the CPSIA. Completely reformulate penalties to restrict them to egregious conduct (including patterns of violations), reckless endangerment or conduct resulting in serious injury.
G. Rewrite the penalty provision applicable to resale of used product so that violations are only subject to penalty if intentional (actual knowledge or reckless endangerment) and only if the violation led to an actual injury. Eliminate the “knowing” standard with its imputed knowledge of a reasonable man exercising due care.
H. Mandatory tracking labels should be explicitly limited to cribs, bassinets, play pens, all long-life “heirloom” products with a known history of injuring the most vulnerable children (babies or toddlers).
I. Public injury/incident database should be restricted to recalls or properly investigated incidents only. Manufacturers must be given full access to all posted incident data, including contact information. The “due process” civil liberty interests of the corporate community MUST BE PROTECTED.
I urge your committee to address the fundamental flaws in the CPSIA to restore order to the children’s product market and to protect small businesses from further damage. I appreciate the opportunity to share my views on this important topic.
Sunday, November 7, 2010
CPSIA - TIA's Toy Safety Certification Program Quietly Dies
TIA Members, please sit down before reading on.
Over the past three years, the Toy Industry Association famously invested millions of dollars in members' dues in something called the "Toy Safety Certification Program" (TSCP). When I say "millions", I mean it. On October 14, 2009, TIA outside counsel Rick Locker referred to "$2 million of technology" available to the industry via the TSCP website. He was referring to the cost of the program to date, roughly. The program began in August 2007 - that's about $1 million per year.
The TSCP recently died a natural death, mercifully. See Carter Keithley's September 7th release on this topic. I figure the program cost NO LESS THAN $3 million of TIA members' money, perhaps more, with NO return on investment. A TOTAL loss. Ouch. Don't expect any heads to roll.
The TSCP was a terrible idea from the get-go. For one thing, the TSCP was a business and the TIA should have NEVER tried to go into business in competition with its members, if only for the reason that real businesses beat dilettantes every time. I believe the business plan for the TSCP was fantastic, if it existed at all in any formal sense. No rational business person would have EVER made such a reckless investment but then again, it wasn't their money. . . so the bet apparently seemed "reasonable" to the decision-makers.
The basic concept underlying this massive bet with other people's money was that if the TSCP cracked down on its own members harshly enough, the CPSC might back off and let the industry police itself. The horrific historical analogs must not have occurred to anyone, nor their tragic ends.
The idea of the TSCP was flawed in several critical respects. First of all, the issues that spawned the CPSC had little to do with the standards - the problem was compliance. A program like the TSCP would hardly snare those who were indifferent to compliance - it was VOLUNTARY. Second, the theory required that the TIA be so harsh that the CPSC would let the TIA take over. Of course, this made the TSCP a rather unappetizing vehicle for most of us. And it was VOLUNTARY. We never considered participating.
Worst of all, the TSCP grossly favored the mass market companies in the toy industry. This could not have been a shock to anyone as the authors of the program were largely mass market toy people. I documented this in my October 18, 2009 blogpost entitled "The TIA Just Wants to HELP You!". The program was going to kill all but a few of us, but that didn't stop the TIA.
What ultimately stopped the TIA was a lack of business. Apparently, we weren't alone in disregarding the multi-million dollar investment of our industry organization. Rumor has it that certain large companies committed to using the program but then backed away when it became clear that no one was joining them in this fun. No one likes a competitive disadvantage, apparently. Who'da thunk it?
And the legacy of the TSCP? The TSCP did such a great job of outlining a horrific testing scheme that the CPSC used critical elements of it as a starting place for their "15 Month Rule". You can trace the harshness of the TSCP through to the pending rule on testing frequency and "reasonable" testing programs. Yes, the TIA provided this leadership - after all, if it's good enough for the TIA, how could the industry complain?
How, indeed. Pass the barf bag, please.
Over the past three years, the Toy Industry Association famously invested millions of dollars in members' dues in something called the "Toy Safety Certification Program" (TSCP). When I say "millions", I mean it. On October 14, 2009, TIA outside counsel Rick Locker referred to "$2 million of technology" available to the industry via the TSCP website. He was referring to the cost of the program to date, roughly. The program began in August 2007 - that's about $1 million per year.
The TSCP recently died a natural death, mercifully. See Carter Keithley's September 7th release on this topic. I figure the program cost NO LESS THAN $3 million of TIA members' money, perhaps more, with NO return on investment. A TOTAL loss. Ouch. Don't expect any heads to roll.
The TSCP was a terrible idea from the get-go. For one thing, the TSCP was a business and the TIA should have NEVER tried to go into business in competition with its members, if only for the reason that real businesses beat dilettantes every time. I believe the business plan for the TSCP was fantastic, if it existed at all in any formal sense. No rational business person would have EVER made such a reckless investment but then again, it wasn't their money. . . so the bet apparently seemed "reasonable" to the decision-makers.
The basic concept underlying this massive bet with other people's money was that if the TSCP cracked down on its own members harshly enough, the CPSC might back off and let the industry police itself. The horrific historical analogs must not have occurred to anyone, nor their tragic ends.
The idea of the TSCP was flawed in several critical respects. First of all, the issues that spawned the CPSC had little to do with the standards - the problem was compliance. A program like the TSCP would hardly snare those who were indifferent to compliance - it was VOLUNTARY. Second, the theory required that the TIA be so harsh that the CPSC would let the TIA take over. Of course, this made the TSCP a rather unappetizing vehicle for most of us. And it was VOLUNTARY. We never considered participating.
Worst of all, the TSCP grossly favored the mass market companies in the toy industry. This could not have been a shock to anyone as the authors of the program were largely mass market toy people. I documented this in my October 18, 2009 blogpost entitled "The TIA Just Wants to HELP You!". The program was going to kill all but a few of us, but that didn't stop the TIA.
What ultimately stopped the TIA was a lack of business. Apparently, we weren't alone in disregarding the multi-million dollar investment of our industry organization. Rumor has it that certain large companies committed to using the program but then backed away when it became clear that no one was joining them in this fun. No one likes a competitive disadvantage, apparently. Who'da thunk it?
And the legacy of the TSCP? The TSCP did such a great job of outlining a horrific testing scheme that the CPSC used critical elements of it as a starting place for their "15 Month Rule". You can trace the harshness of the TSCP through to the pending rule on testing frequency and "reasonable" testing programs. Yes, the TIA provided this leadership - after all, if it's good enough for the TIA, how could the industry complain?
How, indeed. Pass the barf bag, please.
Tuesday, October 19, 2010
CPSIA - Do We Need More Government? [No!]
796 days have passed since ANY Democrat in Congress did ANYTHING to help us on the CPSIA. There are only 14 days left until Election Day.
Hey, have any of you noticed that since I began a daily reminder of our abandonment by this Democrat-led government (reminders began on August 22nd when 738 days had passed without help), no Democrat has done a single thing to help us? Have you also noticed that as they weren't rising up to help us, the Dems were actually engaged in making things WORSE? Definition of Children's Products, the so-called "15 Month Rule", making carpets subject to testing, further implementation of a database certain to make our business environment FAR more hostile.
Do we need a lot more of this?
Mr. Obama says we do: "The basic idea is that if we put our blind faith in the market and we let corporations do whatever they want and we leave everybody else to fend for themselves, then America somehow automatically is going to grow and prosper." The implication is clear - more government is the solution, we can't trust markets. Corporations need overseers, heavy regulation.
Hey, have any of you noticed that since I began a daily reminder of our abandonment by this Democrat-led government (reminders began on August 22nd when 738 days had passed without help), no Democrat has done a single thing to help us? Have you also noticed that as they weren't rising up to help us, the Dems were actually engaged in making things WORSE? Definition of Children's Products, the so-called "15 Month Rule", making carpets subject to testing, further implementation of a database certain to make our business environment FAR more hostile.
Do we need a lot more of this?
Mr. Obama says we do: "The basic idea is that if we put our blind faith in the market and we let corporations do whatever they want and we leave everybody else to fend for themselves, then America somehow automatically is going to grow and prosper." The implication is clear - more government is the solution, we can't trust markets. Corporations need overseers, heavy regulation.
This quote is from a remarkable WSJ article that appeared last week by Daniel Henninger entitled "Capitalism Saved the Miners". Beleaguered victims of the awful CPSIA should read this article. Let me sum it up with his concluding remarks:
"The U.S. has a government led by a mindset obsessed with 250K-a-year 'millionaires' and given to mocking 'our blind faith in the market.' In a fast-moving world filled with nations intent on catching up with or passing us, this policy path is a waste of time. The miners' rescue is a thrilling moment for Chile, an imprimatur on its rising status. But I'm thinking of that 74-person outfit in Berlin, Pa., whose high-tech drill bit opened the earth to free them. You know there are tens of thousands of stories like this in the U.S., as big as Google and small as Center Rock. I'm glad one of them helped save the Chileans. What's needed now is a new American economic model that lets our innovators rescue the rest of us." [Emphasis added]
I don't know about you, but I think we operated our company very well before Mother Government invited herself into our affairs. We knew the difference between right and wrong, and were pretty good at allocating our capital to its highest and best use. Now we must play "Mother May I" with the self-appointed experts who arrived to protect against "dangers" they can't accurately describe or measure. The vacuuming up of our money, our resources, our mind share, our energy, destroys our ability and will to compete.
Fine, ignore the reality. Wait for the bodies. Assert your superiority and your authority. But the facts are the facts. The case against the CPSIA is crystal clear and the only ones who don't "get it" are the Democrats. After two years of banging my head against the wall, I can only conclude that they don't WANT to get it.
It's no mystery - I know why the Dems refuse to listen. They are rather transparent about it. When I spoke to Rep. Jan Schakowsky (D-IL9) at a candidate forum eight days ago, I asked her why she called me a "cynical special interest" to the WSJ. She asked me who I was, and then told me she didn't know me. That fact didn't stop her from trashing me, a private citizen, to a nationally-prominent newspaper. Pointing the finger at me serves her interest in getting reelected - she's saving the populace . . . again. Who is in a position to argue with her? When I protested that our products had been safe for 26 years, she replied that she "didn't understand what the problem is" and turned to a voter standing nearby to assert that she just wants to protect children against lead. The higher moral ground . . . for people who don't know what they're talking about. Unfortunately, scare tactics sell very well.
I believe the Mob also sells protection. Do you want to buy some protection from them?
The Chilean miners were saved by companies that invested their money to make the world a better place incentivized by the opportunity to make a profit. Our industry, the one that serves children as our reason-to-be, is being depleted by a heavy tax - the intrusion of a heavy-handed government that treats us as "guilty-until-proven-innocent". The government REFUSES to listen to us.
Those of you with children will pay the consequences.
Thank you, Mother Government. The market saved the miners, but you will happliy kill us.
Vote on November 2nd for a fresh start.
Wednesday, October 6, 2010
CPSIA - Stories from the Front (My "Vivid" Imagination)
783 days have passed since ANY Democrat in Congress did ANYTHING to help us on the CPSIA. There are only 27 days left until Election Day.
Have I ever mentioned how the CPSIA is strangling us to death slowly, death by a thousand cuts? I know the media and the "leaders" at the CPSC want me to put up bodies, my word and my reasoning are not enough. I also realize the body they want to see most of all is mine. Sorry, guys, I am working to prevent the delivery of that evidence to you. After all, anecdotes aren't evidence. Somebody said that once . . . .
How about some other evidence (anecdotes) from our business in recent days?
a. Good news for the U.S. economy? We just added our SIXTH person to our growing department of compliance and safety folks. Please NOTE that the volume of work is going to EXPLODE when the testing stay is lifted, so these hires are just a starter. For many years, it was one or two people doing this job (including me). No longer . . . .
I know what you're thinking, this obviously confirms how much we needed the extra safety people. In addition, it follows naturally that everyone is so, so, SOOOO much safer now that we have six pairs of eyes on the ball, not the one or two pairs we relied on for years. And those are jobs being created by Congress and the CPSIA - we must be so much better off . . . right?
Well, let's take a look at those points.
First, are we adding jobs? No. The department is clearly growing, BUT those jobs do not create revenue. They create COSTS. We are adding those jobs without increasing new economic activity (we're not growing) - in other words, our burden to conduct the same or less business is growing. That's simply a drain. Even WORSE, as a company, it turns out we shrunk our headcount in 2007, 2008, 2009 AND 2010. So much for a recovery . . . . If we are shrinking our headcount this year but have a growth department like Compliance, what does that mean? It means that we are reducing our investment in revenue-generating activities like Marketing and Sales, and shifting our personnel investment into managing bureaucracy. To pay the cost of paper pushing, we are shrinking overall headcount.
What-a-stimulus-plan!
As for safety, we achieved a remarkable 26-year track record with far less investment and far fewer people. I firmly believe that more cooks in the kitchen sharply raise the probability of poorer results. Yes, more is NOT better. Why? Because the focus on our efforts is now COMPLIANCE, not safety. [We still work on safety first but it has a lot more competition from paper pushing.] Compliance monitoring and "gotchas" have become a perverse parlor game. Consider Sean Oberle's recent meditation on Mood Rings. The subject of whether the rings are SAFE never comes up, it's all about whether they fall within the rules or not. Safety is secondary in the CPSIA scheme - and everyone is losing sight of what we're trying to accomplish. Paper stacked to the rafters won't make anyone safer but then again, it's comforting to have so many rules to follow.
Do I recall correctly that Mattel with its many CPSC-certified internal labs just recalled about 11 million units of toys? Hmmm.
b. Profit Prevention in Full Bloom at Learning Resources. We had two lessons in the joys of safety compliance money-burning in recent days. Consider these stories and their implications on incentive, motivation, ability to fund our operations, fairness and most importantly, safety.
First Case: We sold a longstanding product incorporating a motor to a mass market retailer with its own testing regime. Their testing regime includes CPSIA tests and is administered according to their specifications by a certified test lab of their choosing. The motor for that item was tested and failed for phthalates. We don't know why - it has been made reliably without the six verboten phthalates since 2007 (many passed tests in our files). So we pulled a second sample from the same batch, and bingo, it passes. This happens all the time.
Of course, certified labs are never wrong. We are the only ones who are ever wrong. After all, the certified labs are CERTIFIED. No doubt that's how Mattel keeps its shop so clean. Oops, they had some big recalls recently, didn't they? I am confused . . . .
Anyhow, back to my story. Motor fails for phthalates and then passes. [Let's not dither over whether phthalates on internal components could even THEORETICALLY harm anyone. It's all about compliance.] Unfortunately for us, this nonsense took two weeks. So the customer penalized us by making the sale a guaranteed sale. If they don't sell out, we lose.
Total cost - unknown. Was any of this cost budgeted for? Of course not. Is our customer happy? No. Could we control against this risk? Probably not, as the explanation of the "failed" test is not and never will be known. We are not making pharmaceuticals here, we make injection molded toys, but we are being held responsible for chemistry and testing results that have no real world significance.
And, it is worth mentioning, all this cost and disruption had NO impact on safety. It only reduced our profit and made us miserable.
Second Case: Another motor case. In the mania over safety and compliance, many formerly minor "gotcha's" have become elevated in signficance. This time, we were trying to mollify a customer over EMC approval of a motor. Electrical motors emit a frequency, apparently, which is regulated. You know, the government doesn't want our motor-powered toy to bring down a plane. We are required to test several of our products, sometimes even calculators. In this case, the motor failed . . . although we have no record of planes crashing after several years of sales of this toy and its motor. Our customer then hired a consultant at its expense to tell us how to "fix" our motor. The result - we were told to add two resistors to the motor, which we did, but then it was too weak to power our toy.
Then we had to find another motor. This took time and finally, we found another motor and had to have it retested. This entire process took two months. Once testing was complete, we were so late with this Xmas order that we were forced to bring in inventory by air freight to make it up to the customer. This cost about $15,000 in air freight and testing costs were an estimated $5-6,000 more. Think of how safe the planes are now!
This customer is a big customer of ours and if we didn't air in product for them, they told us they would have cut us off.
We had a great relationship with the customer before this interaction. How do you think they feel about us now? Do you think they respect us as much? Do you think they believe we "know what we're doing" because our motor failed an obscure and meaningless test? Does it matter that it is basically impossible for a terrestrial toy of this magnitude to influence the operation of a plane miles up in the air? No matter what, we look bad and we lost all of our profit and more on this ordeal, not to mention our good name.
And no one was made safer.
Thanks Congress! Thanks CPSC! Thanks Democrats! Can't wait to show my appreciation in the future. I'll find a way.
Have I ever mentioned how the CPSIA is strangling us to death slowly, death by a thousand cuts? I know the media and the "leaders" at the CPSC want me to put up bodies, my word and my reasoning are not enough. I also realize the body they want to see most of all is mine. Sorry, guys, I am working to prevent the delivery of that evidence to you. After all, anecdotes aren't evidence. Somebody said that once . . . .
How about some other evidence (anecdotes) from our business in recent days?
a. Good news for the U.S. economy? We just added our SIXTH person to our growing department of compliance and safety folks. Please NOTE that the volume of work is going to EXPLODE when the testing stay is lifted, so these hires are just a starter. For many years, it was one or two people doing this job (including me). No longer . . . .
I know what you're thinking, this obviously confirms how much we needed the extra safety people. In addition, it follows naturally that everyone is so, so, SOOOO much safer now that we have six pairs of eyes on the ball, not the one or two pairs we relied on for years. And those are jobs being created by Congress and the CPSIA - we must be so much better off . . . right?
Well, let's take a look at those points.
First, are we adding jobs? No. The department is clearly growing, BUT those jobs do not create revenue. They create COSTS. We are adding those jobs without increasing new economic activity (we're not growing) - in other words, our burden to conduct the same or less business is growing. That's simply a drain. Even WORSE, as a company, it turns out we shrunk our headcount in 2007, 2008, 2009 AND 2010. So much for a recovery . . . . If we are shrinking our headcount this year but have a growth department like Compliance, what does that mean? It means that we are reducing our investment in revenue-generating activities like Marketing and Sales, and shifting our personnel investment into managing bureaucracy. To pay the cost of paper pushing, we are shrinking overall headcount.
What-a-stimulus-plan!
As for safety, we achieved a remarkable 26-year track record with far less investment and far fewer people. I firmly believe that more cooks in the kitchen sharply raise the probability of poorer results. Yes, more is NOT better. Why? Because the focus on our efforts is now COMPLIANCE, not safety. [We still work on safety first but it has a lot more competition from paper pushing.] Compliance monitoring and "gotchas" have become a perverse parlor game. Consider Sean Oberle's recent meditation on Mood Rings. The subject of whether the rings are SAFE never comes up, it's all about whether they fall within the rules or not. Safety is secondary in the CPSIA scheme - and everyone is losing sight of what we're trying to accomplish. Paper stacked to the rafters won't make anyone safer but then again, it's comforting to have so many rules to follow.
Do I recall correctly that Mattel with its many CPSC-certified internal labs just recalled about 11 million units of toys? Hmmm.
b. Profit Prevention in Full Bloom at Learning Resources. We had two lessons in the joys of safety compliance money-burning in recent days. Consider these stories and their implications on incentive, motivation, ability to fund our operations, fairness and most importantly, safety.
First Case: We sold a longstanding product incorporating a motor to a mass market retailer with its own testing regime. Their testing regime includes CPSIA tests and is administered according to their specifications by a certified test lab of their choosing. The motor for that item was tested and failed for phthalates. We don't know why - it has been made reliably without the six verboten phthalates since 2007 (many passed tests in our files). So we pulled a second sample from the same batch, and bingo, it passes. This happens all the time.
Of course, certified labs are never wrong. We are the only ones who are ever wrong. After all, the certified labs are CERTIFIED. No doubt that's how Mattel keeps its shop so clean. Oops, they had some big recalls recently, didn't they? I am confused . . . .
Anyhow, back to my story. Motor fails for phthalates and then passes. [Let's not dither over whether phthalates on internal components could even THEORETICALLY harm anyone. It's all about compliance.] Unfortunately for us, this nonsense took two weeks. So the customer penalized us by making the sale a guaranteed sale. If they don't sell out, we lose.
Total cost - unknown. Was any of this cost budgeted for? Of course not. Is our customer happy? No. Could we control against this risk? Probably not, as the explanation of the "failed" test is not and never will be known. We are not making pharmaceuticals here, we make injection molded toys, but we are being held responsible for chemistry and testing results that have no real world significance.
And, it is worth mentioning, all this cost and disruption had NO impact on safety. It only reduced our profit and made us miserable.
Second Case: Another motor case. In the mania over safety and compliance, many formerly minor "gotcha's" have become elevated in signficance. This time, we were trying to mollify a customer over EMC approval of a motor. Electrical motors emit a frequency, apparently, which is regulated. You know, the government doesn't want our motor-powered toy to bring down a plane. We are required to test several of our products, sometimes even calculators. In this case, the motor failed . . . although we have no record of planes crashing after several years of sales of this toy and its motor. Our customer then hired a consultant at its expense to tell us how to "fix" our motor. The result - we were told to add two resistors to the motor, which we did, but then it was too weak to power our toy.
Then we had to find another motor. This took time and finally, we found another motor and had to have it retested. This entire process took two months. Once testing was complete, we were so late with this Xmas order that we were forced to bring in inventory by air freight to make it up to the customer. This cost about $15,000 in air freight and testing costs were an estimated $5-6,000 more. Think of how safe the planes are now!
This customer is a big customer of ours and if we didn't air in product for them, they told us they would have cut us off.
We had a great relationship with the customer before this interaction. How do you think they feel about us now? Do you think they respect us as much? Do you think they believe we "know what we're doing" because our motor failed an obscure and meaningless test? Does it matter that it is basically impossible for a terrestrial toy of this magnitude to influence the operation of a plane miles up in the air? No matter what, we look bad and we lost all of our profit and more on this ordeal, not to mention our good name.
And no one was made safer.
Thanks Congress! Thanks CPSC! Thanks Democrats! Can't wait to show my appreciation in the future. I'll find a way.
Sunday, September 12, 2010
CPSIA - Double-Speak Patrol
760 days have passed since ANY Democrat in Congress did ANYTHING to help us on the CPSIA. There are only 51 days left until Election Day.
Consider the following two events:
a. August 2, 2010: The CPSC Commission voted to authorize yet more Mattel firewalled labs (2) and a lab operated by Hanesbrands, a $2.3 billion market cap maker of underwear. [Oooo, lead in underwear! Is this a sick joke or does the CPSC really think kids are chewing on their dirty underwear? Ew!] I believe, without checking, that Mattel now has nine approved firewalled labs, enabling it to save lots of money which is well beyond the practical reach of any small business. The only parties who have thusfar achieved this relief are mass market companies.
b. August 15, 2010: CPSC Chairman Inez Tenenbaum gave an interview with the Baltimore Sun featuring the following exchange:
"Q: How do you respond to some critics of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act who say the law puts heavy testing burdens on manufacturers, especially smaller producers?
A: We have to have high standards to protect the consumer. So regardless if you're a large business or a small business, we can't let you put lead in children's products, or cadmium. Or overlook flammability laws or use other toxic chemicals. We look at what the danger is. We think if we had a small-business ombudsman who was out there regularly educating small businesses, we could help them prevent problems in terms of compliance. Large corporations have a whole office full of lawyers and engineers and chemists and toxicologists. Small businesses do not. And we don't want to put anyone out of business. We want to help them learn how to comply and sell safe products." [Emphasis added]
Put side-by-side, these two events separated by only a few days, make clear the utter insensitivity of our government to our plight. The dismissive condescension of Tenenbaum in daring to suggest that an ombudsman would make the problems disappear for small businesses is infuriating. The necessary implication is that we small businesses are just too stupid to understand their complicated rules - I guess she thinks only Mattel can read the English language. Of course, the pending testing frequency rule (which I believe will be implemented in the coming weeks, get ready for it) will cause our company to spend $15 million per annum on testing. This sum far exceeds our profits. Perhaps the ombudsman will help us terminate our people to pay for testing, or provide a shoulder to cry on. And we'll be crying alright.
At the same time, Tenenbaum is actively feathering the nest of the VERY Big Business that caused the CPSIA, Mattel. How ironic, isn't it? The fact that she is tilting the children's market fatally in favor of Big Business doesn't seem to be a source of guilt for Ms. Tenenbaum. Empty words are the solution.
Please keep this in mind the next time you suffer through the dark intonations of our Fearless Leader laying the blame for the economic problems of the small business community at the feet of the Republicans. The problems in our market won't be solved with yet another handout - the Dems should try loosening the garrote they are busily tightening around our air passages. Tax relief won't provide much help when the new regulations makes profit impossible.
Let's stipulate that the Dems in Congress and at the CPSC are fully aware of the inequities and other problems embedded in the CPSIA. In the face of a continuous and vigorous public debate for two years+, this seems beyond dispute. I am also aware that this blog is widely and loyally read by these people. Ignorance is not a possible explanation. Stubbornness, self-preservation, zealotry, a lack of political will, exhaustion - any of those make more sense to me as an explanation.
I have no outlet for my anger over this. I just hope you are not a sucker for the Dems' baloney and spinning. Our ONLY hope is a Republican-led Congress that will act to make these people accountable for the damage they are inflicting. The Dems have proven their stripes - to hope they will come to their senses is simply wishful thinking without any basis in reality or fact.
Can you take two more years of this? I cannot and I will not. I need your help, however - you need to vote the scoundrels out of office on November 2. Here is a list of Democrats on the House Energy and Commerce Committee:
Henry A. Waxman, CA
John D. Dingell, MI
Edward J. Markey, MA
Rick Boucher, VA
Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ
Bart Gordon, TN
Bobby L. Rush, IL
Anna G. Eshoo, CA
Bart Stupak, MI
Eliot L. Engel, NY
Gene Green, TX
Diana DeGette, CO
Lois Capps, CA
Mike Doyle, PA
Jane Harman, CA
Jan Schakowsky, IL
Charles A. Gonzalez, TX
Jay Inslee, WA
Tammy Baldwin, WI
Mike Ross, AR
Anthony D. Weiner, NY
Jim Matheson, UT
G. K. Butterfield, NC
Charlie Melancon, LA
John Barrow, GA
Baron P. Hill, IN
Doris O. Matsui, CA
Donna M. Christensen, VI
Kathy Castor, FL
John P. Sarbanes, MD
Christopher S. Murphy, CT
Zachary T. Space, OH
Jerry McNerney CA
Betty Sutton, OH
Bruce L. Braley, IA
Peter Welch, VT
Please help their opponents with cash and labor, and votes. My guy is Joel Pollak, running against Jan Schakowsky. Can you imagine Congress without her? Oh, to dream. . . . His website is www.pollakforcongress.com - please consider supporting his candidacy generously.
Consider the following two events:
a. August 2, 2010: The CPSC Commission voted to authorize yet more Mattel firewalled labs (2) and a lab operated by Hanesbrands, a $2.3 billion market cap maker of underwear. [Oooo, lead in underwear! Is this a sick joke or does the CPSC really think kids are chewing on their dirty underwear? Ew!] I believe, without checking, that Mattel now has nine approved firewalled labs, enabling it to save lots of money which is well beyond the practical reach of any small business. The only parties who have thusfar achieved this relief are mass market companies.
b. August 15, 2010: CPSC Chairman Inez Tenenbaum gave an interview with the Baltimore Sun featuring the following exchange:
"Q: How do you respond to some critics of the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act who say the law puts heavy testing burdens on manufacturers, especially smaller producers?
A: We have to have high standards to protect the consumer. So regardless if you're a large business or a small business, we can't let you put lead in children's products, or cadmium. Or overlook flammability laws or use other toxic chemicals. We look at what the danger is. We think if we had a small-business ombudsman who was out there regularly educating small businesses, we could help them prevent problems in terms of compliance. Large corporations have a whole office full of lawyers and engineers and chemists and toxicologists. Small businesses do not. And we don't want to put anyone out of business. We want to help them learn how to comply and sell safe products." [Emphasis added]
Put side-by-side, these two events separated by only a few days, make clear the utter insensitivity of our government to our plight. The dismissive condescension of Tenenbaum in daring to suggest that an ombudsman would make the problems disappear for small businesses is infuriating. The necessary implication is that we small businesses are just too stupid to understand their complicated rules - I guess she thinks only Mattel can read the English language. Of course, the pending testing frequency rule (which I believe will be implemented in the coming weeks, get ready for it) will cause our company to spend $15 million per annum on testing. This sum far exceeds our profits. Perhaps the ombudsman will help us terminate our people to pay for testing, or provide a shoulder to cry on. And we'll be crying alright.
At the same time, Tenenbaum is actively feathering the nest of the VERY Big Business that caused the CPSIA, Mattel. How ironic, isn't it? The fact that she is tilting the children's market fatally in favor of Big Business doesn't seem to be a source of guilt for Ms. Tenenbaum. Empty words are the solution.
Please keep this in mind the next time you suffer through the dark intonations of our Fearless Leader laying the blame for the economic problems of the small business community at the feet of the Republicans. The problems in our market won't be solved with yet another handout - the Dems should try loosening the garrote they are busily tightening around our air passages. Tax relief won't provide much help when the new regulations makes profit impossible.
Let's stipulate that the Dems in Congress and at the CPSC are fully aware of the inequities and other problems embedded in the CPSIA. In the face of a continuous and vigorous public debate for two years+, this seems beyond dispute. I am also aware that this blog is widely and loyally read by these people. Ignorance is not a possible explanation. Stubbornness, self-preservation, zealotry, a lack of political will, exhaustion - any of those make more sense to me as an explanation.
I have no outlet for my anger over this. I just hope you are not a sucker for the Dems' baloney and spinning. Our ONLY hope is a Republican-led Congress that will act to make these people accountable for the damage they are inflicting. The Dems have proven their stripes - to hope they will come to their senses is simply wishful thinking without any basis in reality or fact.
Can you take two more years of this? I cannot and I will not. I need your help, however - you need to vote the scoundrels out of office on November 2. Here is a list of Democrats on the House Energy and Commerce Committee:
Henry A. Waxman, CA
John D. Dingell, MI
Edward J. Markey, MA
Rick Boucher, VA
Frank Pallone, Jr., NJ
Bart Gordon, TN
Bobby L. Rush, IL
Anna G. Eshoo, CA
Bart Stupak, MI
Eliot L. Engel, NY
Gene Green, TX
Diana DeGette, CO
Lois Capps, CA
Mike Doyle, PA
Jane Harman, CA
Jan Schakowsky, IL
Charles A. Gonzalez, TX
Jay Inslee, WA
Tammy Baldwin, WI
Mike Ross, AR
Anthony D. Weiner, NY
Jim Matheson, UT
G. K. Butterfield, NC
Charlie Melancon, LA
John Barrow, GA
Baron P. Hill, IN
Doris O. Matsui, CA
Donna M. Christensen, VI
Kathy Castor, FL
John P. Sarbanes, MD
Christopher S. Murphy, CT
Zachary T. Space, OH
Jerry McNerney CA
Betty Sutton, OH
Bruce L. Braley, IA
Peter Welch, VT
Please help their opponents with cash and labor, and votes. My guy is Joel Pollak, running against Jan Schakowsky. Can you imagine Congress without her? Oh, to dream. . . . His website is www.pollakforcongress.com - please consider supporting his candidacy generously.
Saturday, August 14, 2010
CPSIA - Happy Birthday CPSIA!!!
Can't let a wonderful occasion like this go unnoticed - HAPPY BIRTHDAY CPSIA! Two years ago today, President Bush signed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act into law, giving vast new powers to CPSC and promising wondrous new levels of "safety" for children in our country.
And how much safer we have become! In my post "Numbers Don't Lie", I abstracted the injury statistics from CPSC children's product recalls over the prior 11 years. I know from "someone who should know" that the CPSC does not tabulate injury statistics like this - so I am your only source even on the second birthday of the CPSIA. No matter, the spreadsheet indicates that there were 242 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the end of my study, April 21, 2010. By contrast, there were a total of 657 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the randomly-selected end of my study, March 5, 1999. The injuries associated with lead that proceeded the CPSIA were one death and two asserted injuries, and after the CPSIA - one asserted lead injury (in two years). [See "Numbers Don't Lie (Update No. 1)".] What an achievement! It's so, soooo clear we need this tough new law. . . .
By the way, I don't mean to be too "science-y", but a reduction in lead injuries from one death and two asserted injuries in nine years to one asserted injury in two years is simply not a statistically significant reduction. And we must consider additionally that ALL of the injuries, before and after the CPSIA, were ASSERTED BUT NOT VERIFIED. So there may be ZERO recorded actual injuries - we just don't know. This makes our health improvement objectives even fuzzier.
And the cost of the CPSIA "final solution"? Well, I have calculated that, using the HTA's estimate of $5.625 billion in annual CPSIA compliance costs (which I believe is low and in any event was calculated before the CPSIA showed its hand on testing frequency - see below), the 11-year cost of compliance is a mere $61.9 Billion. Using EPA metrics for the economic value of a human life and one lost IQ point, and giving full credit to each of the three asserted but unverified lead injuries, I have calculated the cost of the injuries to be $6.1 million over 11 years. That's pretty symmetrical, don't you think? $62 billion in costs to save $6.1 million.
Spend $10,000 to save a buck. That sums up this era in a single sentence.
Oh, but it gets even better. In case you, or pick any regulator, are too dense to understand the implications of those numbers for the future prospects of the children's product market, the CPSC has recently published a rule for comment on testing frequency and "reasonable testing programs". This rule was due on November 14, 2009 (hence the "15 Month Rule") but was delayed because the CPSC understood the rule's potential to literally kill all small businesses in this market. [That would include our business, btw.] So they held a two-day workshop in December 2009 to hear ideas and industry concerns and then spent months crafting the rule. This rule has been in the works for two years now. You have to figure they're serious.
The CPSC was kind enough to illustrate the costs our business can expect under their sparkling new rule. So I broke out my trusty calculator (again - too math-y? too science-y?) and determined that they intend for us to spend a mere $10,000 per item per year in testing. This includes destroying 54 samples of each item in the process of testing. Anyhow, think of how many products you make - and multiply by $10,000. That's your annual testing bill now.
Drum roll, please . . . our bill will be a mere $15 million per year! Pretty exciting to get off so easy. No doubt our bankruptcy will make American kids safer. Of course, I am pretty sure it won't make them any smarter - our educational products will cease to exist. Then, of course, their ignorance of math and science might qualify to run the CPSC. There's always a bright side to tragedy and catastrophe, I suppose.
It is worth a passing note that this is my 490th blogpost on the CPSIA and its terrible effects. I have submitted comments letters by the bushel basket, testified numerous times at the CPSC (often at their request), testified in front of Congress, been on national TV and radio, wrote Op-Eds and been featured innumerable times in various publications, held a rally on Capitol Hill, met with Commissioners, Congressional staffers and members of Congress, and so on. The CPSC's actions are not being taken in ignorance. They are being done in the face of reason. This is not partisanism - this is "know nothing-ism".
So Happy Happy Birthday, CPSIA! Your work is not done, unfortunately. Our company is still breathing.
And how much safer we have become! In my post "Numbers Don't Lie", I abstracted the injury statistics from CPSC children's product recalls over the prior 11 years. I know from "someone who should know" that the CPSC does not tabulate injury statistics like this - so I am your only source even on the second birthday of the CPSIA. No matter, the spreadsheet indicates that there were 242 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the end of my study, April 21, 2010. By contrast, there were a total of 657 recalls of children's products between August 14, 2008 and the randomly-selected end of my study, March 5, 1999. The injuries associated with lead that proceeded the CPSIA were one death and two asserted injuries, and after the CPSIA - one asserted lead injury (in two years). [See "Numbers Don't Lie (Update No. 1)".] What an achievement! It's so, soooo clear we need this tough new law. . . .
By the way, I don't mean to be too "science-y", but a reduction in lead injuries from one death and two asserted injuries in nine years to one asserted injury in two years is simply not a statistically significant reduction. And we must consider additionally that ALL of the injuries, before and after the CPSIA, were ASSERTED BUT NOT VERIFIED. So there may be ZERO recorded actual injuries - we just don't know. This makes our health improvement objectives even fuzzier.
And the cost of the CPSIA "final solution"? Well, I have calculated that, using the HTA's estimate of $5.625 billion in annual CPSIA compliance costs (which I believe is low and in any event was calculated before the CPSIA showed its hand on testing frequency - see below), the 11-year cost of compliance is a mere $61.9 Billion. Using EPA metrics for the economic value of a human life and one lost IQ point, and giving full credit to each of the three asserted but unverified lead injuries, I have calculated the cost of the injuries to be $6.1 million over 11 years. That's pretty symmetrical, don't you think? $62 billion in costs to save $6.1 million.
Spend $10,000 to save a buck. That sums up this era in a single sentence.
Oh, but it gets even better. In case you, or pick any regulator, are too dense to understand the implications of those numbers for the future prospects of the children's product market, the CPSC has recently published a rule for comment on testing frequency and "reasonable testing programs". This rule was due on November 14, 2009 (hence the "15 Month Rule") but was delayed because the CPSC understood the rule's potential to literally kill all small businesses in this market. [That would include our business, btw.] So they held a two-day workshop in December 2009 to hear ideas and industry concerns and then spent months crafting the rule. This rule has been in the works for two years now. You have to figure they're serious.
The CPSC was kind enough to illustrate the costs our business can expect under their sparkling new rule. So I broke out my trusty calculator (again - too math-y? too science-y?) and determined that they intend for us to spend a mere $10,000 per item per year in testing. This includes destroying 54 samples of each item in the process of testing. Anyhow, think of how many products you make - and multiply by $10,000. That's your annual testing bill now.
Drum roll, please . . . our bill will be a mere $15 million per year! Pretty exciting to get off so easy. No doubt our bankruptcy will make American kids safer. Of course, I am pretty sure it won't make them any smarter - our educational products will cease to exist. Then, of course, their ignorance of math and science might qualify to run the CPSC. There's always a bright side to tragedy and catastrophe, I suppose.
It is worth a passing note that this is my 490th blogpost on the CPSIA and its terrible effects. I have submitted comments letters by the bushel basket, testified numerous times at the CPSC (often at their request), testified in front of Congress, been on national TV and radio, wrote Op-Eds and been featured innumerable times in various publications, held a rally on Capitol Hill, met with Commissioners, Congressional staffers and members of Congress, and so on. The CPSC's actions are not being taken in ignorance. They are being done in the face of reason. This is not partisanism - this is "know nothing-ism".
So Happy Happy Birthday, CPSIA! Your work is not done, unfortunately. Our company is still breathing.
Thursday, August 12, 2010
CPSIA - Jobs, the CPSIA and me
I saw this video tonight and it really frustrated me.
Michelle Rena Jones, the unemployed person featured in the video is a victim of our economic downturn, and of Michigan's long dependence on the auto industry. She seems intelligent and highly employable. . . yet she is the part of the long term unemployed. She's not alone by a long shot.
We employ about 150 people in our educational toy business. We consider ourselves fortunate to be able to provide these jobs, given the terrible recession, awful State funding prospects, and most importantly, the overhang of the fatal CPSIA. When I thought about Ms. Jones, I asked myself why we aren't hiring right now.
Frankly, our business reflects the punk economy you hear about on TV. Right now, we lack the confidence that we can safely add people, or even more importantly, that we will see the sales volume to support new people. This closes most doors to new jobs at our shop.
Then there's our ole' pal, the CPSIA. What impact does the CPSIA have on our hiring mentality? Hey, I'm the guy who figured out that this government intends to jam me with a requirement to spend $15 million per annum on testing - how do you think it makes me feel? I assume smaller companies, including the crafters comprising the HTA, realize that despite the various promises and wiped-away tears at the CPSC, the new rules offer scant relief to the small fry. The rules mean business death - and that ain't a job program, kids. If we're toast, so are other small businesses. Actually, if we're toast, everyone's toast.
Right now, I cannot abide investing in our business. Expansion is a joke since the federal government has totally abandoned us. Trust has been obliterated, shredded, stomped on. Congress is completely deaf and the CPSC doesn't give a darn - which is why after two years of work and "dialogue", they produced the drivel we were to comment on last week. [For a candid assessment of those rules, please see my comment to Anne Northup's blogpost of August 11.]
Do you think any rational business manager would hire anyone while fearing that costs far exceeding his annual profits are about to be imposed? Forget it - business people suffering under the crushing burden of the wave of Obama hyper-regulation are thinking of how to survive. Bucking the rules won't work, either - don't forget that the agency has the power to press felony charges against anyone who knowingly breaks this law. 2011 is Tenenbaum's "year of enforcement".
Can't wait. . . .
Ms. Jones won't be likely getting a job from a children's product company anytime soon.
Apparently, some people still wonder why voters are angry and why the Dems are being blamed. If anyone seriously can't figure that one out, they're as deaf as the stone deaf members of Congress we will be voting out of office . . . soon.
Very soon.
Michelle Rena Jones, the unemployed person featured in the video is a victim of our economic downturn, and of Michigan's long dependence on the auto industry. She seems intelligent and highly employable. . . yet she is the part of the long term unemployed. She's not alone by a long shot.
We employ about 150 people in our educational toy business. We consider ourselves fortunate to be able to provide these jobs, given the terrible recession, awful State funding prospects, and most importantly, the overhang of the fatal CPSIA. When I thought about Ms. Jones, I asked myself why we aren't hiring right now.
Frankly, our business reflects the punk economy you hear about on TV. Right now, we lack the confidence that we can safely add people, or even more importantly, that we will see the sales volume to support new people. This closes most doors to new jobs at our shop.
Then there's our ole' pal, the CPSIA. What impact does the CPSIA have on our hiring mentality? Hey, I'm the guy who figured out that this government intends to jam me with a requirement to spend $15 million per annum on testing - how do you think it makes me feel? I assume smaller companies, including the crafters comprising the HTA, realize that despite the various promises and wiped-away tears at the CPSC, the new rules offer scant relief to the small fry. The rules mean business death - and that ain't a job program, kids. If we're toast, so are other small businesses. Actually, if we're toast, everyone's toast.
Right now, I cannot abide investing in our business. Expansion is a joke since the federal government has totally abandoned us. Trust has been obliterated, shredded, stomped on. Congress is completely deaf and the CPSC doesn't give a darn - which is why after two years of work and "dialogue", they produced the drivel we were to comment on last week. [For a candid assessment of those rules, please see my comment to Anne Northup's blogpost of August 11.]
Do you think any rational business manager would hire anyone while fearing that costs far exceeding his annual profits are about to be imposed? Forget it - business people suffering under the crushing burden of the wave of Obama hyper-regulation are thinking of how to survive. Bucking the rules won't work, either - don't forget that the agency has the power to press felony charges against anyone who knowingly breaks this law. 2011 is Tenenbaum's "year of enforcement".
Can't wait. . . .
Ms. Jones won't be likely getting a job from a children's product company anytime soon.
Apparently, some people still wonder why voters are angry and why the Dems are being blamed. If anyone seriously can't figure that one out, they're as deaf as the stone deaf members of Congress we will be voting out of office . . . soon.
Very soon.
Monday, August 9, 2010
CPSIA - The Great Set-Up
For those who had better things to do than wade through my comment letters last week, I want to highlight a few points.
The two CPSC rulemakings up for comment on August 3rd were on component testing and on the so-called "15 Month Rule". Both are very important rules and both have been long discussed. The "15 Month Rule" relates to testing frequency and defines a "reasonable testing program". The long controversy over these rules relates to their acknowledged potential to be TERMINAL to small businesses. This was the principal reason that Inez Tenenbaum delayed issuing these rules on time in November 2009 as required by law (they can vary from law when it suits their purposes, please note). She called a two-day workshop for December 2009 for the purpose of gathering the feedback of stakeholders. I was asked to appear as a panelist, as were two of my colleagues. These sessions were taped (they were able to hear all the feedback and digest it).
So here's a few things you should know:
a. Component testing will not be useful except for the largest companies and for those rare situations when everything falls neatly into place. The rules as written are too complex, too demanding (full traceability of all components is REQUIRED, which is delusional and completely unnecessary for such simple, innocuous products) and far too risky. The liability risk associated with these very challenging rules will scare off all but the most foolhardy or ignorant companies.
b. Component testing relies on a fantastic assumption, namely that component tests (if desired) will even be available. Why don't we assume they will be available for every paint and for every plastic pellet on the planet? Does that solve the problem? I dare say not. There are many convenient examples of likely missing test reports - think of aluminum foil in a science kit, for instance. If you are missing only a few component certificates, any benefit from the rule is lost.
c. The "15 Month Rule" was apparently NOT CHANGED from the draft discussed in December 2009. In other words, despite the agency's "misgivings" about the rule way back then, and even after two days of comments by more than 200 stakeholders, the agency ended up in the same problematic place - and put the rule out for comment now. Of course, they filled in some holes (see below). In my opinion, this means either that the "feedback" process was a complete sham (the agency gave the appearance of "listening" but did as it pleased anyhow) or else that the agency lacks the temerity to tell Congress that the CPSIA is simply screwed up. Having ducked that punch, the CPSC instead opted to put you and me out of business.
If they were unable or unwilling to listen in the last nine months, I have absolutely no confidence they will listen this time. That bodes badly for me and for you. Consider the following . . . .
d. Using the numbers from the CPSC's rulemaking, I derived that the agency wants me to spend $10,000 per item per year in testing costs (all-in). We have 1,500 items. Do the math - that's $15 million per year in testing. This is for a company with ONE RECALL OF 130 PIECES TO ITS NAME IN 26 YEARS. This is also the rule regulating a "risk" that killed ONE CHILD and MAY HAVE INJURED THREE CHILDREN . . . in 11 years. [You can review the math in my comment letter. It's their numbers, not mine.] Do you think this might be a touch excessive? No matter, that's our problem to resolve.
I can't get this $15 million number out of my head. Do you realize that this rule could become the law shortly? Hey, HTA members, do you get it yet? All that nuzzling up to the CPSC, all their tears over your plight - this rule shuts your doors. If they push forward on this rule (as I anticipate), we will all face a very daunting choice - do we close our doors, sell our companies, go into another business or, breath deep, knowingly break the law by ignoring this rule? Is this a surprise to anyone? This has to be the world's stupidest rule - and we are left with the ultimate Hobson's Choice. Thanks CPSC.
Let's not forget that Bob Adler spoke in stern tones last February when he said he would not vote to extend the stay on the testing and certification rules again. In the absence of further Commission action, the testing stay lapses on February 11, 2011. This rulemaking is intended to put the agency in position to let the stay expire. The next step would be enforcement of this new rule. Ms. Tenenbaum has publicly announced that 2011 will be all about enforcement - you have been warned, the pogroms are coming.
Do you get it . . . yet? IF the agency cannot wrap up this rulemaking in time, it will need to extend the stay. Arguably, that problem is on its doorstep right now. Even they understand that businesses need time to plan, and without final rules, no planning or preparation can take place. IF they cannot get this done in time (soon), they will have to extend the stay AGAIN. This would be incredibly damning of the agency, as it would be an apparent concession that the awful CPSIA cannot be implemented, perhaps ever. Of course, that only confirms what you and I have known for a long time - the law can't be fixed by this agency and is fatally flawed. In the absence of dynamic Congressional action, we're all toast (this is old news).
I urge you to take this battle to the political arena. The CPSC and the Dem-controlled Congress have shown that they just won't listen. They don't care about our problems. I say that if they are intent in putting us out of business, all of our productive businesses making contributions to our community and our markets every day, then it's time to return the favor. We need to put THEM out of business first.
Time's a-wastin'.
The two CPSC rulemakings up for comment on August 3rd were on component testing and on the so-called "15 Month Rule". Both are very important rules and both have been long discussed. The "15 Month Rule" relates to testing frequency and defines a "reasonable testing program". The long controversy over these rules relates to their acknowledged potential to be TERMINAL to small businesses. This was the principal reason that Inez Tenenbaum delayed issuing these rules on time in November 2009 as required by law (they can vary from law when it suits their purposes, please note). She called a two-day workshop for December 2009 for the purpose of gathering the feedback of stakeholders. I was asked to appear as a panelist, as were two of my colleagues. These sessions were taped (they were able to hear all the feedback and digest it).
So here's a few things you should know:
a. Component testing will not be useful except for the largest companies and for those rare situations when everything falls neatly into place. The rules as written are too complex, too demanding (full traceability of all components is REQUIRED, which is delusional and completely unnecessary for such simple, innocuous products) and far too risky. The liability risk associated with these very challenging rules will scare off all but the most foolhardy or ignorant companies.
b. Component testing relies on a fantastic assumption, namely that component tests (if desired) will even be available. Why don't we assume they will be available for every paint and for every plastic pellet on the planet? Does that solve the problem? I dare say not. There are many convenient examples of likely missing test reports - think of aluminum foil in a science kit, for instance. If you are missing only a few component certificates, any benefit from the rule is lost.
c. The "15 Month Rule" was apparently NOT CHANGED from the draft discussed in December 2009. In other words, despite the agency's "misgivings" about the rule way back then, and even after two days of comments by more than 200 stakeholders, the agency ended up in the same problematic place - and put the rule out for comment now. Of course, they filled in some holes (see below). In my opinion, this means either that the "feedback" process was a complete sham (the agency gave the appearance of "listening" but did as it pleased anyhow) or else that the agency lacks the temerity to tell Congress that the CPSIA is simply screwed up. Having ducked that punch, the CPSC instead opted to put you and me out of business.
If they were unable or unwilling to listen in the last nine months, I have absolutely no confidence they will listen this time. That bodes badly for me and for you. Consider the following . . . .
d. Using the numbers from the CPSC's rulemaking, I derived that the agency wants me to spend $10,000 per item per year in testing costs (all-in). We have 1,500 items. Do the math - that's $15 million per year in testing. This is for a company with ONE RECALL OF 130 PIECES TO ITS NAME IN 26 YEARS. This is also the rule regulating a "risk" that killed ONE CHILD and MAY HAVE INJURED THREE CHILDREN . . . in 11 years. [You can review the math in my comment letter. It's their numbers, not mine.] Do you think this might be a touch excessive? No matter, that's our problem to resolve.
I can't get this $15 million number out of my head. Do you realize that this rule could become the law shortly? Hey, HTA members, do you get it yet? All that nuzzling up to the CPSC, all their tears over your plight - this rule shuts your doors. If they push forward on this rule (as I anticipate), we will all face a very daunting choice - do we close our doors, sell our companies, go into another business or, breath deep, knowingly break the law by ignoring this rule? Is this a surprise to anyone? This has to be the world's stupidest rule - and we are left with the ultimate Hobson's Choice. Thanks CPSC.
Let's not forget that Bob Adler spoke in stern tones last February when he said he would not vote to extend the stay on the testing and certification rules again. In the absence of further Commission action, the testing stay lapses on February 11, 2011. This rulemaking is intended to put the agency in position to let the stay expire. The next step would be enforcement of this new rule. Ms. Tenenbaum has publicly announced that 2011 will be all about enforcement - you have been warned, the pogroms are coming.
Do you get it . . . yet? IF the agency cannot wrap up this rulemaking in time, it will need to extend the stay. Arguably, that problem is on its doorstep right now. Even they understand that businesses need time to plan, and without final rules, no planning or preparation can take place. IF they cannot get this done in time (soon), they will have to extend the stay AGAIN. This would be incredibly damning of the agency, as it would be an apparent concession that the awful CPSIA cannot be implemented, perhaps ever. Of course, that only confirms what you and I have known for a long time - the law can't be fixed by this agency and is fatally flawed. In the absence of dynamic Congressional action, we're all toast (this is old news).
I urge you to take this battle to the political arena. The CPSC and the Dem-controlled Congress have shown that they just won't listen. They don't care about our problems. I say that if they are intent in putting us out of business, all of our productive businesses making contributions to our community and our markets every day, then it's time to return the favor. We need to put THEM out of business first.
Time's a-wastin'.
Tuesday, August 3, 2010
CPSIA - Comment Letter on the "15 Month Rule"
August 3, 2010
Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 820
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0038 Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification.
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0038) published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).
The End of (Business) Life As We Know It:
As I sit down to record my comments on this rule, I take comfort in knowing that the CPSC admits what it is doing here. In a section entitled “Caveats and Possible Market Reactions to Third Party Testing Requirements”, the agency acknowledges the severe impact of its new rule on manufacturers:
a. Significantly increased costs,
b. Incentive to redesign (presumably successful) products,
c. Incentive to reduce features on products,
d. Incentive to eliminate (presumably useful) components in finished goods,
e. Incentive to reduce product lines,
f. Exit the market altogether,
g. Go out of business,
h. Create barriers to entry for future business expansion, especially in specialty markets (non-mass market),
i. Devastate niche markets (noting particularly the “special needs” educational market – sorry, blind kids!), and
j. Incentive to delay or forgo product or manufacturing process improvements (to avoid testing costs).
Quite a stimulus program! Of course, the CPSC knows we can’t meet this challenge alone. In “The Potential Effects of the Proposed Rule”, the agency advises us to hire a few helpers:
a. Lawyers to review CPSC regulations,
b. Engineers and chemists to develop product specifications, conduct tests and design a program for production testing,
c. Statisticians or consultants to determine the frequency, sample size and collection method for production testing, and
d. Technicians, “perhaps working under the supervision of an engineer, chemist or similar professional”, to perform production tests.
This certainly is a Brave New World for us. Luckily we have the CPSC to tell us what to do. Unfortunately, we can’t afford an in-house legal department or teams of engineers, chemists or statisticians. We don’t even have technicians. Incredibly, somehow we bumble on in our blissful, almost charming ignorance, having had only one recall of 130 pieces (we recovered every unit) out of perhaps 1,000,000,000 units sold in the last 26 years. No doubt all the pain the CPSC is promising us will be worth it . . . gotta keep everyone so safe.
Seriously, Is Anyone Listening?
On page 28338 of the Federal Register, the Proposed Rule reproduces the “reasonable testing program” as it stood before the December 10-11, 2009 workshop at the CPSC. The workshop (which we attended with three people who were each asked to appear as a panelist) was ostensibly for the purpose of giving “stakeholder feedback” on the so-called “15 Month Rule” (the Proposed Rule) and the component testing rule (also up for comment today, posted under separate cover). We gave detailed feedback on these rules – none positive – yet the Proposed Rule seems to have preserved the original, deeply-flawed concepts intact.
It is difficult not to conclude that the process of providing feedback to this CPSC is a sham. While Chairman Tenenbaum has long touted her “policy” of seeking feedback from all stakeholders including industry, judging from this rule, the commitment to seeking feedback does not involve maintaining an open mind. It appears that the most likely feedback to be well-received is feedback that ratifies what the agency already plans to do. Other feedback is “wrong”, I guess. I doubt you will find this letter useful.
As time ebbs on and as the drumbeat of a CPSC bent on our destruction becomes more and more clear, the incentive to waste a few days preparing detailed comments also ebbs. Nevertheless, owing to the importance of this Proposed Rule, I am hereby submitting comments. I have no reason to be optimistic that you will consider my point of view with an open mind. This rule has all the earmarks of a fait accompli.
Deeply Flawed Economic Analysis.
The Proposed Rule devotes pages and pages to a tortured analysis of its purported compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”). This section of the Proposed Rule is a virtual admission of how unworkable the rule is (and the CPSIA testing scheme in general). As a starting point, the rule states: “The objective of the rule is to reduce the risk of injury from consumer products, especially from products intended for children aged 12 years and younger.” In my recent study of CPSC recall data posted on its website, I have found exactly ONE DEATH and THREE ASSERTED INJURIES from lead or lead-in-paint from 1999-2010. Please keep this statistic in mind as I review the economics of your “injury reduction” effort.
The flaws in the RFA analysis are clear in its discussion of testing costs for toys. The analysis acknowledges that it only accounts for out-of-pocket testing costs, nothing else. Significant additional (and ignored) costs include samples destroyed or damaged in testing, transportation of samples, administrative costs for managing testing, administration costs for managing the testing data, administrative costs for managing recordkeeping, an allocation of general management time, legal expenses relating to testing and so on. Depending on the scale of the business, I estimate that these costs (and distractions) will add 15%-50% to the out-of-pocket testing costs.
The RFA analysis concludes that testing a typical toy will cost $1,262 per product. As an average, this might be a good number for our business. I would note, however, that the Proposed Rule posits that we will test multiple samples, sending in perhaps four separate samples per item to satisfy the bizarre “required high degree of assurance” standard. [The rule states clearly that testing one sample is never enough. Interestingly, we have never had the experience in the last 20 years that multiple safety tests of the same product reveals anything useful other than rapidly approaching poverty.] The rule’s four-sample regime takes the testing cost per toy up to $4,848 (by the calculation in the document) plus another $2,500 for mechanical tests (because the rule posits that we will submit FIFTY samples for mechanical tests). That brings us up to $7,348 per item, plus 54 destroyed samples. This implies a rough “all-in” cost of $10,000 per item. We have 1,500 catalog items in our product line. Without a “reasonable testing program” in place (see below), we will have to test each item annually. This is a cost of $15 million for our company EVERY YEAR. [We also sell custom items, a business that would presumably be terminated by this testing rule. That’s several jobs down the drain.]
Does it surprise you to know that $15 million in testing costs exceeds our annual profit? By far?
The RFA analysis is deeply flawed in other ways, too. The rule duly reports that “[a]ccording to a representative of a trade association, there are an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 individual toys on the market.” Oh, really? Perhaps the CPSC shouldn’t have consulted the International Hubcap Manufacturers Association for this information. A quick visit to the Amazon.com website reveals listings of 808,465 toys and games on August 3rd (http://amzn.to/djtTVX). Amazon is a customer of ours – I estimate that they list about one-third of all toys and games sold in the consumer market. Call it 2.5 million toys and games available to consumers in the U.S. But that’s not all – the category also includes specialty items not present on consumer sites. For instance, our industry, the education industry, is largely invisible on consumer sites. I estimate that about one million SKUs are available to purchase at the annual convention of the International Reading Association. Millions of other SKUs are displayed at the national math show, the national science show and the national early childhood show. Add in special needs and other sub-markets – and you get well in excess of 4-5 million toys and games. So the RFA analysis might be off by 100x in its assessment of the toy market ALONE. That’s not close. . . .
The RFA analysis goes on to conclude that the ENTIRE MARKET of products affected by the rule is 100,000–150,000 products. This includes “wearing apparel, accessories, jewelry, juvenile products, children’s furniture, etc.”, plus non-children’s products and other children’s products like ATVs, bikes, bunk beds and so on. It is hard to dignify this ridiculous data with a retort, except to note that it is absurd on its face. The apparel industry ALONE offers as many as 8,000,000 different children’s SKUs for sale. The RFA analysis is fatally flawed.
At $10,000 per SKU, the projected children’s product testing costs will easily exceed $50 billion per year. Remember the 11-year CPSC statistic on lead deaths and injuries – one death and three ASSERTED injuries? [There are no recorded injuries from phthalates or cadmium, by the way.] The 11-year compliance cost will exceed $550 billion (in 2010 dollars), expended by U.S. companies to “reduce” this risk of injury. It would cost a lot less to wrap every American child in bubble wrap.
Small Businesses CANNOT SURVIVE THIS RULE.
Assuming we are supposed to take this rule seriously, the Proposed Rule is perhaps the best friend of the mass market yet invented by an agency seemingly bent on the destruction of the small business community. This letter documents again and again the unrealistic expectations and assumptions made by the authors of this rule with respect to businesses in general and small businesses in particular. Thousands of small businesses of every stripe and color will be affected by this rule. Are you seriously thinking that they will all hire statisticians, chemists and engineers to prepare the reams of data, plans and reports the CPSC expects? Once this massive, herculean effort is completed, who will be safer anyhow? I can think of someone – mass market companies who have been handed a game-ending cost advantage on a silver platter by the CPSC. This, combined with mass market companies’ ability to create certified firewalled in-house labs, favors the big guy dramatically. No wonder the rule states again and again how prejudicial this rule is to small business. The CPSC knows what it’s doing.
Small businesses will strain to even understand what is expected of them. The rule is obtuse, long-winded and full of arcania. Small business people may not have the time or skills to master this complex rule. When the CPSC turns to its attention to enforcement (as promised for 2011) and selects a few small businesses to whip into shape, the market will take note of the pain and a mass exit will result. I realize, however, that Cassandra-like predictions haven’t influenced the CPSC in recent times. One of the Commissioners has even been quoted as saying that “anecdotes aren’t evidence”. It feels like we have to die to prove we were right. A few small businesses might just do that, if the agency waits long enough.
The Commission has asked for feedback on how to address these issues. The complexity of the CPSIA safety rules proves that they are unworkable. To repair this damage, the Commission must ask Congress to restore its ability to assess risk. I am assuming that the Commission would exercise this discretion with more common sense than is embodied in this rule. CPSC rules should be trimmed back to things that MATTER, only. Second, the agency should build its rules and its enforcement activity around DATA. Injury statistics tell the agency what is important. If a particular hazard generates ONE DEATH AND THREE ASSERTED INJURIES OVER 11 YEARS, you can safely relax your rules quite a bit (there are worse problems out there). Education might make a difference, however.
Finally, the Commission should NOT take ANY step if there is EVEN A SHRED OF DOUBT about the impact on small business. Small business is the major jobs creator in America. When you promulgate rules that choke the life out of small business or sharply reduce their incentive to invest, you are killing our economy. You have a heavy responsibility to keep this place running, even if it’s an imperfect world. While it’s sad that a child ever dies, the pain and suffering imposed on countless families from lost jobs, lost capital, lost access to needed products, and so on likely far exceeds it.
Reasonable Testing Program – Busy Work to Keep Us From Running Our Businesses.
The “Reasonable Testing Program” (“RTP”) represents a choice presented to manufacturers of children’s products under this rule. If we endure the expense and disruption of a RTP, we can cut our testing frequency (read, testing costs) in half. A very tempting prospect but the cost of a RTP seems too high, leaving us with a Hobson’s Choice. We can’t afford annual testing and we cannot afford a RTP. What should we do? What will anyone do?
Owing to the burden and complexity of RTPs, I predict EVERY REGULATED COMPANY will violate these rules. Since Ms. Tenenbaum has promised to turn to enforcement in 2011, the CPSC regulators should have a pretty easy time finding juicy targets. Every company will provide wonderful enforcement opportunities.
Although our testing program has been highly-effective over the last 26 years, our program would never meet these standards. We do not maintain the volume of paperwork that the new CPSC rule now requires. We know what we’re doing, but we have not organized our files into a how-to manual. Perhaps the agency thinks every company in the country is an ISO 9001 company. They’re not, and this kind of documentation is rare and breathtakingly expensive to prepare.
Having endured the CPSIA spectacle for two years now, I do not trust the seemingly flexible definition of necessary documentation. The pattern is that these seemingly open-ended terms (which may or may not describe our current recordkeeping) will mature into something rigid down the line. Even if they don’t, we still face the risk that we will not measure up to the expectations of the CPSC enforcement officer at the time of reckoning. The feeling that we are being set up is inescapable. As noted above, given our record of performance, the agency should have NO concerns about how we go about our business. Nonetheless, I feel certain that these rules will bite me in the future.
Sample selection under the rule should not be based on any statistical formula (per the baffling presentation of Dr. Michael Greene at the December 2009 workshop). If the overall safety results of the company are strong, the choice of samples by the company or factories should be presumed compliant without further inquiry. Random selection (taking one off the shelf . . . without the assistance of a statistician) works just fine in our experience, and there is no evidence that testing multiple samples will accomplish anything but will certainly raise costs. Better sampling won’t lower injury rates that already approach zero.
We currently do not use production testing and have zero production testing plans in place. With one recall in 26 years, I would assert this kind of testing is superfluous in our business and basically useless from a safety standpoint. It will significantly raise costs, however. The tedious exercise of preparing a pallet load of production testing plans to meet the new requirements is just plain busy work. One must ask what the CPSC was thinking when it penned this description of a production testing plan: “A production testing plan may include recurring testing or the use of process management techniques such as control charts, statistical process control programs, or failure modes and effects analysis (FMEAs) designed to control potential variations in product manufacturing that could affect the product’s ability to comply with the applicable rules, bans, standards or regulations.” Fancy words but . . . what planet are they from?
The requirement to list all the tests applicable to our items, again and again, to satisfy the RTP requirements is typical of mindless busy work asked of us. Does the CPSC think this will make ANY difference? Most businesses confirm safety tests with their testing lab partners anyhow. More bureaucracy, taken to new heights.
We don’t have any remedial plans in place either. We are quite familiar with how to appropriately resolve compliance and quality issues, and have never had a problem with regulators in the exercise of our business judgment. The requirement to prepare a detailed written plan, just in case we have another recall in the next 26 years, is pure officiousness. This is yet another waste of our time, our money, our resources and our intellect.
The recordkeeping requirements of a RTP is well beyond our ability or interest to preserve for 1500 products produced in thousands of lots over the course of a year. Taking a “Dear Diary” approach to how we source, test, move, remediate, repair, investigate and otherwise manage children’s products is completely unreasonable. This is especially ridiculous given our track record.
The Commission has asked what a RTP might cost us. I have a hard time estimating it because all the fun in our business would be gone. If we had to endure the bureaucratic nightmare this rule envisions, if anyone actually expects us to do all this to make simple plastic toys for schools, I would have to seriously consider our alternatives. So it might cost us our entire company. That’s the whole enchilada, guys.
Remember, we don’t have to make children’s products, nor do we have to stick around for the next act of this tragedy. If the CPSC persists in ruining what was once a rather safe industry with a strong track record, the cost will be the entire market for children’s products.
Is that a high enough price to give you pause? I know, I know, more anecdotes . . . .
The Requirement to Document Procedures against Undue Influence is Unreasonable.
The “Undue Influence Procedures” requirement (“UIP”) is essentially a requirement to document efforts to avoid fraud. If you’re not inclined to commit fraud, there’s little reason to set out your plan to not commit fraud. Here’s our current policy – “Don’t break the law or commit fraud”. This has worked well for us, as we have never exerted undue influence in the last 26 years and have no plans to start now.
I am really sorry that there are bad people in the world, some small number of which may have at one time attempted to exert undue influence over one or more test labs. Perhaps the CPSC should concern themselves with the bad guys and leave the rest of us alone.
Material Change Rules Place Too Much Risk on Manufacturers.
The CPSC’s rule on when to test after a “material change” is sufficiently open-ended to render the judgment on when to test fairly obvious – ALWAYS TEST. Deep within the Proposed Rule, Section 1107.10(b)(2)(ii) instructs “A material change is any change in the product’s design, manufacturing process, or sourcing of component parts that a manufacturer exercising due care knows, or should know, could affect the product’s ability to comply with the rules . . . .” “Due care” is defined as “the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”
In other words, the agency’s 20-20 hindsight can construct a case for testing for a material change for just about anything that “might” or “could” affect results or that a hypothetical “prudent person” might think of investigating. Of course, this issue only comes up in the context of an injury or a recall, so what are the odds that any judgment to NOT test would withstand inquiry by an angry CPSC? Zilch. So either you always test or you take a big risk. This is completely unfair and unreasonable.
Testing Frequency Must Be Left to the Manufacturer and to the Market.
A rule requiring manufacturers to test according to these standards every year is going to kill us and many other businesses. No one can afford the testing scheme outlined above, we least of all. If we must test according to these standards, we will be out of business quickly. It is equally unrealistic to imagine that testing cost savings from maintaining a RTP will hold much appeal since that project is so wasteful and gargantuan. Of course, a firewalled in-house lab would be nice for all of us small businesses, but that’s unrealistic, too (not to mention undesirable). We have no realistic way to moderate these costs. Please see my other August 3 comment letter for an explanation of why I believe component and composite testing will likewise provide no relief.
Testing is supposed to assure product quality and compliance. If we have a good, long term record of safety, why can’t we just carry on as we have, and deal with issues as they arise? That worked for 26 years. The new way is just unaffordable.
The “High Degree of Assurance” Standard is Unreasonable and Not Derived from the CPSIA.
The rule seems to conclude that a “high degree of assurance” is a necessary element of any “reasonable testing program”. The importance of the “reasonable testing program” which was incorporated into the CPSIA as an alternative to third party testing for non-children’s products, has been imputed to the children’s product area as a way to reduce testing frequency, and with it, the “high degree of assurance” standard (“HDA”) was likewise imputed. Thus, sliding down this slippery slope, the HDA standard has become part and parcel of the “15 Month Rule”. Abracadabra.
The Commission has requested feedback on the meaning of the definition of HDA in Section 1107.2. Happily, the agency has rejected a strict statistical interpretation requiring “95% probability” of compliance. What should the definition be interpreted to mean? The “high degree of assurance” should be based on an overall assessment of the safety record of the company. It should NOT be based on the results of an individual product, even if recalled or deemed dangerous. In our case, we have done business for 26 years, had one recall of 130 pieces of out of about 1,000,000,000 pieces sold. All of these units were recovered. Thus, we believe there is zero probability that a recalled product is in the market. Our historical recall rate is approximately 130/1,000,000,000 or 0.00001% over a 26-year period.
With this record over so many years, our company should be deemed to have satisfied this HDA requirement and be endorsed as having a reasonable testing program without further inquiry. And if we DON’T deserve the HDA designation, then the CPSC should articulate what level of safety achievement would earn the designation.
Notably, the entire children’s product industry also meets this requirement. Of the 899 recalls of children’s products from 1999-2010, only one death and three asserted injuries from lead were recorded by the CPSC. Thus, the probability of being injured from lead by a children’s product is nearly zero, given that literally billions of children’s products are sold every year. [The apparel and footwear industry claims annual sales of about 4 billion units ALONE.] Industry recall rates are likewise well under 1% per annum. With injury statistics and recall rates in hand, the CPSC should GREATLY loosen the strictures of the “high degree of assurance” standard to focus its resources on activities that might actually injure someone.
One-to-One Product Testing Will Punish the Smallest Companies.
The prophylactic approach to testing adopted by the CPSC will inevitably put many small or micro businesses into bankruptcy, or drive them into unregulated markets to avoid the CPSIA’s wasteful bureaucratic costs. If the law does not permit the agency to adopt sensible rules that allow businesses to manage their compliance risk as best they can (where the standards remain in place, but the government stops trying to tell businesses HOW to comply), then the Commission must finally tell Mr. Waxman what he doesn’t want to hear – that his law is broken and can’t be fixed. [Notably, these mini businesses most at risk have an exemplary record of safety and very low recall rates. NOTHING is gained by rules that crush the little guy.]
We in the small business community have suffered for two solid years while regulators have sought any possible way to avoid delivering this “unpleasant” message. I get the impression that the demise of our businesses would not be too great a cost for the agency to incur to avoid telling Congress what it doesn’t want to hear. If the Commission is genuinely interested in a fix, it must take action with Congress. I do not believe the agency can devise sensible regulations to fix this problem short of a legislative change.
Ban on Retesting Will Unnecessarily Create Crises at Small Businesses.
In our experience, test labs are neither infallible nor definitive in their understanding of U.S. safety laws and regulations. It is not unusual to experience failed test reports for reasons besides safety problems. In addition, children’s products are not so pure and perfect in their composition that every test produces the same result. The CPSC itself instructed manufacturers to audit their test labs in the ironically-dated April 1, 2010 version of the Proposed Rule in response to industry complaints that test results varied from test lab to test lab. By forbidding retesting, the Proposed Rule removes discretion and appropriate problem resolution techniques from a commonplace quality event. You don’t need to manage a very large portfolio of products before the probability of an ordinary course testing problem rises exponentially. This is a matter of mathematics. If retesting is banned, the CPSC is legislating a crisis of the week.
Again, CPSC injury data informs us that the nature of the problem is extremely modest. Historical injury rates are VERY low. This retesting rule is completely unnecessary and penal to all companies except perhaps mass market companies with greater resources. Small businesses won’t have teams of engineers or statisticians around to save the day. Many small businesses will naively call the CPSC for “help”, only to find out that they have created a worse crisis. Some small businesses may miss this point in the Proposed Rule and continue to retest, only to be punished later when the CPSC finds evidence of retesting at the time of a recall. Is this really how you want to regulate?
I would note that the justification for all this is bad acts: “[Retesting] may tempt unscrupulous parties to attempt to ‘test the product into compliance’. . . .” To my knowledge, this behavior has little precedence and even so, it is an abuse that can be dealt with other ways. If honorable and law-abiding companies use retesting to resolve honest problems, no harm is being done. Punishing good guys because you are afraid that otherwise bad guys might benefit is excessive and inappropriately harsh.
The 10,000 Piece Limit for One-Time Testing is Arbitrary and Unfair.
The CPSC has failed to persuade that the 10,000 limit is an appropriate break point for testing. First of all, the limit is cumulative, not related to sales in a period or per annum. Second, the threshold bears no relationship to risk of injury. In other words, it’s completely arbitrary. Why 10,000? Why not? In my view, that’s not enough to justify this rule. Many of the micro businesses that might benefit from this rule have NEVER had a recall. These are the people this rule will restrict. And the logic of this is . . . what, exactly?
Even more remarkable is the rule’s insistence that these low volume items be tested annually after passing the 10,000 piece threshold. Small companies will never have a RTP so annual testing (or more frequently, if for instance the item is hand-assembled) will be mandated. Consider a product selling 2,000 piece per year. Under these rules, the incentive to drop it once it crosses the 10,000 threshold will be powerful. This reminds me of the incentive on small businesses to not hire a 26th employee to avoid an onslaught of Obamacare obligations. A tacit cap on sales will be imposed by this rule. Nice!
The solution to this problem is to require one-time testing before sale, and thereafter according to the business judgment of the manufacturer. Remember, the retailers that buy from the manufacturer will also have something to say about testing frequency, too. Not all solutions are better if imposed by the government.
Alternative Testing Technologies.
The ability to test at low cost with XRF is attractive. For our business, it is tempting to use an XRF gun but for two reasons: (a) cost, and (b) health risk. XRF guns cost $30,000 each and have high annual maintenance costs (several thousand dollars a year). We might need several guns to manage our inventory volumes, a very costly prospect. XRF guns are portable x-ray machines. Notwithstanding the assurance of XRF gun manufacturers, I am quite reluctant to place an x-ray machine in the hands of a warehouse worker in our facility. This is an invitation to disaster. We likewise have no interest in hiring a highly-paid technician to wield the gun, or technicians to wield the guns. In any event, we cannot expose our employees to a possible risk of x-ray genetic damage. I am surprised that the CPSC doesn’t take this risk more seriously. Is lead a worse problem than x-rays?
In any event, I fail to understand what would be accomplished by a XRF solution for small businesses. The process of XRF testing may be inexpensive, but would be disruptive. In any event, I don’t see a connection to safety so I prefer a solution that restores sanity to our safety practices. Burning in a wasteful and disruptive process will only bog down our economy and our competitiveness. Until the CPSC can point to a risk factor relating to the little guys, one cannot rationally conclude that XRF makes this regulation better, just somewhat less worse.
In sum, the Proposed Rule is a dangerous rule with the acknowledged prospect of doing severe market damage. The CPSC knows this, having admitted it in writing in the text of the rule. There is no excuse to push forward with a defective rule on this scale. The Commission must talk honestly with Congress . . . before it’s too late.
Thank you for considering my views on this important subject.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061
Todd A. Stevenson
Director, Office of the Secretary
Room 820
U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission
4330 East West Highway
Bethesda, Maryland 20814
Agency: Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC)
Re: Docket No. CPSC–2010-0038 Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification.
Dear Mr. Stevenson:
I am hereby submitting comments in response to the Solicitation of Comments on Testing and Labeling Pertaining to Product Certification (Docket No. CPSC–2010–0038) published in the Federal Register on May 20, 2010 (the “Proposed Rule”).
The End of (Business) Life As We Know It:
As I sit down to record my comments on this rule, I take comfort in knowing that the CPSC admits what it is doing here. In a section entitled “Caveats and Possible Market Reactions to Third Party Testing Requirements”, the agency acknowledges the severe impact of its new rule on manufacturers:
a. Significantly increased costs,
b. Incentive to redesign (presumably successful) products,
c. Incentive to reduce features on products,
d. Incentive to eliminate (presumably useful) components in finished goods,
e. Incentive to reduce product lines,
f. Exit the market altogether,
g. Go out of business,
h. Create barriers to entry for future business expansion, especially in specialty markets (non-mass market),
i. Devastate niche markets (noting particularly the “special needs” educational market – sorry, blind kids!), and
j. Incentive to delay or forgo product or manufacturing process improvements (to avoid testing costs).
Quite a stimulus program! Of course, the CPSC knows we can’t meet this challenge alone. In “The Potential Effects of the Proposed Rule”, the agency advises us to hire a few helpers:
a. Lawyers to review CPSC regulations,
b. Engineers and chemists to develop product specifications, conduct tests and design a program for production testing,
c. Statisticians or consultants to determine the frequency, sample size and collection method for production testing, and
d. Technicians, “perhaps working under the supervision of an engineer, chemist or similar professional”, to perform production tests.
This certainly is a Brave New World for us. Luckily we have the CPSC to tell us what to do. Unfortunately, we can’t afford an in-house legal department or teams of engineers, chemists or statisticians. We don’t even have technicians. Incredibly, somehow we bumble on in our blissful, almost charming ignorance, having had only one recall of 130 pieces (we recovered every unit) out of perhaps 1,000,000,000 units sold in the last 26 years. No doubt all the pain the CPSC is promising us will be worth it . . . gotta keep everyone so safe.
Seriously, Is Anyone Listening?
On page 28338 of the Federal Register, the Proposed Rule reproduces the “reasonable testing program” as it stood before the December 10-11, 2009 workshop at the CPSC. The workshop (which we attended with three people who were each asked to appear as a panelist) was ostensibly for the purpose of giving “stakeholder feedback” on the so-called “15 Month Rule” (the Proposed Rule) and the component testing rule (also up for comment today, posted under separate cover). We gave detailed feedback on these rules – none positive – yet the Proposed Rule seems to have preserved the original, deeply-flawed concepts intact.
It is difficult not to conclude that the process of providing feedback to this CPSC is a sham. While Chairman Tenenbaum has long touted her “policy” of seeking feedback from all stakeholders including industry, judging from this rule, the commitment to seeking feedback does not involve maintaining an open mind. It appears that the most likely feedback to be well-received is feedback that ratifies what the agency already plans to do. Other feedback is “wrong”, I guess. I doubt you will find this letter useful.
As time ebbs on and as the drumbeat of a CPSC bent on our destruction becomes more and more clear, the incentive to waste a few days preparing detailed comments also ebbs. Nevertheless, owing to the importance of this Proposed Rule, I am hereby submitting comments. I have no reason to be optimistic that you will consider my point of view with an open mind. This rule has all the earmarks of a fait accompli.
Deeply Flawed Economic Analysis.
The Proposed Rule devotes pages and pages to a tortured analysis of its purported compliance with the Regulatory Flexibility Act (“RFA”). This section of the Proposed Rule is a virtual admission of how unworkable the rule is (and the CPSIA testing scheme in general). As a starting point, the rule states: “The objective of the rule is to reduce the risk of injury from consumer products, especially from products intended for children aged 12 years and younger.” In my recent study of CPSC recall data posted on its website, I have found exactly ONE DEATH and THREE ASSERTED INJURIES from lead or lead-in-paint from 1999-2010. Please keep this statistic in mind as I review the economics of your “injury reduction” effort.
The flaws in the RFA analysis are clear in its discussion of testing costs for toys. The analysis acknowledges that it only accounts for out-of-pocket testing costs, nothing else. Significant additional (and ignored) costs include samples destroyed or damaged in testing, transportation of samples, administrative costs for managing testing, administration costs for managing the testing data, administrative costs for managing recordkeeping, an allocation of general management time, legal expenses relating to testing and so on. Depending on the scale of the business, I estimate that these costs (and distractions) will add 15%-50% to the out-of-pocket testing costs.
The RFA analysis concludes that testing a typical toy will cost $1,262 per product. As an average, this might be a good number for our business. I would note, however, that the Proposed Rule posits that we will test multiple samples, sending in perhaps four separate samples per item to satisfy the bizarre “required high degree of assurance” standard. [The rule states clearly that testing one sample is never enough. Interestingly, we have never had the experience in the last 20 years that multiple safety tests of the same product reveals anything useful other than rapidly approaching poverty.] The rule’s four-sample regime takes the testing cost per toy up to $4,848 (by the calculation in the document) plus another $2,500 for mechanical tests (because the rule posits that we will submit FIFTY samples for mechanical tests). That brings us up to $7,348 per item, plus 54 destroyed samples. This implies a rough “all-in” cost of $10,000 per item. We have 1,500 catalog items in our product line. Without a “reasonable testing program” in place (see below), we will have to test each item annually. This is a cost of $15 million for our company EVERY YEAR. [We also sell custom items, a business that would presumably be terminated by this testing rule. That’s several jobs down the drain.]
Does it surprise you to know that $15 million in testing costs exceeds our annual profit? By far?
The RFA analysis is deeply flawed in other ways, too. The rule duly reports that “[a]ccording to a representative of a trade association, there are an estimated 50,000 to 60,000 individual toys on the market.” Oh, really? Perhaps the CPSC shouldn’t have consulted the International Hubcap Manufacturers Association for this information. A quick visit to the Amazon.com website reveals listings of 808,465 toys and games on August 3rd (http://amzn.to/djtTVX). Amazon is a customer of ours – I estimate that they list about one-third of all toys and games sold in the consumer market. Call it 2.5 million toys and games available to consumers in the U.S. But that’s not all – the category also includes specialty items not present on consumer sites. For instance, our industry, the education industry, is largely invisible on consumer sites. I estimate that about one million SKUs are available to purchase at the annual convention of the International Reading Association. Millions of other SKUs are displayed at the national math show, the national science show and the national early childhood show. Add in special needs and other sub-markets – and you get well in excess of 4-5 million toys and games. So the RFA analysis might be off by 100x in its assessment of the toy market ALONE. That’s not close. . . .
The RFA analysis goes on to conclude that the ENTIRE MARKET of products affected by the rule is 100,000–150,000 products. This includes “wearing apparel, accessories, jewelry, juvenile products, children’s furniture, etc.”, plus non-children’s products and other children’s products like ATVs, bikes, bunk beds and so on. It is hard to dignify this ridiculous data with a retort, except to note that it is absurd on its face. The apparel industry ALONE offers as many as 8,000,000 different children’s SKUs for sale. The RFA analysis is fatally flawed.
At $10,000 per SKU, the projected children’s product testing costs will easily exceed $50 billion per year. Remember the 11-year CPSC statistic on lead deaths and injuries – one death and three ASSERTED injuries? [There are no recorded injuries from phthalates or cadmium, by the way.] The 11-year compliance cost will exceed $550 billion (in 2010 dollars), expended by U.S. companies to “reduce” this risk of injury. It would cost a lot less to wrap every American child in bubble wrap.
Small Businesses CANNOT SURVIVE THIS RULE.
Assuming we are supposed to take this rule seriously, the Proposed Rule is perhaps the best friend of the mass market yet invented by an agency seemingly bent on the destruction of the small business community. This letter documents again and again the unrealistic expectations and assumptions made by the authors of this rule with respect to businesses in general and small businesses in particular. Thousands of small businesses of every stripe and color will be affected by this rule. Are you seriously thinking that they will all hire statisticians, chemists and engineers to prepare the reams of data, plans and reports the CPSC expects? Once this massive, herculean effort is completed, who will be safer anyhow? I can think of someone – mass market companies who have been handed a game-ending cost advantage on a silver platter by the CPSC. This, combined with mass market companies’ ability to create certified firewalled in-house labs, favors the big guy dramatically. No wonder the rule states again and again how prejudicial this rule is to small business. The CPSC knows what it’s doing.
Small businesses will strain to even understand what is expected of them. The rule is obtuse, long-winded and full of arcania. Small business people may not have the time or skills to master this complex rule. When the CPSC turns to its attention to enforcement (as promised for 2011) and selects a few small businesses to whip into shape, the market will take note of the pain and a mass exit will result. I realize, however, that Cassandra-like predictions haven’t influenced the CPSC in recent times. One of the Commissioners has even been quoted as saying that “anecdotes aren’t evidence”. It feels like we have to die to prove we were right. A few small businesses might just do that, if the agency waits long enough.
The Commission has asked for feedback on how to address these issues. The complexity of the CPSIA safety rules proves that they are unworkable. To repair this damage, the Commission must ask Congress to restore its ability to assess risk. I am assuming that the Commission would exercise this discretion with more common sense than is embodied in this rule. CPSC rules should be trimmed back to things that MATTER, only. Second, the agency should build its rules and its enforcement activity around DATA. Injury statistics tell the agency what is important. If a particular hazard generates ONE DEATH AND THREE ASSERTED INJURIES OVER 11 YEARS, you can safely relax your rules quite a bit (there are worse problems out there). Education might make a difference, however.
Finally, the Commission should NOT take ANY step if there is EVEN A SHRED OF DOUBT about the impact on small business. Small business is the major jobs creator in America. When you promulgate rules that choke the life out of small business or sharply reduce their incentive to invest, you are killing our economy. You have a heavy responsibility to keep this place running, even if it’s an imperfect world. While it’s sad that a child ever dies, the pain and suffering imposed on countless families from lost jobs, lost capital, lost access to needed products, and so on likely far exceeds it.
Reasonable Testing Program – Busy Work to Keep Us From Running Our Businesses.
The “Reasonable Testing Program” (“RTP”) represents a choice presented to manufacturers of children’s products under this rule. If we endure the expense and disruption of a RTP, we can cut our testing frequency (read, testing costs) in half. A very tempting prospect but the cost of a RTP seems too high, leaving us with a Hobson’s Choice. We can’t afford annual testing and we cannot afford a RTP. What should we do? What will anyone do?
Owing to the burden and complexity of RTPs, I predict EVERY REGULATED COMPANY will violate these rules. Since Ms. Tenenbaum has promised to turn to enforcement in 2011, the CPSC regulators should have a pretty easy time finding juicy targets. Every company will provide wonderful enforcement opportunities.
Although our testing program has been highly-effective over the last 26 years, our program would never meet these standards. We do not maintain the volume of paperwork that the new CPSC rule now requires. We know what we’re doing, but we have not organized our files into a how-to manual. Perhaps the agency thinks every company in the country is an ISO 9001 company. They’re not, and this kind of documentation is rare and breathtakingly expensive to prepare.
Having endured the CPSIA spectacle for two years now, I do not trust the seemingly flexible definition of necessary documentation. The pattern is that these seemingly open-ended terms (which may or may not describe our current recordkeeping) will mature into something rigid down the line. Even if they don’t, we still face the risk that we will not measure up to the expectations of the CPSC enforcement officer at the time of reckoning. The feeling that we are being set up is inescapable. As noted above, given our record of performance, the agency should have NO concerns about how we go about our business. Nonetheless, I feel certain that these rules will bite me in the future.
Sample selection under the rule should not be based on any statistical formula (per the baffling presentation of Dr. Michael Greene at the December 2009 workshop). If the overall safety results of the company are strong, the choice of samples by the company or factories should be presumed compliant without further inquiry. Random selection (taking one off the shelf . . . without the assistance of a statistician) works just fine in our experience, and there is no evidence that testing multiple samples will accomplish anything but will certainly raise costs. Better sampling won’t lower injury rates that already approach zero.
We currently do not use production testing and have zero production testing plans in place. With one recall in 26 years, I would assert this kind of testing is superfluous in our business and basically useless from a safety standpoint. It will significantly raise costs, however. The tedious exercise of preparing a pallet load of production testing plans to meet the new requirements is just plain busy work. One must ask what the CPSC was thinking when it penned this description of a production testing plan: “A production testing plan may include recurring testing or the use of process management techniques such as control charts, statistical process control programs, or failure modes and effects analysis (FMEAs) designed to control potential variations in product manufacturing that could affect the product’s ability to comply with the applicable rules, bans, standards or regulations.” Fancy words but . . . what planet are they from?
The requirement to list all the tests applicable to our items, again and again, to satisfy the RTP requirements is typical of mindless busy work asked of us. Does the CPSC think this will make ANY difference? Most businesses confirm safety tests with their testing lab partners anyhow. More bureaucracy, taken to new heights.
We don’t have any remedial plans in place either. We are quite familiar with how to appropriately resolve compliance and quality issues, and have never had a problem with regulators in the exercise of our business judgment. The requirement to prepare a detailed written plan, just in case we have another recall in the next 26 years, is pure officiousness. This is yet another waste of our time, our money, our resources and our intellect.
The recordkeeping requirements of a RTP is well beyond our ability or interest to preserve for 1500 products produced in thousands of lots over the course of a year. Taking a “Dear Diary” approach to how we source, test, move, remediate, repair, investigate and otherwise manage children’s products is completely unreasonable. This is especially ridiculous given our track record.
The Commission has asked what a RTP might cost us. I have a hard time estimating it because all the fun in our business would be gone. If we had to endure the bureaucratic nightmare this rule envisions, if anyone actually expects us to do all this to make simple plastic toys for schools, I would have to seriously consider our alternatives. So it might cost us our entire company. That’s the whole enchilada, guys.
Remember, we don’t have to make children’s products, nor do we have to stick around for the next act of this tragedy. If the CPSC persists in ruining what was once a rather safe industry with a strong track record, the cost will be the entire market for children’s products.
Is that a high enough price to give you pause? I know, I know, more anecdotes . . . .
The Requirement to Document Procedures against Undue Influence is Unreasonable.
The “Undue Influence Procedures” requirement (“UIP”) is essentially a requirement to document efforts to avoid fraud. If you’re not inclined to commit fraud, there’s little reason to set out your plan to not commit fraud. Here’s our current policy – “Don’t break the law or commit fraud”. This has worked well for us, as we have never exerted undue influence in the last 26 years and have no plans to start now.
I am really sorry that there are bad people in the world, some small number of which may have at one time attempted to exert undue influence over one or more test labs. Perhaps the CPSC should concern themselves with the bad guys and leave the rest of us alone.
Material Change Rules Place Too Much Risk on Manufacturers.
The CPSC’s rule on when to test after a “material change” is sufficiently open-ended to render the judgment on when to test fairly obvious – ALWAYS TEST. Deep within the Proposed Rule, Section 1107.10(b)(2)(ii) instructs “A material change is any change in the product’s design, manufacturing process, or sourcing of component parts that a manufacturer exercising due care knows, or should know, could affect the product’s ability to comply with the rules . . . .” “Due care” is defined as “the degree of care that a prudent and competent person engaged in the same line of business or endeavor would exercise under similar circumstances.”
In other words, the agency’s 20-20 hindsight can construct a case for testing for a material change for just about anything that “might” or “could” affect results or that a hypothetical “prudent person” might think of investigating. Of course, this issue only comes up in the context of an injury or a recall, so what are the odds that any judgment to NOT test would withstand inquiry by an angry CPSC? Zilch. So either you always test or you take a big risk. This is completely unfair and unreasonable.
Testing Frequency Must Be Left to the Manufacturer and to the Market.
A rule requiring manufacturers to test according to these standards every year is going to kill us and many other businesses. No one can afford the testing scheme outlined above, we least of all. If we must test according to these standards, we will be out of business quickly. It is equally unrealistic to imagine that testing cost savings from maintaining a RTP will hold much appeal since that project is so wasteful and gargantuan. Of course, a firewalled in-house lab would be nice for all of us small businesses, but that’s unrealistic, too (not to mention undesirable). We have no realistic way to moderate these costs. Please see my other August 3 comment letter for an explanation of why I believe component and composite testing will likewise provide no relief.
Testing is supposed to assure product quality and compliance. If we have a good, long term record of safety, why can’t we just carry on as we have, and deal with issues as they arise? That worked for 26 years. The new way is just unaffordable.
The “High Degree of Assurance” Standard is Unreasonable and Not Derived from the CPSIA.
The rule seems to conclude that a “high degree of assurance” is a necessary element of any “reasonable testing program”. The importance of the “reasonable testing program” which was incorporated into the CPSIA as an alternative to third party testing for non-children’s products, has been imputed to the children’s product area as a way to reduce testing frequency, and with it, the “high degree of assurance” standard (“HDA”) was likewise imputed. Thus, sliding down this slippery slope, the HDA standard has become part and parcel of the “15 Month Rule”. Abracadabra.
The Commission has requested feedback on the meaning of the definition of HDA in Section 1107.2. Happily, the agency has rejected a strict statistical interpretation requiring “95% probability” of compliance. What should the definition be interpreted to mean? The “high degree of assurance” should be based on an overall assessment of the safety record of the company. It should NOT be based on the results of an individual product, even if recalled or deemed dangerous. In our case, we have done business for 26 years, had one recall of 130 pieces of out of about 1,000,000,000 pieces sold. All of these units were recovered. Thus, we believe there is zero probability that a recalled product is in the market. Our historical recall rate is approximately 130/1,000,000,000 or 0.00001% over a 26-year period.
With this record over so many years, our company should be deemed to have satisfied this HDA requirement and be endorsed as having a reasonable testing program without further inquiry. And if we DON’T deserve the HDA designation, then the CPSC should articulate what level of safety achievement would earn the designation.
Notably, the entire children’s product industry also meets this requirement. Of the 899 recalls of children’s products from 1999-2010, only one death and three asserted injuries from lead were recorded by the CPSC. Thus, the probability of being injured from lead by a children’s product is nearly zero, given that literally billions of children’s products are sold every year. [The apparel and footwear industry claims annual sales of about 4 billion units ALONE.] Industry recall rates are likewise well under 1% per annum. With injury statistics and recall rates in hand, the CPSC should GREATLY loosen the strictures of the “high degree of assurance” standard to focus its resources on activities that might actually injure someone.
One-to-One Product Testing Will Punish the Smallest Companies.
The prophylactic approach to testing adopted by the CPSC will inevitably put many small or micro businesses into bankruptcy, or drive them into unregulated markets to avoid the CPSIA’s wasteful bureaucratic costs. If the law does not permit the agency to adopt sensible rules that allow businesses to manage their compliance risk as best they can (where the standards remain in place, but the government stops trying to tell businesses HOW to comply), then the Commission must finally tell Mr. Waxman what he doesn’t want to hear – that his law is broken and can’t be fixed. [Notably, these mini businesses most at risk have an exemplary record of safety and very low recall rates. NOTHING is gained by rules that crush the little guy.]
We in the small business community have suffered for two solid years while regulators have sought any possible way to avoid delivering this “unpleasant” message. I get the impression that the demise of our businesses would not be too great a cost for the agency to incur to avoid telling Congress what it doesn’t want to hear. If the Commission is genuinely interested in a fix, it must take action with Congress. I do not believe the agency can devise sensible regulations to fix this problem short of a legislative change.
Ban on Retesting Will Unnecessarily Create Crises at Small Businesses.
In our experience, test labs are neither infallible nor definitive in their understanding of U.S. safety laws and regulations. It is not unusual to experience failed test reports for reasons besides safety problems. In addition, children’s products are not so pure and perfect in their composition that every test produces the same result. The CPSC itself instructed manufacturers to audit their test labs in the ironically-dated April 1, 2010 version of the Proposed Rule in response to industry complaints that test results varied from test lab to test lab. By forbidding retesting, the Proposed Rule removes discretion and appropriate problem resolution techniques from a commonplace quality event. You don’t need to manage a very large portfolio of products before the probability of an ordinary course testing problem rises exponentially. This is a matter of mathematics. If retesting is banned, the CPSC is legislating a crisis of the week.
Again, CPSC injury data informs us that the nature of the problem is extremely modest. Historical injury rates are VERY low. This retesting rule is completely unnecessary and penal to all companies except perhaps mass market companies with greater resources. Small businesses won’t have teams of engineers or statisticians around to save the day. Many small businesses will naively call the CPSC for “help”, only to find out that they have created a worse crisis. Some small businesses may miss this point in the Proposed Rule and continue to retest, only to be punished later when the CPSC finds evidence of retesting at the time of a recall. Is this really how you want to regulate?
I would note that the justification for all this is bad acts: “[Retesting] may tempt unscrupulous parties to attempt to ‘test the product into compliance’. . . .” To my knowledge, this behavior has little precedence and even so, it is an abuse that can be dealt with other ways. If honorable and law-abiding companies use retesting to resolve honest problems, no harm is being done. Punishing good guys because you are afraid that otherwise bad guys might benefit is excessive and inappropriately harsh.
The 10,000 Piece Limit for One-Time Testing is Arbitrary and Unfair.
The CPSC has failed to persuade that the 10,000 limit is an appropriate break point for testing. First of all, the limit is cumulative, not related to sales in a period or per annum. Second, the threshold bears no relationship to risk of injury. In other words, it’s completely arbitrary. Why 10,000? Why not? In my view, that’s not enough to justify this rule. Many of the micro businesses that might benefit from this rule have NEVER had a recall. These are the people this rule will restrict. And the logic of this is . . . what, exactly?
Even more remarkable is the rule’s insistence that these low volume items be tested annually after passing the 10,000 piece threshold. Small companies will never have a RTP so annual testing (or more frequently, if for instance the item is hand-assembled) will be mandated. Consider a product selling 2,000 piece per year. Under these rules, the incentive to drop it once it crosses the 10,000 threshold will be powerful. This reminds me of the incentive on small businesses to not hire a 26th employee to avoid an onslaught of Obamacare obligations. A tacit cap on sales will be imposed by this rule. Nice!
The solution to this problem is to require one-time testing before sale, and thereafter according to the business judgment of the manufacturer. Remember, the retailers that buy from the manufacturer will also have something to say about testing frequency, too. Not all solutions are better if imposed by the government.
Alternative Testing Technologies.
The ability to test at low cost with XRF is attractive. For our business, it is tempting to use an XRF gun but for two reasons: (a) cost, and (b) health risk. XRF guns cost $30,000 each and have high annual maintenance costs (several thousand dollars a year). We might need several guns to manage our inventory volumes, a very costly prospect. XRF guns are portable x-ray machines. Notwithstanding the assurance of XRF gun manufacturers, I am quite reluctant to place an x-ray machine in the hands of a warehouse worker in our facility. This is an invitation to disaster. We likewise have no interest in hiring a highly-paid technician to wield the gun, or technicians to wield the guns. In any event, we cannot expose our employees to a possible risk of x-ray genetic damage. I am surprised that the CPSC doesn’t take this risk more seriously. Is lead a worse problem than x-rays?
In any event, I fail to understand what would be accomplished by a XRF solution for small businesses. The process of XRF testing may be inexpensive, but would be disruptive. In any event, I don’t see a connection to safety so I prefer a solution that restores sanity to our safety practices. Burning in a wasteful and disruptive process will only bog down our economy and our competitiveness. Until the CPSC can point to a risk factor relating to the little guys, one cannot rationally conclude that XRF makes this regulation better, just somewhat less worse.
In sum, the Proposed Rule is a dangerous rule with the acknowledged prospect of doing severe market damage. The CPSC knows this, having admitted it in writing in the text of the rule. There is no excuse to push forward with a defective rule on this scale. The Commission must talk honestly with Congress . . . before it’s too late.
Thank you for considering my views on this important subject.
Sincerely,
Richard Woldenberg
Chairman
Learning Resources, Inc.
380 North Fairway Drive
Vernon Hills, IL 60061
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